Europe and the Migration Crisis: the Response of the EU Member States

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and Aaron T. Walter

EUROPE
AND THE MIGRATION CRISIS:

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CONTENT

PART II

Introduction: Time of Choosing

The European continent not for the first nor the last time is experiencing movement of people seeking refuge. Issues such as poverty, instability in home countries, natural disasters and in particular violent conflicts within the EU's vicinity have driven people to seek safety and to realise their full potential in Europe. Migration has always been and remain part of the world. Likewise, the immigration debate will never be an easy one, but it can become less tendentious and more deliberative if its participants consider the facts.

More than a million people reached Europe in 2015. The primary driver remains a better economic situation, but concerns over physical security and persecution have been the catalyst for the long, expensive and dangerous journey to Europe. The extreme violence and chaos in Syria and terrible conditions in parts of equatorial Africa has made the eastern Mediterranean a hot zone for migration.

Migration is a prominent part of the post-2015 agenda for Europe where policy intervention, if managed in a responsible way can protect the rights of migrants, draw the economic, social, and human benefits of migration while suppressing negative, reactive domestic elements of popular sovereignty.

This is vital as it is evident that the migration crisis exposed and in some cases exacerbated a number of already existing challenges in the European Union and amongst national European policies. Therefore, as the sub-heading of this introduction asserts it is a time of choosing. Rather than focus solely on 'exceptional' and immediate issues raised by the recent refugee crisis, the discussion must also address medium and longer-term trends and issues relevant to migration policy at large. With this understanding the modest scope of this book is thus explained.

The following monograph is divided into two parts. The first part is an exploration of the theoretical and practical challenges within the study of migration in Europe. The authors within this first part discuss specific themes such as the theory of migration, the push and pull factors of the new wave migration, protection of EU borders, the development of EU migration and asylum policy, the security dimension of migration, and how the migration crisis has affected the future of the European Union as a political and economic bloc; while the first part concludes with an exploration of migration within European society whether as integration, assimilation or multicultural.

More specifically, part one of this monograph contains chapters with specific themes. Chapter One, explores theories of population migration. This includes gravitational models of migration. Contemporary migration, belonging to the post-industrial period where migration became the object of study of several social sciences. Despite the fact that migration has existed since the beginning of humanity, the phenomenon of theorization began with the formation and development of industrial society, and the economic market.

Relations that triggered social mobility. Recent decades have seen contemporary theories that are enjoying high popularity and elaborate on migration policies classified based on the approach to the phenomenon of migration in economic, sociological, political, and demographic theories.

Chapter Two explores the economic, social and political hardships that are the push factors, while comparative advantages within more wealthy nations are the pull factor. Moreover, the chapter discusses migration with recent focus on migrants from the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean region, Sub-Saharan Africa and since 2013 has included Syria and Iraq.

Chapter Three examines the 2015 immigration crisis under the assumption that it was an asymmetrical issue. The argument put forth is that no cost-effective and humanly sensitive border management system can manage the scenario of unprecedented numbers of refugees that produced chaos, improvisation and ad-hoc decision making that produced border management causing new challenges and security threats for national systems of governance.

Chapter Four discusses migration policy as a totality; a system of ideas and measures taken at the level of state institutions with the help of the state

and public institutes, through adhering to specific principles, and aims to reach certain goals. The chapter explains how Migration policy includes the concept (an argumentation of goals and objectives in the field of migration), migration programs and activity of government bodies in management of migration processes that is vital for the supranational state community that is the European Union. As such, EU migration policy, asylum, the evolution and specifics of EU migration policy with the main institutes of migration management, and the main documents in the field of EU migration and asylum policy are highlighted.

Chapter Five explores the present migration crisis. How the 2010's have been characterized by mass refugee, migrant flows into Europe. A phenomenon with its peak in the middle of the second decade, especially during 2014-2016, how member-states have faced this modern migration crisis of unprecedented proportions and its consequences for the European Union on the topic of migration policy.

Chapter Six discusses the challenge of migration as the security threat. Specifically, the deteriorating security environment as one of the key push factors of migration. While, for centuries people have migrated to escape wars and avoid conflict, persecution and physical confrontation migration itself is linked to various security threats and may serve as a vehicle for new security threats and challenges mostly associated with organized crime, terrorism, ethnic violence, excluded communities, racism, and spread of poverty. More to the point, the chapter discusses migration as a security threat and its implications for the EU societies, especially in relation to criminality, terrorism and political radicalization.

Chapter Seven is an overview on integration, assimilation, and multicultural aspects of migration. Specifically, how the arrival of immigrants throughout history has led to some form of multiculturality, from the spread of food, fashion, and sport. In brief, integration policy is part of migration policy. And despite its criticism, multiculturality or multiculturalism is a ideology and policy of respecting of cultural, ethnic, lingual or religious differences that long has been practiced in the European Union.

In today's conditions, the conditions of globalism, when migration processes have become an integral characteristic of the contemporary world, migration policy is an important and topical part of any state's social

policy. The crisis within the EU only confirms this. The authors have made every effort in these following chapters of part one to discuss this.

The second part of this book is region specific. The authors have endeavored to examine the responses by European member states since 2015 to the migration crisis. Therefore, the Western responses of by Germany, France, Benelux, United Kingdom, and Ireland; the southern European responses from Italy, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Malta, Cyprus, and Croatia, to the Central and Eastern European Response by Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Austria, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania; the Northern Responses of Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. Also included in the second part are the European Eastern Partnership countries and those in the visa-free regime with the EU, specifically Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine.

Chapter Eight offers the reader the response from the Western part of the EU. The selection of the countries is partially arbitrary, but focuses on the position of several states which have played a key role during 2015. Especially the case of Germany which played central role in the crisis and attempts to solve the issue. France and the United Kingdom can not neglected in this exploration as they are strong actors, along with the Benelux countries. These Western European nations all are offering strong influence on EU policies since all have, historically, national experiences with migration. Ireland, as the "island behind island" must not be forgotten in this bloc as it too has offered much to the bloc.

Chapter Nine explores the positions of Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Malta, Cyprus and Croatia. Despite the fact that these EU members have different length of EU membership they share the geographic location of direct access into the Mediterranean Sea and as such are transit countries on the Southern "Mediterranean" way or Balkan Way into Europe. Spain and Portugal as former colonial powers have some experience with migration from the New World, and Africa via Gibraltar or various islands in the Mediterranean sea and Atlantic i.e. the Canary Islands. Similarly important is Italy as a significant gateway to Europe, while the two island states of Malta and Cyprus have served for centuries as the crossroad between continents. While, migrants often pass Croatia, viewed mainly as a transit country; Greece is the connection between Europe and Small Asia and the beginning of the Balkan route.

Chapter Ten investigates the response of Central and Eastern European part of the European Union. As stated in the other opening sections of this part; the selection of the countries is partially arbitrary. The chapter focuses on the position of several states that played a role during the 2015 migration crisis. This is especially true for Hungary and Austria playing central roles in the crisis and attempts by Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia to solve the issue. Neglected, but no less important are Bulgaria and Romania, who as EU actors can influence policies because of their geographic location. It is important to note that in this bloc there are countries with significant immigration experience: Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania as former Warsaw bloc nations underwent their own migration in the 1990s following the 1989 Revolutions. and return to democratic rule. This is highlighted in 2004 and 2007 as they joined the E.U. Therefore, each has historic experience with economic migration and can play an important part in navigating migration policy of the EU at an institutional level.

Chapter Eleven examines the response of the Northern part of the EU. Similarly, to other chapters in this part of the part of the book the selection of the countries is partially arbitrary. The chapter focus on the position of several states which played a key role during 2015 crisis. This is especially the case of Sweden which plays a central role in the crisis. Not neglected has been the role of the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, which are strong EU actors and the role of Denmark and Finland, each with strong influence on European policies and national experiences with migration. Moreover, in this bloc are countries with valuable immigration experience, i.e. Denmark, Sweden, and Finland since the 1970s experienced steady migration of foreigners, while since the 1990s, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania have experienced the trend of inter-European integration.

Chapter Twelve investigates the political-practical dimension of the European Union's relationship with a number of post-soviet states (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) in the context of Eastern Partnership policy. More specifically, the chapter explores the visa-free regime as a complex two-way process that includes in itself both the free, visa-less entry into the country or residence, and the free, visa-less entry into the destination country. The liberalization of the visa regime with the European Union by Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia are discussed in detail.

From the research perspective there is a principal research question. What was the response of the EU member state on the migration crisis of 2015 and 2016? This research question is important as national perspectives often results in limited understanding of the crisis. Is it really that "Western" countries try to do as much as possible and Central and Eastern European countries are passive laggards and loud critics? The second part of this monograph provides certain corrections.

Similarly important is first part of the book providing general background. The immigration crisis of 2015 hit the EU and its member states in the process of building up common migration and asylum rules. Many measures were built in the early 1990s and slowly developed under the umbrella of Justice and Home Affairs. Therefore, could the EU be better prepared for the crisis? To answer this question it is necessary to have a complex understanding of several related issues. First, a theoretical chapter provides several narratives on how to look at migration. Migration is related with push and pulls factors which help us in the understanding the causes of migration. There is also an issue of border protection, migration policy and asylum rules. Migration is also related with crime. All these forms an environment in which migration takes place and needs to be revealed for deeper understanding.

From the methodological perspective the monograph might be considered as an exploratory case study dealing with migration crisis of 2015 and 2016 as it explores in its complexity political environment in which the migration crisis emerged. It also explores attitudes of individual EU member states. For this reason, the second part may be understood as an case-study umbrella consisting of 28 mini-case studies providing information on how individual member states reacted.

To the reader, the authors hope that the information and research presented within this book is of exploratory and intrinsic value. Moreover it is the wish of the authors that these chapters provide a valuable contribution to the evolving discussion within Europe on the topic of migration and the migration crisis in particular. For these reasons book will be hopefully enjoyed by migration experts and academia in general, civil servants or even broader public with special interest in the topic of migration.

Trnava, 2018

PART I

1

MIGRATION
IN THEORIES

The goal of this chapter is to shed light on the main theories of population migration. In accordance to this, the following chapter structure is proposed: the first section characterizes the input of the German-English researcher E. G. Ravenstein in the development of migration theory; the main laws of migration established by him are being uncovered. The second section is dedicated to the analysis of Traditional economic theories of migration, such as mercantilism, the classic economic school, Marxism, the Neoclassic economy, the theory of human capital, and Keynesian theory. In the third compartment, an analysis is given of Modern economic theories of migration, such as the new economy of migration, the theory of a segmented (dual) labour market, Cumulative causality, dependency theory, the global system theory. The fourth compartment is dedicated to reviewing of Social theories of migration. In the framework of sociological, institutional, demographic, political, and systemic approaches, reviewed are theories such as the theory of migrant networks, theory of social capital, and others. The multiplicity of approaches and theories alludes to a permanent scientific interest, the development of migration theory. At the end of the chapter, the literature on the topic in question is provided.

Despite the fact that migration exists from the beginning of humanity, theorization began with the formation and development of industrial society, and the economic market relations that triggered the intensification of social mobility, including territorial mobility.

The first theoretical constructs based on researching the migration phenomenon appeared by the end of the 19th century. For example, during this period, Ernst Georg Ravenstein formulated the first "laws of migration" (Ravenstein 1889: 241-305) and are tied to the massive wave of migration that happened at the end of the 19th – beginning of 20th century. In that same context, we can also mention the *gravitational* and the *push-pull* models of migration that originated during the period.

The gravitational models of migration as a logical continuation of the "laws" formulated by E. G. Ravenstein, appreciate the amplitude of migration in accordance with the distance between the two countries – the country of origin and of destination – as well as in accordance with the number of the said countries' populations. At the same time, the gravitational models cannot be considered a theory in themselves, but rather "a collection of empirical regularities" (Massey et al. 1998) that emerges from E. G. Ravenstein's laws of migration which is as follows (Ravenstein 1885: 167-227; 1889: 241-305):

1. The majority of migrants travel short distances;
2. The bigger the territorial center, the more attractive it is from an immigration point of view;
3. For each migration flux there is a migration counter-flux (a flux of counter-migration) that compensates it;
4. The development of big urban centers is due to population migration and not natural population growth;
5. The volume of migration increases as the industry, commerce, and transportation develop;
6. The economic factors are decisive in migration;
7. Migration is taking place gradually, step by step;
8. Urban population is less active from a migration point of view than rural population;
9. Women more frequently migrate within a country's borders, whereas men migrate without;
10. The majority of migrants are adults and unmarried; families are less tempted to migrate;
11. The majority of migrants from rural localities head for big industrial and commercial centers.

PART I: Migration in theories

The push – pull models, although appearing in the same period, saw development almost an entire century later (Lee 1966: 47-57) and viewed migration as a factor of equilibrium between the special determinants. Currently, the two categories of the *push – pull* factors are used in specialized literature to designate any kind of influence that gives impulse to migration, be it towards the destination-country (pull) or within the origin-country (push).

Even though the theorization of migration began at the end of the 19th century, the majority of migration theories actually appeared in the second half of the 20th century, being determined by increasing amplitude and complexity. Contemporary migration, belonging to the *post-industrial* period (the period that began after WWII), differs from the migration which followed WWI (Toffler 1980). It is for this reason that during the period migration becomes the object of study of several social sciences and humanities, such as economy, sociology, demographics, political science, etc. In general, some authors maintain that previous elaborations, when compared to the contemporary ones, have rather historical value (Arango 2000: 283-296; Modială 2009). For example, J. Arango affirms that: "*The construction of theories in this domain is practically an issue of the 20th century, of its last third in particular. The most contributions predating the 1960's only hold historical interest, with the exception of a number of contributions to the dictionary of migration, and the special significance of a few remarkable precursors.*" (Constantinescu 2002: 93-114).

In the same context, Portes wrote back in 1997 that migration is a phenomenon that is too complex to be encompassed by a single theory (Vlăsceanu 2010: 804). A theory of this sort would become, in the conditions in which it will attempt to incorporate all the domains of migration, much too general and abstract to be able to adequately serve its purpose. Therefore, in the present, theories that treat the migration phenomenon from a specialized (economic, sociologic, demographic, political, etc.) or interdisciplinary point of view are gaining more and more popularity.

In the present, among the contemporary theories that are enjoying the highest popularity and are holding an imposing weight in the elaboration of migration policies, the following can be mentioned: neoclassical economy; the new economy of migration; segmented (dual) labor market; structural-historical tradition and the global system; approaches from the point of view

of migrant networks; systemic approach; cumulative causation; theories of assimilation, adaptation, and integration of migrants; etc. These theories of migration can be classified based on the approach to the phenomenon of migration in economic, sociological, political, demographic, etc. theories.

1.1 Traditional economic theories of migration

The economic theories of migration are the most diverse, due to the migration phenomenon being treated as one of the principle factors of development. Migration, especially labor migration, has been in sight of almost all economic doctrines, since the foundation of economics as a science.

Thus, *mercantilism* (17th century) that appeared in the backdrop of the creation and expansion of a global economic system saw in migration a process of seeking out workplaces. According to the mercantilists (Th. Mun, J. B. Colbert), an efficient economic activity that would lead to the enrichment of the state requires a cheap workforce.

The increase in the number of the population will contribute to both the development of the industry and the prosperity of commerce, and to the increase of the political and military might of the state. In this context, emigration decreases economic growth in an obvious way, whereas immigration, on the contrary, contributes to economic development. The issue of population growth has been conceived as one of the primary objects of state policy. It is in this regard that emigration towards colonies has been strictly controlled, whereas commerce of slaves between African and American colonies with the European metropolis, who were struggling with territorial expansion and the reduction of population, was encouraged. Priority was given to attraction of cheap foreign workforce, and emigration of a country's own citizens was restricted (Rusu 2003). Mercantilist ideas, in particular those of attraction of cheap workforce, can be found in other economic theories of migration as well, including the contemporary ones.

Table 1: The Economic theories of migration

The theory	The theory's foundation	Representatives	The main idea
Mercantilism	17th century	Th. Mun, J. B. Colbert	Migration – the process that influences economic development
The classical school	18th century	A. Smith, T. R. Malthus, J. S. Mill	Migration – a benefic process that leads to the expansion of markets
Marxism	19th century	K. Marx	Migration – the process that reduces the risk of overproduction crises
Theory of cumulative causality	1957	G. Myrdal, D. Massey	Migration – the process that self-renews itself through the mechanisms that it gives birth to
Neoclassical theory	1960	O. Stark, M. P. Todaro, J. R. Harris	Migration – the decision of a rational individual who is capable of evaluating the prospects while viewing the effects of migration on the increase of income
Theory of human capital	1964	G. Becker, Th. Shults, L. A. Sjaastad	Migration – the process of investment into the migrants' human capital
New Economic Order	1972	W. R. Bohning, G. Bhagwati	Migration – a process that requires a compensation of the countries-donors of workforce

Global system theory	1974	I. Wallerstein, S. Sassen, E. M. Petras	Migration – a mechanism of regulation of the global supply and demand of workforce
Theory of a dual labor market	1979	L. Basch, M. J. Piore	Migration – the effect of demand of workforce in the secondary sectors of developed countries
Prosperity theory	1980	J. L. Simon	Migration (immigration) – a positive factor of socio-economic and demographic development
Social capital theory	1987	D. Massey, L. P. Goldring, J. Durand	Migration – a mechanism of formation of social capital
New economic theory of migration	1989	E. Taylor, O. Stark, P. Arnold, D. Massey	Migration – a family strategy directed towards the minimization of risks of income decrease through their diversification

Source: Branascu N. Migraţia internaţională a forţei de muncă: tendinţe şi efecte social-economice. Teza de doctor, Chişinău, ASEM, 2014.

The classic economic school, represented by A. Smith, examined migration through the prism of interdependence between the export of capital and of workforce, accentuating the role of the labor market in the functioning of an economy. The classics of political economy would propose a lifting of barriers between states in reference to circulation of goods, of capital, and of population. For example, J. S. Mill considered emigration to colonies to be benefic because it contributed to the expansion of the market for national produce, alleviating the negative impact of overproduction crisis (Mill 1994).

Marxism, based on *the capitalist law of population* formulated by K. Marx[1], considered migration one of the essential characteristics of

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[1] According to the capitalist law of population, capitalistic development of an economy would

PART I: Migration in theories

mobility and development of a population. According to Marxism, the basic factor of economic and social development is mass industrial production that conditions the increase of mobility of the workforce (change of occupation, of profession, of place of employment, of place of residence). Population mobility, including territorial mobility, is determined for the most part, but the circulation of capital from one branch to the other, from one region to another, from one country to the other. As a result, the migration of population represents an important factor of industrial development.

Neoclassical economy represents one of the major theoretical constructs in the domain of international migration. Emerging at the end of the 19th century, the theory shows the role of economic factors in explaining the phenomenon of migration, as well as the decision to migrate. Utilized originally to explain internal mobility, neoclassic economy has become one of the major theoretical constructs in the domain of migration during the 60's-70's period of the 20th century from the perspective of international migration, placing a major emphasis on the role of economic factors in explaining the intensification of migration fluxes (on a macro level) and of the decision to migrate (on a micro level).

Contemporary adherents of this theory (O. Stark, M. P. Todaro, J. R. Harris), affirm that migration begins as a result of unbalance in the supply and demand of labor between diverse geographic areas, expressed through a difference in the level of incomes or salaries. In the areas poor in capital and rich in workforce, the salary is on a lower level when compared to the countries where the situation is the opposite (an abundance of capital and a deficit of workforce). The surplus from the two markets (workforce in one case, and capital in the other) will shift towards areas of maximization of economic profit. By this logic, the workforce will move to the country that is rich in capital and poor in workforce, whereas the flux of capital will move away from the said country. This flux will bring with itself the mobility of highly-qualified specialists. Thus, the fluxes of migration are becoming a mechanism of equilibrium at a global level of internal market deficiencies, and will lead to the establishment of salary levels that will be lower than

determine the transformation of a part of the active population into a relative super-population – the unemployment that appears in the wake of the availability of human resources from labor activity. The said surplus is determined by the replacement of the workers by machines and equipment, as result, it represents a consequence of the technological progress. Thus, the capitalist mode of production is providing itself with a process of production with a "reservist army" of human resources.

in the period predating the intensification of migration into the developed country, and accordingly, to the increase of salaries in the poor country. In this way, migration leads to the reduction of economic differences between the country of origin and the country of destination.

The **theory of human capital** can be seen as a logical continuation of the neoclassical approach to migration. Emerging in the second half of the 20th century with the scientific contributions of the Nobel Prize winners Th. Schultz and G. Becker, the theory of human capital represents a microeconomic approach to all the forms of manifestation of internal and external migration as of an investment into human capital. According to this theory, migration is explained through each individual's tendency to increase their capabilities of obtaining income throughout their active lifetime, in other words, to develop their own human capital. In this context, the decision to migrate taken by an individual, as a factor of growth of the stock of human capital, represents the result of a process of rational and comparative analysis of the costs and benefits of migration. The "rational individual" evaluates the incomes of international migration (monetary incomes, moral, social, etc.), and compares them to the ones they could obtain if they don't migrate, taking into consideration the trip prices. The act of migration will take place if the result of this evaluation will be positive. Because migration will generate an income only after a certain period of time, migration can be considered a form of investment into human capital. At the same time, alongside the monetary incomes, migration can lead to obtaining new professional, linguistic, etc. skills, which also relates to the domain of investment into human capital.

The ***Keynesian theory*** too emphasizes the importance of workforce migration seeing it as an important factor of functionality of the global labor market. The principle aspects of the Keynesian theory that deal with the phenomenon of migration deny the fact that the economy is able to automatically regulate itself, and exclude unemployment as one of the factors that generate migration, explaining this y the imperfect mobility of the workforce.

1.2 Modern economic theories of migration

At the end of the 20th century, the **new economy of migration** is becoming more and more widespread. Originating from neoclassical economy and

surpassing a number of its limitations in explaining the contemporary manifestations of the migration phenomenon, the new economy of **migration** seems to be one of the approaches that are "*the most specific to contemporary migration*" (Arango 2000). The expansion of the number of variables that influence labor migration, the emphasis of the role played by the family or the community in the formation of migration behavior, and the identification of certain new connections between migration (as a phenomenon tied to the labor market) and the phenomena associated with other markets (distinct from the labor market) are the distinctive base features of the new economy of migration. The new economy of migration is tied to the name of Oded Stark, who as the theory's main promoter, brings a number of major modifications to the approach of neoclassical economy. As part of the new perspective, the decision to migrate belongs to the family/ household, and the individual's departs is part of a strategy aimed at minimizing the risks tied to income sources. Obtaining money from a migrant member, the family/ household diversifies its own sources of income (Stark and Lucas 1988: 465-481; Vlăsceanu 2010: 807). Migration is tied to the imperfect functioning of institutions that, in the developed countries, minimize the risks concerning a household's incomes (private insurance, the credit market, or the government social programs). According to the new economy of migration, the household's risks are decreased by the continual flux of money obtained through the transfers of one of the family-members who are working abroad (Massey 1999a: 36).

In the new economy of migration, a household's incomes are not considered only in absolute terms (as they are in the neoclassic variant), but rather, are reported to the level of the community of origin (Stark and Taylor 1989: 11). The level of a household's incomes within a community can in itself act as a stimulus for migration. The more a household is approaching the lower margin of distribution of income, the stronger the migration effect determines the amplification of *relative frustration* (Stark and Taylor 1989: 11; Vlăsceanu 2010: 807).

At the end of the 1970's, the ***theory of a segmented (dual) labor market*** offered a new answer to the "Why do people migrate?" question from a structural perspective, centered exclusively on factors from the countries of destination. The best-known representative of this current, M. J. Piore, argues that international migration appears as result of an increasing

demand for labor in the developed economies (Piore 1994: 23-33; Vlăsceanu 2010: 807). The essential element of this theory consists in the existence of a dual labor market in the destination country that includes a primary sector, with stable workplaces, favorable working conditions, generous social benefits, and a prospective professional career, and a secondary sector with unqualified and unstable workplaces, difficult of hazardous working conditions, and meager possibilities for professional development (Piore 2001: 435; Vlăsceanu 2010: 807). Native workers avoid employment in the secondary sector due to the decreased status and prestige of the associated jobs, whereas attracting them into this sector through increased salaries is not a viable solution for the employers. The result would be a general increase of salaries that would lead to inflation. If previously, the demand for labor in the secondary sector was being satisfied by the attraction of the female workforce, of adolescents, and of the rural population, then the current social and demographic changes have substantially reduced the recruitment potential of these categories for the underpaid, unqualified, and unstable jobs.

The modifications tied to the position of women in developed societies, the changes that intervened in the process of education, the decrease of fertility, accented urbanization – are all factors that diminished the sources of alimentation of the secondary segment of the labor market. In this context, immigrants are becoming the potential workforce that could successfully fill in the reduction of internal supply for the secondary sector, without causing the negative consequences of inflation. There are several reasons why the 3D[1] services would be acceptable to the migrant worker. However small the salaries in the destination country, they still surpass those from the origin country.

At the beginning of the 1980's, the difficulty of identifying the two segments raised serious questions for the dual labor market theory. The development of ethnic communities of immigrants, and the studies dedicated to them, completed the theory with the identification of *a third labor market segment* that is manifested through the firms established by the immigrants (Portes and Wilson 1980: 285). The peculiarity of this enclave lies in the combination of characteristics that are specific of both the primary and secondary sectors, "*by creating new mobility opportunities*

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[1] 3D comes from dirty, dangerous, difficult; what characterize secondary jobs.

for the immigrants" and allowing "*the use of their previous investment into human capital*" (Portes and Wilson 1980: 315). Even though there is proof of the development of enclaves of several migrant communities (Cuban, Japanese, Korean, etc. in the USA), it is difficult to identify the extent to which the appearance of an enclave could be postulated in the case of any flux. According to studies up to this day, at least two conditions are necessary for the development of a migrant community into an enclave: "*the presence of immigrants with sufficient capital and entrepreneurial capabilities*" and "*the renovation of the enclave's workforce through sustained immigration*".

Cumulative causation is a theory that interprets migration as a cumulative process. At the origin of this theory are the works of G. Myrdal on the issue of dynamic/ cumulative causality, an idea taken and applied to the phenomenon of international migration by D. Massey (Massey et all. 1998: 814). It's about the development and integration of elements that given in particular by the theories of *migrant networks* and of *social capital*. The theory offers a return to the "Why do people migrate?" question. In itself, *"cumulative causality"* maintains that "*every act of migration is detrimental to the existing social context in which future decisions of migration are a lot more probable*" (Massey et all. 1998: 813). There are factors that act on different levels that are at the base of the cumulative character of international migration. Here, it is spoken in particular of the mode in which a series of elements, such as: the distribution of household incomes on a community level; the distribution of land and the way in which it is utilized in regard to the proprietor's status; migration culture; regional distribution of human capital; social labeling of labor in the destination country – and to which migrant networks and migrant institutions are added – change under the influence of migration, and induce ulterior migration departures. The heterogeneous character of cumulative causality, as a theoretical approach, is becoming explicit after the mention of mechanisms of migration self-support. The theory's merit consists in the attempt to incorporate all these elements into a single construct, based on the principle of complementation.

Another theory that has connections to the migration phenomenon is the **dependency theory**. The theory of dependency, as *a theory of development* from the 1960's and 70's, sees in the contemporary development of capitalism the installation of a global economic order in which the industrialized countries represent a center that develops asymmetrical relations of

dependence with the less developed countries. The theory of dependency would have not been a theory of migration had it not had tangents to the *brain-drain* phenomenon. In this context, migration is seen as just one of the mechanisms that contribute to the consolidation of capitalist order.

In the 1970-80's, another theory developed the idea of a global order, enunciated in the framework of the theory of dependency, is **the global system theory**. The founders of this theory (S. Sassen, E. M. Petras, I. Wallerstein) consider that the current global system is based on strong historical traditions, and as result, migration is usually taking place between the former colonies and metropolis. The base idea is that of domination of the countries located in the developed center of the capitalist world, that are attempting to consolidate their prospects of development through the penetration into the less developed countries in search of raw materials, cheap workforce, and new markets (Portes 1979: 425-437; Vlăsceanu 2010: 811). According to the theory, the main effect of migration is the appearance of a new category of individuals that migration in search of a better life towards urban localities or towards industrialized countries. The factors that lead to the appearance of this category of people are multiple, among which, the principal factor – technological progress – that leads to the modernizing of agriculture, which results in the reduction of the necessary workforce and creates a surplus in the rural area. On the other hand, industrial development leads to the increase of the necessary workforce, resulting in the the increase of probable migration.

1.3 Social theories of migration

The economic theories of migration are completed by more theories that interpret the migration phenomenon from a sociological, demographic, cultural, or political point of view. Thus, the **sociological approach** to migration researches migration, in particular, from the point of view of migrant adaptation to the new socio-cultural or ethnic environments. Within this approach, a particular interest represents the **theory of migration networks.**

The theory of migrant networks represents one of the most current theories of contemporary migration. The increase towards migrant networks had begun to manifest back in the 1960's and 70's, as part of the analysis of

the effects of rural-urban migration on an individual level. In international migration, the interest for migrant networks is imposed during the last quarter of the previous century, at the same time as the manifestation and awareness on the level of scientific research of the global modifications of thee migration phenomenon.

The social and symbolic relations that are established within the migrant networks offer migrants access to information, support in the possibility of entry into the destination countries, support in the possibility of finding employment and lodging, as well as the means to live during the post-arrival period, social and emotional support. Any migration event, through the inclusion of a new individual into the network, leads to the increasing probability of a prospective appearance of a similar event, therefore widening the circle of people with access to the network's resources, and multiplying these resources at the same time (Espinnosa and Massey 1999: 106-137).

The migrant networks theory, in its evolution, aims to initiate new directions for analysis, such as the institutionalism approach, or the theory of social capital.

The institutionalism approach to migration is, as yet, at its incipient stage. Being an attempt to systematize and consolidate other migration theories, the institutionalism approach centers itself upon the study of the institutions that appear and are developed as part of the migration fluxes.

Migration institutions are extremely heterogeneous, and include, on the one hand, agents (individuals, firms, state institutions that intervene into the process of migration regardless of the legal or illegal status of their activities) that meet the entry, transportation, finding a place to work or to stay, and facilitate the receipt of documents, etc. in the destination country, and on the other hand, volunteer organizations that provide support to the immigrants, militating for the latter's rights, and offer financial, legal, and other assistance. The central idea of this approach consists in the possibility of institutionalization of the migrant flux, combined with the existence of migrant networks.

In 1987, in an analysis of Mexican migration into the USA, Massey and his colleagues, upon analyzing migrant networks, initiated the ***theory of social capital***. Massey states: "*Personal contacts with friends, relatives and paisanos offers the migrants access to jobs, lodgings, and financial assistance*

in the United States. The more the network of interpersonal connections is extended and elaborated, social capital is becoming more and more available to future migrants everywhere in the community of origin, progressively reducing the financial and physical costs of migration into the USA" (Massey et all. 1987: 170). The usual ties of friendship or kinship offer them few advantages, in or through themselves, to the people that are attempting to migrate internationally. Once someone from a personal network had migrated, these ties transform into a resource that can be utilized to obtain access to employment abroad, and everything this employment brings along with it. The prospect accentuates the positive effects of social capital. The proposed prospect is dynamic, preoccupied with the formation of social capital through the expansion of networks. It can be affirmed that the theory of social capital addresses an old topic (that of networks) from a new perspective, it's anticipated benefits however, representing rather a future goal.

Contemporary analysis of migration processes is done also with the help of the ***demographic approach*** that is represented by such authors as A. Sauvy, A. Landry, V. Trebici, D. Valentei, etc., according to which, migration has a major influence upon demographic behaviors, having a negative impact upon the population's reproduction, and accordingly, upon the population's birth rate, marriage, and mortality. In the same context, the demographic approach flashes out the durable effects of population growth as of a determinant factor of societal development, as well as the importance of the migration factor for the countries in which a strong reduction in the rates of reproduction and an increase in the population's aging are attested.

The political science approach to migration is presented in the works of G. P. Freeman, A. Zolberg (Zolberg 1989: 403-430), etc., and starts off from the necessity to manage migration processes by the state with the use of migration policy. This approach sees migration as a form of cooperation between states, one that consists in territorial mobility of the population, circulation that correspond with certain norms in the legislations of the origin and destination countries. According to this approach, the role of states is in exercising control upon entry and departure of persons, in determining of criteria and procedures of granting citizenship, in consolidation of institutions and management of migration processes. In

this approach migration policy can be treated as a component of state's demographic or social policy. The approach can interpret migration from the point of view of certain eventual cultural or interethnic consequences as well, especially in the areas where the issue of migration can generate various interethnic conflicts.

The systemic approach to migration starts with Mabogunje, who, in the 1970's, applied the systemic perspective in his study of rural-urban migration in Africa (Vlăsceanu 2010: 787). At the end of the 1980's, this approach reappears in the studies of M. Critz, H. Zlotnik, etc., who are attempting to explain the current forms of the migration phenomenon, simultaneously integrating into their explanation aspects tied to both the country of origin, and the country of destination (Zlotnik 1992: 1-2). This theoretical construct has, at its base, the idea of existence of a system that is formed of a number of countries, some of origin, others of destination, between which exist stable migration fluxes. The existence of some migration fluxes however, is a necessary condition, but not likewise efficient for the definition of a migration system, and the exchange of people represents but one of the fluxes that bring the countries together into a system. The systemic approach follows the goal to explain the phenomenon of migration in all its complexity, simultaneously taking into account all the factors that lead to migration (economic, political, social, and demographic factors), at different levels (macro, mezzo, and micro), that act in different historical contexts.

Conclusion

The enormous diversity of migration theories that have appeared in the recent years was determined by their permanent search and adaptation to the new realities of the phenomenon of migration during the period of transition towards a post-industrial society. The end of the 1970's and the 1980's could be considered the period in which the rethinking of theoretical support in the field of migration took place, due to the provocations that the migration phenomenon placed before the domain's specialists. The growing number of migrants globally, the difficulties that appear in controlling the migrant flux, the diversification of the forms of manifestation of migration, have all increased the attention given to the phenomenon at the level of

scientific research. Attempts to permanently improve the conceptual apparatus represent the basic characteristic of the theoretical support to international migration at the beginning of the 21st century, which present themselves as rather a "mosaic" (Arango 2000) than a new systemic approach paradigm of the migration phenomenon. A theoretical approach that is capable to completely encompass the migration process' complexity, its dynamic character, the diversity of economic, social, cultural and political factors that intervene into the appearance and unfolding of international migration, is still something that remains to be desired.

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2

PUSH AND PULL FACTORS OF THE NEW MIGRATION

Migration may be defined as movement from one place to another and has been practiced for millennium. In recent years, the focus has been on migrants from the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean region, Sub-Saharan Africa and since 2013 has included Syria and Iraq. In addition to this form of migration there is intra-EU migration. Micro-theories suggest that individual rational actors decide to migrate because a cost-benefit calculation. The following chapter will explore the economic, social and political hardships that are the push factors, while comparative advantages within more wealthy nations are the pull factor.

International migration has grown in magnitude and complexity with particular focus now at the policy level of nation states. Migration is a global phenomenon and, arguably, a key global issue of the twenty-first century. As an issue for the European Union, migration and potential migration to the Continent highlights the cause and effect of wider expansion as a feature of globalization.

While, the focus has been on migrants from the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean region, Sub-Saharan Africa in years past, attention since 2013 has included Syria and Iraq. In addition to this form of migration there is intra-EU migration; indicating the scope, impact, and intricacy of migration. Furthermore, violations of immigration laws within origin and destination countries have resulted in illegal migration causing a strong and adverse reaction by European citizens. As a result, such domestic variables have affected social and political development. The rise of far-

right parties and and anti-immigrant sentiments in relation to rising levels of ethnic diversity have become typical with specific studies providing the theoretical arguments for the existence of a connection between integration policies and public opinion (Bourhis et al., 1997; Favell, 2001; Jakobs and Herman, 2009). The following chapter explores the theoretical concept of the push-pull model implicit in economic models of migration to offer an explanation as to the causes of migration. Moreover, the so-called new wave of immigration is examined, highlighting the number of negative or push factors in the country of origin that cause people to move away, in combination with a number of positive or pull factors that attract migrants to a receiving country.

Economic, social and political hardships are the push factors, while comparative advantages within more wealthy nations are the pull factor. Therefore, combinations of push and pull factors would determine the size and direction of migration flows (Portes and Böröcz, 1989) with certain assumptions such as the more disadvantaged a nation is, the more likely it will produce migration. While macro-economic theory reveals the development of labour migration within the process of economic development (see e.g. Ranis and Fei, 1961; Harris and Todaro, 1970; Todaro, 1976) micro-economic models suppose that individuals make rational cost-benefit calculations based upon labour markets, not only about the decision whether to migrate or not, as well as alternative destinations. Wage differentials and employment rates when included in the various costs related to travel are important as too are the psychological costs of leaving friends and family (e.g. Sjaastad, 1962; Todaro, 1976, 1989; Burda, 1993). Moreover, once efforts involved in adapting to another country, individual characteristics also assist in explaining how individual cost-benefit calculations might produce different outcomes, and how the larger the difference between expected returns indicate the size of migration flows. Such macro and micro theories are important and can be best understood within neoclassical economic theory.

Neoclassical economic theory, as Massey et al. (1993, p. 433) claim is "*probably the oldest and best-known theory of international migration*" suggest people migrate based on available work. Wallenstein's (1974) World Systems Theory, another macro theory posits that migration mobilizes cheap labor for capital the perpetuates uneven development and

exploitation. Piore's (1979) "dual labor market theory" puts forward as a basis of argument that international migration is caused by a permanent demand for immigrant labor, inherent to the economic structure of developed nations. This does help understand various micro-theories that suggest motivations to move based upon where individuals are the most productive, based on their skills.

For example, micro-theories suggest that "*individual rational actors decide to migrate because a cost-benefit calculation leads them to expect a positive net return, usually monetary, from movement*" (Massey et al., 1993, p. 434). Thus, the argument is that people weigh personal factors to arrive at migration decisions. This is supported by Lee (1966) who posited four major factors which affect the decision to migrate, namely, factors associated with the area of origin, factors associated with the area of destination, intervening obstacles, and personal factors. Additional comparative research within Migration Systems Theory from Kritz and Zlotnik (1992), and expounded by other scholars all support the idea that countries exchange migrants with each other. According to Castles and Miller (1998, p. 23), the theory "*emphasizes international relations, political economy, collective action, and institutional factors.*" Moreover, Fawcett and Arnold (1987, p. 24) define these linkages as the "*state-to-state relations and comparisons, mass culture connections and family and social networks.*" The recent 'wave' of migration in the summer of 2015 indicates once more the tendency is to analyze regional migration. This wave is arguably more acute than prior waves to Europe since media discourse highlight the illegal means of migration instead of legal means, indicating how migration costs may play a more important role for illegal than for legal migration. Furthermore, Migration Systems Theory examines the linkages between migration territories. Fawcett and Arnold (1987, p. 24) define these linkages as the "*state-to-state relations and comparisons, mass culture connections and family and social networks,*" while Castles and Miller (1998) suggest that migratory movements occur "*from the existence of prior links between sending and receiving countries based on colonisation, political influence, trade, investment and cultural ties*" further making the claim that any migratory movements is a result of macro structures such as the political economy of the world market, interstate relationships and laws interacting with micro structures such

as beliefs and networks. If applied to the most recent wave, it is arguably also to avoid political oppression, poverty and hope for a better future. With, protection from an enemy, and legislative actions as the main causes of illegal migration. While, brief macro and micro economic theories has been presented in the above paragraphs it is necessary to understand the situation in home nations. As such, the first part shall include political and economic and social conditions, while the second part of the chapter explains the attractiveness of the European Union for immigrants.

2.1 Situation in the countries of origin

As described in the first section, various social, economic, and political push factors act as a determiner driving people away, while those same various factors are pull factors. It is certainly true that micro-economic factors such as expected earnings in a destination country or the likelihood of employment is a measurement of migration. Meanwhile, individual characteristics such as education, language skills, and prior training are part of their narratives. However, the situation in the home country is more often the primary motivator.

Political dissatisfaction has been studied in relation to emigration in autocratic contexts (e.g. see Colomer, 2000; Fleck and Hanssen, 2013), but political discontent as a potential driver of emigration in democratic contexts has seldom been considered (for exceptions, see Hiskey et al., 2014; Lapshyna, 2014; Meardi, 2012; Triandafyllidou and Gropas, 2014). Though such a study is recommended, it will not be the primary focus within these following paragraphs. Within intra-European migration it is conceivable that common emphasis on political motivations for migration across contrasting migration contexts would exist. Migration from south to north and east to west for example. Post-crisis Spain may offer insight into south-north migration, but this author admits to a lack of in-depth analysis in literature, notable exceptions (e.g. Bygnes, 2015; Triandafyllidou and Gropas, 2014; Jendrissek, 2016; Bygnesand Erdal, 2016); it is known however that extensive analysis has been done on migrants from the eastern parts of Europe for western Europe (e.g. Bleahu, 2004; Briggs and Dobre, 2014; Burrell, 2009).

Still, the political behavior of intra-European migrants is a paradox as revealed in research (Favell, 2010;Muxel, 2009; Recchi, 2015) showing actual participation in elections and political activities in new country as low. When push factors for non-EU migration is examined, political and economic factors are ranked high as motivators. The goal for migrants is not only economic theory of maximizing income, but minimizing risk. The latter is the distinguishing factor in war-torn nations as political situations drive people out of their native countries is the link to recent migration crisis facing Europe since 2015.

Political

Political dissatisfaction is a push factor, especially if violent conflict exists. Moreover, if political leaders and institutions have been incapable of improving the country's situation, this was a high motivator for migration. So, strong disappointment and exasperation with seemingly perpetual 'transition process'. Therefore, it is important to make a distinction between the economically-motivated movement of workers and those politically motivated. Admittedly, such a classifications as 'economic migrants' and 'political refugees' are oversimplification. Political and economic causes frequently join forces in producing movement (see e.g. Kunz, 1981; Zolberg et al., 1989; Suhrke, 1995). Richmond (1993) characterized free decision-making and rational choice ('proactive' migration) at one end of a continuous scale, and within this constructed framework of movement placed conditions of crisis and intolerable threat (resulting in 'reactive' migration) at the other side.

Economic

It is known that migration policies are determined by market mechanisms. Poverty, denial of essential needs and war are the known factors. If the first two are examined, however, Ballard argues that clothes, watches, and other material things create a distorted image. Difficulties are minimized to delight and ensure pride of family and kin (Ballard, 1977). Still, to improve the financial situation is a large motivation. Martin and Zurcher (2008) argue that relocating to another country can be grouped loosely into

two categories, economic and non-economic. However, the factors which actually propel a migrant to make that final move may be divided into three categories: Demand-pull, Supply-push, networks/other.

Table 2: Factors Which Affect Migration

Type of Migrant	Demand-Pull	Supply-Push	Network/Other
Economic	Labour Recruitment	Unemployment or Underemployment issues such as low wages	Jobs and wage information flow
Non-Economic	Family Unification (husbands and wives join spouses, children join parents)	Fleeing war and/or civil unrest	Communications; transportation; assistance organizations; desire for new experience

Source: Martin, P. & G. Zurcher (2008). Managing Migration: The Global Challenge

These factors that support migration support the claim by Lowell and Findlay (2001, p. 3) that the demand for skilled labor in developed countries have increased, but pull factors such as "*better wages and employment conditions, better information, recruitment and cheaper transportation,*" encourage skilled migrants to seek jobs and opportunities in developed countries. Moreover, Nurse (2004, p. 108) states that "*economic decline, widening inequality, increasing poverty social displacement, crime and political crisis have been the main drivers of emigration.*" Therefore, the major push factors influencing migration include, an unstable economy, general crime and violence, which in turn affects an individual's social and economic opportunities and career advancement. Furthermore, migrants are high-skilled workers, they contribute to technological adaptation then low-skilled migrants do occupational mobility, specialization, and human capital creation. In both cases it supplies labour shortages (Constatnt, F. A. 2014, p.1) a positive effect arising from different cultural and work experiences can be brought by enriching native workers and bringing new ideas to workplace and labour market. Migration reacts push effect for economic or social development as a possibility to accelerate the diffusion of new, foreign ideas and technologies to national labor market, or even

company and employer. Finally, when hiring a foreigner, an employer also acquires an employee who knows several languages, what may help in communicating with customers in other parts of the world.

According to Skeldon (2005, p. 5) "*Human capital is considered to be of central importance to development and the ultimate reduction, even eradication of poverty*". So, poverty is an important push factor. Thus, any loss of the skilled through migration may be prejudicial to the achievement of development goals and any discussion of the movement of the skilled is inextricably bound up with what is generally referred to as the 'brain drain', a debate that has been ongoing for over four decades." Moreover, Schmid (2006) claims while some countries prefer the remittances over human capital, they are still unable to provide the necessary social services for their populations. This may be part of the answer to explain popularity of so-called chain migration were once one member of the family settles in a new country and the immediate family emigrates and joins. While it is not debatable that professionals are needed for sustainable development further study is recommended on the professional migrant as an actor say in intra-European migration as opposed to the policy maker that manages to constrain the actor for example current national and proposed supra-national laws within the European Union on immigration. Moreover, Quinn and Rubb (2005) posit migration occurs when the individual cannot find the appropriate job which matches with their skill, as such an "education-occupation" factor Quinn and Rubb (2005, p. 164) plays an important role in the individual's decision to immigrate to another country. Because economic migration and labour mobility is increasingly a feature of the global economy, therefore, managing it by using policy and other instruments is necessary. One of the instruments adopted by European Union regulation in the relation to the third country nationals is called European Union Blue Card. It is also considered as an European Initiative, constituent a common policy for high-skilled migrants which is based on the assumption of granting temporary work permit (Boeri, T. - Brucker, H. - Docquier, F. - Rapoport, H., 2012, p. 30). Therefore, poverty is not the only push factor, there is also a social component.

Social

There exists a link between policy and attitudes towards migrants. These theoretical perspectives contain assumptions about the causality of the relationship. What is interesting to note is that these theories are in opposition to each other. Certain theories assume that policies are a determinant of public opinion rather than a consequence of it (Mettler and Soss, 2004), whereas public opinion as the main driver of policies (Brooks and Manza, 2006) if argued. While within a nation the social situation, as described in the beginning of this section explains why migration is often an attractive option. However, within the host nations, public attitudes towards immigrants vary.

Public opinion on immigrants is an umbrella term that is used interchangeably for general or public attitudes toward immigrants (Ceobanu & Escandell 2010; Fetzer 2000), anti-immigrant feelings, prejudice toward immigrants (Stephan, Ybarra & Bachman 1999a) and attitudes toward outgroups as described by Marie-Sophie Callens from the University of Leuven. It is perhaps not surprising then that in comparison of European nations, that while the number of immigrants moving to and settling in Europe has increased over the past decade, so has the openness of Europeans to migrants and especially to refugees; that people with a migrant background are better integrated in inclusive countries. Additionally, perhaps surprisingly, voters have not turned against people immigrating or seeking asylum, neither after the 2008 economic crisis or following the large numbers of refugee arrivals in 2015. This however does not account for the use of immigrants within their context of the 'other' being effectively used by politicians in national election campaigns since 2016.

2.2 How Immigrants View the EU

The aim to improve the conditions of life and for one's family is a powerful motivation. As mentioned in section 2.2.1 on poverty this is accurate if conditions at home offer no tangible benefits to stay, are poor and offer little or no opportunities for improvement. Europe therefore is genuinely considered the preferred option. Patrick Jabbi, a Congolese migrant stated, "*We all travel to get to plant a new life. We Africans we believe that if you*

go to Europe your life is good" (AlJazerra, 2015). This simple quote links the relationship between reasons to leave a native country as described in sections 2.2 and 2.3 above, primarily finding a job (family motives) or income considerations (economic reasons) while the destination is determined by the possibilities of logistics.

The European Union, and which member state is considered as attractive. Leaving their homes, crossing national borders and seeking for guarantees such as human security and financial sources for their families. In the historical context the migration is linked with easier using different means of transport, which demonstrate cheaper and more frequent travel connections for those, who come from faraway locations. Geography, both better and cheaper transport means pose less of a barrier to people's movement. This phenomena is accompanied by (better) access to global information.

One can recognize two basic categories of Immigrants, European citizens moving to another EU country and second, representatives coming from third-world countries.

In 2016, 4.3 million people immigrated to the European union. This total is formed by the addition consisting an estimated 2.0 million immigrants coming from non-member countries, 1.3 million citizens of a different Europe union Member State from, 929 000 people who migrated to an EU Member State of which they had the citizenship and 16,000 stateless people (Eurostat, 2018).

Most migration today is linked directly or indirectly to the search for decent work opportunities. In 2017 ILO estimates that there are 150 million migrant workers. This number assumes over 65 percent of all migrants (ILO, 2017, p. 1). Even if employment is not the primary driver, it usually features in the migration process at some point. While many times we witness freedom of capital and movement of trade, then at the same time the free movement of labour force is the most regulated aspect of economic performance. Yet, simply said there does not exist, "one-size fits all" policy (Pichler, 2017). With consideration of significance of political science, the area of migration policy of the individual EU members states and labour policy will be explored in Part Two of this book.

Table 3: Immigration by citizenship (Eurostat 2016)

	Total immigrants (thousands)	Nationals (thousands)	Nationals (%)	Non-nationals Total (thousands)	Non-nationals Total (%)	Citizens of other EU Member States (thousands)	(%)	Citizens of non-member countries (thousands)	(%)	Stateless (thousands)	(%)
Belgium	123.7	17.6	14.2	105.4	85.2	58.9	47.6	46.5	37.6	0.0	0.0
Bulgaria	21.2	9.3	43.6	12.0	56.3	1.3	6.2	10.6	50.0	0.0	0.2
Czech Republic	64.1	4.5	7.1	59.5	92.9	29.6	46.3	29.9	46.7	0.0	0.0
Denmark	74.4	19.7	26.5	54.6	73.5	25.0	33.6	28.6	38.4	1.1	1.5
Germany (¹)	1,029.9	110.5	10.7	912.8	88.6	403.6	39.2	507.0	49.2	2.2	0.2
Estonia	14.8	7.1	48.1	7.7	51.9	3.5	23.7	4.2	28.2	0.0	0.0
Ireland	85.2	28.0	32.9	56.1	65.8	28.9	33.9	27.2	31.9	0.0	0.0
Greece	116.9	30.7	26.3	86.1	73.7	16.6	14.2	69.5	59.5	0.0	0.0
Spain	414.7	62.6	15.1	352.2	84.9	116.3	28.0	235.6	56.8	0.2	0.1
France	378.1	137.2	36.3	240.9	63.7	82.7	21.9	158.2	41.8	0.0	0.0
Croatia	14.0	7.7	55.3	6.2	44.7	2.2	15.8	4.0	28.9	0.0	0.0
Italy	300.8	37.9	12.6	262.9	87.4	62.7	20.8	200.2	66.6	0.0	0.0
Cyprus	17.4	3.6	20.5	13.8	79.5	7.4	42.3	6.5	37.3	0.0	0.0
Latvia	8.3	4.9	58.7	3.4	41.0	0.5	6.0	2.9	34.9	0.0	0.1
Lithuania	20.2	14.2	70.5	6.0	29.5	0.8	3.7	5.2	25.7	0.0	0.1
Luxembourg	22.9	1.3	5.8	21.5	94.1	16.0	69.7	5.6	24.3	0.0	0.0
Hungary	53.6	29.8	55.6	23.8	44.4	10.5	19.6	13.3	24.7	0.0	0.0
Malta	17.1	1.4	8.1	15.7	91.9	9.0	52.6	6.7	39.3	0.0	0.0
Netherlands	189.2	42.5	22.5	144.8	76.5	63.9	33.8	76.7	40.5	4.2	2.2
Austria	129.5	9.8	7.5	119.6	92.4	64.7	50.0	54.5	42.1	0.5	0.4
Poland (²)(³)	208.3	105.4	50.6	102.9	49.4	22.8	10.9	80.1	38.4	0.0	0.0
Portugal (³)	29.9	14.9	49.7	15.1	50.3	7.2	24.1	7.8	26.2	0.0	0.0
Romania	137.5	119.6	87.0	17.9	13.0	5.6	4.1	12.3	8.9	0.0	0.0
Slovenia	16.6	2.9	17.2	13.8	82.8	3.4	20.4	10.4	62.4	0.0	0.0
Slovakia	7.7	4.1	53.0	3.6	47.0	3.0	38.9	0.6	8.1	0.0	0.0
Finland	34.9	7.6	21.9	26.9	77.0	7.1	20.3	19.6	56.3	0.2	0.5
Sweden	163.0	20.0	12.3	142.5	87.4	30.5	18.7	104.4	64.0	7.6	4.6
United Kingdom	589.0	74.2	12.6	514.8	87.4	249.4	42.3	265.4	45.1	0.0	0.0
Iceland	8.7	2.3	26.2	6.4	73.8	5.3	60.9	1.1	12.8	0.0	0.0
Liechtenstein	0.6	0.2	29.2	0.4	70.8	0.2	37.4	0.2	33.4	0.0	0.0
Norway	61.5	6.7	10.9	54.7	89.1	21.4	34.9	32.4	52.7	0.9	1.5
Switzerland	149.3	24.3	16.3	125.0	83.7	87.3	58.5	37.6	25.2	0.0	0.0

Note: The individual values do not add up to the total due to rounding and the exclusion of the 'unknown' citizenship group from the table.
(¹) Break in series. (²) Provisional. (³) Estimate.

Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr_imm1ctz)

PART I: Push and Pull Factors of the New Migration

Conclusion

In this chapter international migration and the multitude of factors contributing to it, was explored. Moreover, varying policy goals of sending and receiving authorities, as well as potential policy responses to migration from individual European nations that vary greatly was discussed. The European Union is under increasing pressure to reform its asylum and immigration practices with the issue taking on an economic as well as humanitarian urgency since the 2015 'immigration crisis'. Going through the historical perspective, the focus has been on reasons why the migration has taken a place in society. Most of them are motivated by the urge for higher wages and better opportunities, but some of them are forced to leave their homes due to some economic factors as lack of employment, low pay, poor standard of living, or the non-economic ones such famine and poverty, natural disaster, armed conflicts, war or persecution. On the other hand, during this age of progress easier ways for movement of peoples has occurred. This demographic changes have created economic and social pressure almost in every society (Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division, 2015, pp. 6-7). Migration is influenced by a combination of economic, environmental, political and social factors in the country of origin of the immigrant which are presented like pressure (push) factors. It is assumed that the relative economic prosperity and political stability of the EU have had a significant impact on migrant attractiveness in the past on immigrants. "*It is neither the first nor the last time that people will seek refuge in Europe. Poverty, instability, natural disasters and in particular violent conflicts in countries in the EU's vicinity drive people to seek safety and to realise their full potential in Europe*" (European Commision, 2016, p. 3).

From the migrants' point of view, aiming to improve the conditions of life for themselves and for their families, is a powerful motivation for migration, the more so if conditions at home are poor and offer little or no opportunities for improvement. As such, economic push and pull factors, especially dissatisfaction with the situation in home countries in comparison to life in the country of destination are all important factors motivating migration. Migrants are high-skilled workers, they contribute to technological adaptation then low-skilled migrants do occupational mobility, specialization, and human capital creation. In brief: supplying

labour shortages. Positive effect arising from different cultural and work experiences can be brought by enriching native workers and bringing new ideas to workplace and labour market. Migration reacts push effect for economic or social development as a possibility to accelerate the diffusion of new, foreign ideas and technologies to national labor market, or even company and employer. Moreover, when hiring a foreigner, an employer also acquires an employee who knows several languages, and may help in communicating with customers from other parts of the world.

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3

ENHANCING BORDER MANAGEMENT IN THE EU

Since 1985 borders of the EU member states experienced significant transformation towards shared border management. The main aim of this chapter is to provide overview of this transformation and reveal border management regime in political perspective as borders are important aspect of migration. The chapter has chronological approach providing understanding of key milestones in border policy. Later part of the chapter deals with EU agency FRONTEX and its position within EU border management while focusing on its extended mandate. It helps to find answer on question: how EU border management developed and what are main issues in this area.

The migration crisis of 2015 led to EU criticism. Politicians, media and citizens were looking for the culprit and critically pointed to the EU. Especially in Central and Eastern Europe critical voices pointed out, that the "*EU failed to protect borders and stop the wave of refugees*". This is, however, the wrong perception and a deep misunderstanding of rights and responsibilities of the EU regarding border management. The main aim of this chapter is to highlight and clarify the role of the EU (respectively its FRONTEX agency) in the EU border management in the light of refugee crises. The contribution will analyze the transition of Frontex in the post 2015 period in the terms of capacities and cooperation. For this purpose the chapter is divided into three parts. First part is describing pre-crisis setting of the EU border management. This is because it is worth to know the starting position of the transition. The second part assesses EU performance during immigration crisis in relation to border management which later resulted

to enhanced Frontex mandate. The changes of the updated Frontex status is the subject of the third part. The chapter concludes that the immigration crisis strengthened EU border management.

This chapter is based on the assumption that the 2015 immigration crisis was an asymmetrical issue. No cost-effective and humanly sensitive border management system can manage a scenario where more than 1 million refugees decide to cross the border. For this reason, a certain level of chaos, improvisation and ad-hoc decision making is at place in order to prevent human disaster. On the other side flaws in the border management resulted in new challenges and security threats. It may be well expected, that among those who passed EU borers are individuals or small groups of those who have hostile intentions. Moreover the high numbers of migrants from different cultures present challenge for national systems of governance.

3.1 EU border management: the beginning

The origins of the EU border management were created out of the EU/EC structure and are related to the so called Schengen system which refers to the set of intergovernmental treaties. The Schengen system was aimed at creation of space without internal borders among member states. Lack of internal borders had been compensated by enhancement of external borders. On 14. June 1985 representatives of France, Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg met in Schengen where they signed the convention (see Schengen Agreement of 1985). Article 1 of the agreement stressed that: *"As soon as this Agreement enters into force and until all checks are abolished completely, the formalities for nationals of the Member States of the European Communities at the common borders between the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic shall be carried out in accordance with the conditions laid down below."* In the following articles states made agreement to soften border controls.

It is important to note that the Schengen Agreement almost entirely deals with abolishment of common borders while the management of external borders is dealt only in two articles. For example article 17 stress that *"With regard to the movement of persons, the Parties shall endeavour to abolish checks at common borders and transfer them to their external borders. To*

that end they shall endeavour first to harmonise, where necessary, the laws, regulations and administrative provisions concerning the prohibitions and restrictions on which the checks are based and to take complementary measures to safeguard internal security and prevent illegal immigration by nationals of States that are not members of the European Communities.". In other words, management of external borders required additional rules for the management. Similar provisions regarding goods can be found under article 24: *"With regard to the movement of goods, the Parties shall seek means of transferring the checks currently carried out at the common borders to the external borders or to within their own territories. To that end they shall take, where necessary, common initiatives among themselves and within the European Communities to harmonise the provisions on which checks on goods at the common borders are based. They shall ensure that these measures do not adversely affect the necessary protection of the health of humans, animals and plants*". In this regard, Schengen Agreement was first cornerstone to the new shared system which gradually developed regarding its content and membership which gradually increased.

Schengen Agreement leaves impression that external border protection was neglected or at least the methods and level of border protection varied among states. We can expect that rather slow response to common border management standards was result of two factors. First, external borders were changing due to increasing number of members or its expectation and second aspect influencing the passivity is the reality of Cold war. Borders between East and West were not very porous and had relatively strict regime from the both sides. Moreover, from the early beginning all members of the Schengen agreement participated within the European Community single market project which also focused on barriers removal especially after the adoption of Single European Act.

In 1990 the Schengen agreement was accompanied by the Convention implementing the Schengen agreement which can be characterized as legally binding document with more specific requirements for member states including the regime of external borders especially with asylum seekers. Particularly important is Joint Declaration on Article 139 which states that *"the Convention shall not be brought into force until the preconditions for its implementation have been fulfilled in the Signatory States and checks at external borders are effective."* . According to the Convention, external

borders may in principle be crossed only at border crossing points and that states shall introduce penalties for unauthorised crossing of external borders (Article 3). The convention also specifies the regime at the external borders which shall be subject of checks by competent authorities, which shall use mobile units to carry out external border surveillance between crossing points and to deploy enough suitably qualified officers to carry out checks ad surveillance along external borders. Finally, the Convention stressed that an equal degrees of control shall be exercised at external borders (Article 6). In other words, the Convention sets a common standard while keeping the principle that border management is the responsibility of signatories.

From the early beginning the border management issue in the EC was slightly schizophrenic as the member states were involved in two branches. One group of states focused on control abolition under the Schengen system while another involving the same members and some more focused on creation of single market with four freedoms. Both branches had different method of cooperation. While Schengen was strictly intergovernmental project without participation of the EC institutions the cooperation within EC fallen under the qualified majority. The schizophrenia even deepened after the adoption of Maastricht treaty.

External borders are mentioned under article K.1 of the Treaty of the European Union is stated, that rules of governing the crossing by persons of the external borders of the Member States and the exercise of controls thereon shall be regarded as the matter of common interest together with asylum, immigration policy and other issues (Article K.1). In other words, the issue of the market related measures were covered under first, the supranational pillar of the EU while some related issues overlap into interior and justice cooperation which is purely intergovernmental and covered by the third pillar. This resulted in agenda duplication and organizational chaos characterized by overlap (see for example Boer 1997: 401), especially when Schengen Convention entered into force in 1995.

The schizophrenia was overcame in the Treaty of Amsterdam which incorporated Schengen acquis into the primary law of the EU and transferred some part of migration and asylum acquis from the third intergovernmental to first supranational pillar as it become evident that more unified approach will be beneficial to all member states. However, the key principle remained.

The border management and border protection is the responsibility of the EU member states. However, the Amsterdam treaty envisaged further development in that area. For example, Article B sets, that *"the Union shall set itself the following objectives: … o maintain and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice, in which the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime"* (Article B) or that the *"Council shall promote cooperation trough Europol … to establish a research, documentation and statistical network on cross-border crime"* (article K.2). To sum up the Amsterdam treaty revision made the prospect for further border management coordination.

3.2 Creation and conduct of Frontex

On 26th October 2004 the EU adopted Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, abbreviated as Frontex. The foundations for Frontex were based on the experience of External Borders Practitioners Common Unit which was composed of the Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA) and heads of national border control services (SCIFA+) who met together within Council (Nael 2009). Generally speaking, it served as an expert body tasked with improving border management in the EU and coordinated seven ad-hoc Centres on Border Control including Risk Analysis Centre based in Helsinki, Centre for Land Borders located in Berlin, Air Borders Centre in Rome, Western Sea Borders Centre in Madrid, Ad-hoc Training Centre for Training in Traiskirchen (Austria), Centre of Excellence in Dover and Eastern Sea Borders Centre based in Greek Piraeus.

Establishing the sovereign agency was another step to better coordination and border management and reacted to increased need for high standard of border protection. It is, however important to note, that Regulation is providing only limited powers related to limited to the newly established agency. According to Article 2 of the regulation Frontex shall:

(a) Coordinate operational cooperation between Member States in the field of management of external borders;

(b) Assist Member States on training of national border guards, including

the establishment of common training standards;
(c) Carry out risk analyses;
(d) Follow up on the development of research relevant for the control and surveillance of external borders;
(e) Assist Member States in circumstances requiring increased technical and operational assistance at external borders;
(f) Provide Member States with the necessary support in organising joint return operations.

In other words, Frontex was created merely as supplementary and assisting agency to the border management which remained responsibility and was predominantly carried out by the member states. The agency was entrusted to "evaluate, approve and coordinate" proposals for joint operations and pilot projects or in agreement with the Member States to launch its own projects (Article 3). Here the possible activity was limited by the willingness of the Member states. Frontex was also entrusted by other activates such as to develop and apply a common integrated risk analysis model, was entrusted to develop a common core curriculum for border guards (training programmes), to follow up research related to borders (Article 6) to create and maintain technical equipment (Article 7) available to Member states or to support Members States in circumstances requiring increased technical and operational assistance at external borders. When necessary, Frontex had to provide necessary assistance for organising joint return operation of Member States and identify best practices in this area (Article 9). Later articles are allowing agency to maintain information exchange systems (Article 11), to facilitate cooperation with Ireland and the UK (Article 12) or Europol (Article 13). Frontex does not order border guards in the terrain, is not deciding about their location or numbers, it is not running crossing points at external borders and in general is not responsible for borders protection in the EU. All key activities and powers remained within the hands of EU member states and Frontex therefore had only limited measures how manage the 2015 immigration crisis.

It is important to note that Frotex actively used its mandate and developed cooperation with the member states and variety of other actors in various areas. In 2015 the document entitled "External Evaluation of the Agency under art. 33 of the Frontex Regulation – Final Report" was published. The

181 pages long document assessing the role of Frontex was carried out by an independent external entity – the Ramboll Management Consulting and Eurasylum Ltd between July 2014 and July 2015 (before the full outbreak of immigration crisis). The study analyzed in detail Frontex performance in the areas of operational activities (Joint Operations and Joint Return Operations, Risk analysis), capacity building (especially training, research and development or pooled resources) and horizontal activities (such as the establishment of the EUROSUR system and inter-institutional cooperation with other actors). In general Frontex has been positively evaluated in all areas (see External Evaluation ..., p. 6-9).

The evaluation found out that Frontex's coordination of Joint Operations and Joint Return Operations was effective, and that agency developed and disseminated all necessary code of conduct and best practices guidelines and allocated enough resources to conduct operational tasks (External Evaluation ... p. 6). The only minor issue was operational cost efficiency and utilisation of adequate technical equipment. Similarly evaluation confirmed that Frontex was able to conduct accurate high quality risk analysis with only minor issue related to the differences in the risk analysis at the level of Member States (External Evaluation ..., p. 6). In other words there were only minor issues and total lack of systemic or substantial failures.

This is true also for other analyzed areas. Frontex provided effective training for national border guards and support of the agency was very positively addressed by all stakeholders. Frontex also gained very positive evaluation regarding research and development which helped to fulfill the mandate of the agency. Similarly, OPERA tool managed by Frontex contributed to rapid deployment of human resources and technical equipment, helping Frontex to effectively address requests from the member states (External Evaluation ..., p. 7). Regarding horizontal activities Frontex established EUROSUR which become soon operational, but had some systemic issues regarding data availability. Frontex also succeeded to develop inter-agency cooperation with other relevant actors in the area of border management and protection, including Europol, European Asylum Support Office or EU Agency for large-scale IT systems (External Evaluation ... p. 9). To sum up, Frontex was working well with small space for increasing effectiveness. It is thus a paradox, that after an overall positive evaluation study was published

Frontex soon became seen as ineffective and its mandate was significantly strengthened.

3.3 Towards more efficient border management

In September 2016 Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 was repealed by Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 establishing European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) under which mandate of previous agency has been extended. The new 76 long regulation created unbalanced and in some areas very detailed piece of secondary law which strengthened Frontex especially in the area of capacities and coordination.

Among most important measures regarding capacities was the measure allowing Frontex to set up and deploy European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) teams, including a rapid reaction pool which might be deployed during joint operations or during rapid border interventions. Frontex was allowed to set up a technical equipment pool and was allowed to buy and maintain its own equipment. The new capacities were allowed to be used at the "hotspot areas" where Frontex might deploy its EBCG teams and equipment in order to assist during screening, debriefing identification and fingerprinting (Article 8). In other words Frontex received human resources and equipment to independently launch operations at the localities affected by immigration crisis. The conduct of the mission is hover subject of further detailed rules.

Article 15 of the new Frontex regulation sets out the rules for initiating joint operations and rapid border interventions at the external borders. This might be done on the request of the member state facing pressure or "disproportionate challenges" such as influx of high number of immigrants, cross-border crime, human trafficking etc. at the external borders. Article 16 sets out the rules for Operational plan for joint operations which are designed by the executive director with the cooperation of the Member state where are agreed details about the scope, duration, modus operandi and other issuer related to the joint operation.

The rapid border intervention is new tool under Frontex regulation. Upon request of the member state the executive director immediately inform the management board. The executive director shall take decision on the request within two working days and is responsible for creation of

operational plan. The deployment of the rapid reaction pool shall according to Article 18 takes no more than five working days after the date on which the operational plan was agreed between the executive director and the hosting Member State. However, the additional deployment of the EBCG teams shall take within seven working days after the deployment of rapid reaction pool (Article 17). In other words this mechanism strengthens the palette of tools how Frontex might help member states to deal with irregular shocks at the external borders.

A similar measure is the request of the member state for assistance provided by migration management support teams (article 18) and specific procedures were set under article 19 dealing with situations requiring urgent actions at the external borders. In this situation when the Schengen area is put in jeopardy, the Frontex may:

(a) Organise and coordinate rapid border interventions and deploy European Border and Coast Guard teams from the rapid reaction pool, and additional European Border and Coast Guards teams as appropriate;

(b) Deploy European Border and Coast Guard teams in the framework of the migration management support teams at hotspot areas;

(c) Coordinate activities for one or more Member States and third countries at the external borders, including joint operations with neighboring third countries;

(d) Deploy technical equipment;

(e) Organise return interventions.

Following Articles 20 and 21 of the new regulation deals with EBCG, its composition and instructions. Article 20(5) stress that The total number of staff made available by the Member States shall amount to a minimum of 1 500 border guards or other relevant staff whose profiles shall be set by the decision of Frontex' management board. However, on a proposal by the executive director, the management board shall decide by an absolute majority of its members with a right to vote on the profiles and the overall number of border guards and other relevant staff to be made available for the European Border and Coast Guard teams. Once deployed, during deployment of EBCG teams, the host Member State shall issue instructions to the teams in accordance with the operational plan (Article 21). It is

important to note, that articles regarding EBCG are detailed, setting clear time limits and responsibilities while leaving space for further development of EBCG representing human force for management of critical situations.

In the area of coordination the Frontex has been strengthened in several ways. First, the Agency has obligation to cooperate with member states in a good faith and in a timely and accurate manner exchange all necessary information (Articles 9 and 10). However, the duty to inform is not only on the agency but also on the member states who are responsible to "*provide the Agency with all necessary information regarding the situation, trends and possible threats at the external borders and in the field of return.*" (Article 11). As pointed out by Francesca Ferraro and Emilio de Capitani (2016) a very important contribution to strengthening the role of Frontex is also Article 11(1) requiring Frontex' common integrated risk analysis model to be applied by the Agency and Member States which will according to authors help to avoid hyper-dramatisation or under-estimation used for political reasons and political aims (Ferraro and Capitani 2016: 9). Agency is also responsible for monitoring member states management of external borders and providing evaluations and once per year to monitor and assess availability of the technical equipment, systems, capabilities, resources, infrastructure etc. which is available to the EU member states for border management operations (Ferraro and Capitani 2016: 9).

On the 6th of October, 2017 Frontex published a review document mapping the achievements of the first years since the new enhanced mandate. Material stress that Frontex has more than 1700 officers deployed at the land, sea and air borders assisting to member states. Moreover, the agency succeeded to establish 1500 officers under the Rapid Reaction Pool, which is composed of surveillance officers, registration experts, advanced-level document officers and nationality screening experts. It has to be added that human resources are supported by Rapid Reaction Equipment Tool composing of vessels, aircraft, helicopters, patrol cars and other vehicles which might be deployed within two weeks after initial request (Frontex 2017). New Frontex agency extended its activities in various states which are especially transit countries or countries of origin. Frontex, for example opened various liaison offices to support activities related to border management in problematic countries and get involved in several capacity building projects under the umbrella of the

Africa Frontex Intelligence Community, Regional Support to Protection-Sensitive Migration Management in the Western Balkans and Turkey (IPA II) and Eastern Partnership Integrated Border management Capacity Building Project. Frontex is involved also in EU Naval Force Mediterranean Operation Sophia, EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya and EUCAP Sahel Niger (Frontex 2017). In other words, Frontex succeeded to be involved in most important operations and developed activities preventing illegal migration.

Similarly impressive is the statistics regarding returns. Within the first year of enhanced mandate Frontex assisted in the return of more than 10 000 foreign nationals which is three times more that the year before. For the purpose to support and coordinate return operations Frontex succeeded to create special Return Support Unit that has 60 people working on return operations. However, even in this area is a promise to increase effectiveness as the agency relies on the aircrafts chartered directly by the member states. In the close future Frontex seek to manage returns with its own planes and use commercial flights (Frontex 2017). In this sense the number of effective returns may be higher and Frontex may prove to be effective assistant in managing and partially out-sourcing activities of member states.

Frontex remains very dedicated in the vulnerability assessment which is necessary to discover flaws in the border management system and take counter-measures ensuring effective border management. Frontex is also important actors in law enforcement and has increasing importance in the fight against terrorism, combating document fraud, human trafficking etc. (Frontex 2017). That has implications for cooperation with other agencies, especially Europol, European Union Maritime Security Agency or even EU Fisheries Control Agency and the access of other actors into the various systems, such as Schengen Information System, ETIAS etc. In other words complex border management and Frontex involvement in other fields related with migration will always present the challenge and raise questions about appropriate model of governance. For example ss pointed out by Francesca Ferraro and Emilio De Capitani (2016), the reform went half way and failed to clarify the line between Frontex and Member states regarding responsibilities and duties (Ferraro and Capitani 2016). This might pose no problem at the calm times, but lead to conflicts during crises.

This is for example, the issue the agency acting in urgent situations. Under a normal procedure a state affected by irregular influx of immigrants requests Frontex to launch the EBCG operation, then the affected state together with the Executive Directors agree on the Operation plan and following this step the member state conduct command over the whole operation. However, for example Herbert Rosenfeldt (2016) raised the important question. What if the state remains passive or tries to avoid involvement of Frontex? Preventing the Frontex to intervene was one of the critical issues (see European Commission 2015). Rosenfeldt points out that even when a state will not initiate the start of the procedure, it still has to agree on the operation plan and somebody has to take over the command (Rosenfeldt 2016) which places advantage on the state without limiting its border sovereignty. However, from the other perspective the affected member state shall act as actively as possible to ensure the security at the external border which might be seen "common border" if we consider the physical absence of internal border. For this reason solidarity will be always key principle within EU border management.

Conclusion

From the initial provisions under the Schengen convention EU created complex and unique system with growing complexity and outreach to many other areas including security, human rights, visa and asylum systems etc. Next to the scope also the horizontal and vertical line of border management develop to include more actors. Despite build up of the system was successful and Frontex filled its task without considerable problems the crisis of 2015 uncovered various weaknesses and contributed to change of political environment. A new window of opportunity has opened.

Frontex enjoyed new mandate and considerably developed its operational capacities which were almost immediately used. However, the reform ended half way. Simply said Frontex still does not represent fully capable authority to manage EU border protection and greater part of the responsibility is on EU member states. EU border management thus remains hybrid catched between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. This however might have negative implications if the advantages of intergovernmental governance will meet advantages of supranational

elements while limiting the negative aspects of both. The time and further external evaluation will show whether EU border managements and the role of Frontex in it is appropriate and sufficient.

Similarly to other crises the EU is stronger due to changes brought by the Regulation 2016/1624. For sure these changes could have been made much earlier before the crises which acted as the catalyst to existing changes and opened the window of opportunity to adopt new measures in sovereignty sensitive area. Nevertheless, EU border management remains the responsibility of the Member states and despite strengthened Frontex is far from being sovereign and capable organization to handle large scale problems on the borders. During the first year of its enhanced mandate the agency showed, that it is able to assist member states and was capable that any time before. However, it is questionable where the line of Frontex power towards migration challenge which might again become asymmetric and unmanageable when states fail within the EU neighbourhood.

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4

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EU MIGRATION AND ASYLUM POLICY

The purpose of this chapter is to uncover the policy of the European Union in the field of migration and asylum. Accordingly, the following chapter structure is proposed: the first section reviews the evolution and specifics of the European Union's migration policy, identifies the main stages of its development and the specific aspect of each of the types of migration management policies that were used. In this section the main directions of migration management are uncovered. Speaking of the specifics of migration policy, attention is drawn to the fact that the realization of EU policy in the field of migration and asylum has revealed a certain specific, caused by the fact that the politics of migration and mobility in the EU are multilevel and multidimensional. Light is shed on the main community bodies and mechanisms of migration management in the EU (Treaties, Regulations, Decisions, Directives and others). In the second part the main aspects of EU policy in the field of migration and asylum are presented. Shown here are the main documents in which the main approaches to European policy in the field of migration and asylum are being developed and formulated. Herewith, attention is drawn to the fact that the EU's policy consists of the unification of approaches, the formation of a common community policy, common standards. Taken as example is the multiplicity of approaches to the issue of social benefits given to refugees and asylum seekers in EU member-states.

It is known that migration policy is a totality, a system of ideas and measures taken at the level of state institutions with the help of which the state and other public institutes, by adhering to specific principles, aim to reach certain goals in the field of migration. Migration policy includes the concept (an argumentation of goals and objectives in the field of migration), migration programs and activity of government bodies in management of migration processes. In today's conditions, the conditions of globalism, when migration processes have become an integral characteristic of the contemporary world, migration policy is an important and topical part of any state's social policy. Any state that strives to have stable and effective development must take these conditions into account, and conduct a wise and balanced migration policy. This includes the European Union also, which is a supranational community that consists of 28 European countries.

4.1 EU Migration Policy: Evolution and Specifics

Since the moment of the European Union's appearance (1957) migration policy has been important. However, it should be noted that it carried a practical-applied, economic nature. This was tied to the fact that freedom of movement for people, the European community's citizens, and workforce was viewed as one of the four primary liberties (alongside the free mobility of goods, capital, and services) necessary for the development of economy and social progress. In other words, at the base of the interest for migration were the internal factors of development of the states that have taken steps toward the creation of European integration, the intra-union mobility of workforce.

In the conditions of the Western European countries' economic growth, the necessity for labor-force also increased; this was brought (since the late 1950's) from third countries. Foreign workers were employed based on the rotation principle. Their presence was beneficial and temporary. Until 1973, migration policy toward the non-EU states carried a secondary character. Between the European countries there was no coordination in migration policies, it seemed like control was possible, posed no difficulties, and had a limited structural effect.

The oil crisis of 1973, increased prices on energy carriers and dictated a change to the approaches of economic development, and accents have

shifted toward energy-saving technologies. This was followed by a crisis of outdated policies in the field of migration (1974-1979). Migration processes in the EU now took on new features. All immigration programs got shut down, and migrant workers from third countries were no longer invited. Attempts to send the guest workers back home were unsuccessful. Temporary labor migrant repatriation programs collapse. New trends appear: the closure of legal economic migration channels leads to a transition from temporary labor migration to emigration, labor immigrant family reunifications become more and more frequent, illegal migration increased, and economic migrants were attempting to arrive to Europe masquerading as political refugees.

Gradually, the idea that migration requires management took dominance in EU countries. In the 1980's, collaboration between EU countries in the field of migration become permanent. Initially, this was not manifested through actual treaties. In the mid-80's, a group of national coordinators tasked with researching the freedom of people's mobility and immigration was established.

Continued development of immigration policy took place in the 1990's. With the fall of the socialist system, the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the number of refugees into the European Union increased. Limitations on legal immigration and refugees were introduced. Europe was being more and more often referred to as a "besieged fortress" (Geddes 2000: 15).

During 1991-1994, new principles and procedures of European migration policy were developed and adopted. Namely, the notion of "safe countries" was introduced with the express purpose to reduce the number of applications for political asylum. Furthermore, the "safe third countries" principle, where refugees could be placed, has been defined. Negotiations were held with migrant transit countries that were not part of the EU; a treaty of readmission was signed with more than 70 countries outside of the EU. The countries that required visas were identified. The systemic approach to migration policy was used – visa regime simplification for the countries outside of the EU was tied to the signing and activity of the readmission treaty.

The unified European system of identification of persons in search of asylum was created. The unified registration database for irregular migrants

was established. In 1993, migrants' dactyloscopic data (fingerprints) registration is introduced. Since 2007, biometric data began to be registered into a unified database. In order to fortify border control on the European Union's outer borders, the principle of "buffer zone" creation was developed. The fortification of migration control tied in with counteracting illegal migration (this also concerned asylum seekers). Sanctions against illegal migration organizers were introduced. At the same time, attention was given to the policy of integration of accepted immigrants.

The European Union's adoption of multiple and varied documents and its introduction of different procedures of regulation of migration processes yielded positive results. A complete system of European policy in the field of migration and asylum was established. Since the year 2000, a fortification of joint actions for migration management on the international, bilateral and regional levels has taken place; as well as the limitation policy regarding unqualified labor migrants. It should also be noted the efficiency in asylum application reviewing. Coordination of national legislations and migration management procedures, as well as of stimulation of immigration of qualified specialists and students is taking place. The European Union developed and began implementing the New Neighbor Policy with southern and eastern EU neighbor-countries, paying great attention to collaboration in the field of migration. An expansion of the Schengen zone took place, now counting 26 European countries. New elements aimed at the stimulation of positive effects of migration are being introduced, a global approach to migration and development is being approved, and mind is given to mobility and circular migration programs.

The Migration Crisis (2014-2016) in the European Union has shown the fragility of migration policies in the conditions of mass migrant and refugee inflow. The Schengen and Dublin-III treaties have widely been violated. The EU managed to find the solution to the problems by using complex and diverse emergency measures, by moving from reactive to proactive actions, by moving the center of combating illegal and forced migration to the countries of origin and transit, and by active collaboration with third countries outside of EU-space.

At the same time, the migration crisis revealed the lack of solidarity action between the EU countries, the limited nature of administrative approaches, the importance of collaboration and stimulation of economic development

in the origin-countries, and the necessity to increase the role of EU political institutes in developing and implementing policies in the field of migration and asylum. Today, the problem of consolidation of solidarity within the European Union, the search and use of mechanisms of strengthening of joint actions between EU countries, the inclusion of third countries into the implementation of EU migration policy are becoming the primary task of preventing the repetition of the migration crisis of the mid-2020's. Herewith, this is not a question of just the EU's modern migration and asylum policy, but of the survival of the unified European project as a whole.

The evolution of the European Union's policy in the field of migration and asylum has revealed several periods of development of EU cooperation and integration on immigration and asylum (Geddes 2000: 13-43). The European Union gradually increased its presence via migration policies, thus demonstrating its growing desire to participate in solving migration problems both at community level, and at regional and national levels.

- First stage (1957–1986): characterized by Minimal immigration policy involvement;
- Second stage (1986–1993): characterized by Informal intergovernamentalism;
- Third stage (1993–1999): characterized by Formal intergovernmental cooperation;
- Fourth stage (1999–present): characterized by Communitarisation (intensive trans-governmentalism).

Migration policy / migration management in the European Union is implemented in several key-directions, each of which is multi-leveled and includes in itself a multitude of other aspects of sub-directions:

- Legal migration management;
- Legal management of the freedom of mobility of goods, labor, services and people inside the Schengen zone;
- Legal mechanisms of humanitarian migration management;
- Social integration of immigrants/ refugees.

The realization of EU policy within the migration and asylum field has revealed a certain specific, caused by the fact that the politics of migration and mobility in the EU are multilevel and multidimensional.

This is tied to the process of formation and functioning of the European Union as of a supranational European community that includes sovereign national states, which delegate a certain part of their sovereignty and competencies to the community bodies who, on the one hand, unlike the national bodies, are characterized by a lower functional determinacy, and on the other, have a division between the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government.

It is necessary to note the multitude of types/ variants of policy. This will allow to better understand the relations between the EU member-states; the nature of European (EU) mobility, migration policy and policy of asylum in the more and less developed regions; the different influence that mobility, migration, and the policy of asylum-granting has on the different EU countries, etc. Furthermore, it should likewise be noted that the different types of migration (labor migration, family migration/ family reunification, forced migration and asylum seeking, irregular migration, labor mobility in the EU, and immigrant integration) create different concrete forms of political reaction. Herewith, they exert their influence at different levels of the multi-level EU system that includes the sub-national, national, and supranational levels (Boswell and Geddes 2001: 15-18).

Then there's the issue of combining the national and community interests at the supranational, regional, and national levels that is gaining particular complexity and permanent importance in the negotiation process, search for compromise, concessions, political "bargaining", which the national states are facing only in crisis conditions when separatist tendencies begin to appear and aggravate.

Furthermore, we should note another peculiar feature of the process of development and implementation of migration policy. It is not specific only to migration policy. It is characteristic of the decision-making process in general. Here, we are talking about such important components as: "talk", "decision" и "action"; deliberate malintegration; and the policy stream. By researching their dynamics, one can, first of all, differentiate between the discourse and the real practice when it comes to the development of migration policy; secondly, identify the different rival interests that influence the formation of migration policy; and thirdly, see how party rhetoric influences the bureaucratic decisions in the individual member-states and in the EU in general.

We should note that in the European Union there is a well-developed and serious regulatory framework of migration management. First of all, we should list the base documents that review and regulate the various aspects of migration processes. These are – the Rome Treaty (1957), the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), the Nice Treaty (2001), the Prüm Convention (2005), the Lisbon Treaty (2009), and other.

The Schengen Agreements (1985 and 1990) contributed to the simplification of migration control within the EU and likewise to its harshening on the EU's outer borders with the countries that are not EU-members and did not sign the Schengen documents. The Dublin Convention (1992), in accordance to which the application of asylum-seekers is being reviewed in the first country (country of admission into the EU). Herewith, the EU countries are guided by the first country's decision to grant / deny refugee status. We should likewise note the two London resolutions (1992) that gave the ability to divide the economic migrants and refugees; to accelerate the procedure of asylum application reviewing; and gave the classification for "safe countries", from whence there could be no refugees. The Tampere, Hague, Stockholm Action Plans (1999-2014) also deserve mention.

In 1999, the European Union began developing a single (common) official EU migration strategy, the purpose of which was to unify the visa procedures and to standardize migration rules in EU states. Based on the Treaty on the European Union functioning, the following fields of migration management are covered by the general rules:

- The unification and standardization of the rules of crossing the EU borders, and the rules of entry into the EU member-states;
- The demands for the immigrants for their legal stay within the territory of an EU state;
- The procedure of counteracting illegal migration, and human trade (the minimal standard; an EU participant-state may expand the list of actions and punitive sanctions for carrying out these actions);
- The standardization of readmission treaties;
- The standardization of integration initiatives and activities (the minimal standard; the EU participant-state may expand the list of obligatory criteria).

Starting with 1999, the issues of migration and asylum granting fall under the scope of the Amsterdam Treaty. The main juridical results are provisions, directives, decisions, recommendations, and conclusions. Currently, within the European Union there are two mechanisms of legal registration for migration.

Regulations and *Decisions* – are the European Union's legal acts that, after being adopted by the European Parliament, have direct influence in the EU member-states. The national legislators' decision is not necessary for their enactment. However, during the signing of the Treaty for the creation of the European Union, individual participant-countries have made special clauses on the functioning of rules and decisions. The exceptions concern Denmark on the issues of unification of migration rules, and the standardization of the visa and asylum policies. The parliamentarians of Ireland and the UK define the amount of rules and decisions that are obligatory for Ireland and the UK. Among the rules that directly function in all EU states, we should consider the legal management of attraction of highly qualified specialists (the *Blue Card*) Council adopts the «EU Blue Card»: more advantages for high-skilled foreign workers (Council of the European Union 2009).

Directives – are the European Union's legal acts that demand incorporation into internal (national) law of the EU member-states. The EU Parliament establishes the date of obligatory incorporation of a directive into the internal legislation of the EU member-states, however, the forms, methods, and special clauses on the way the directive functions within the territory of one country or another is decided by each county's national parliament. The legal registration of EU migration policy, for the most part, takes place through directives.

Among the general rules of exceptional competencies for the EU member-states there are: making the final decision on a migration application; establishing the principles, order, and specifics of granting the right for long-term stay, including the right for residence for a term of more than three months; establishing the principles, order, and specifics for labor activity within the territory of an EU member-state, etc. (Gulina 2017)

It is known that the European Union is an organization that is based on treaties. These treaties, approved within the field of public international law between the member-states, may later be turned into laws that bind the member-countries. This ability to turn treaties between states into

laws that tie these states together is a unique and defining trait of the EU. In general, the EU political system is presented as a "hybrid" that includes both a separation of powers, and the inter-institutional negotiations that are the everyday component of EU policy.

In the EU, migration management is carried out by different supranational bodies (Boswell and Geddes 2011: 51-75):

European Council (Council of Ministers) where the representatives of national governments sit. Since 1974, the European Council convokes the heads of states and governments to determine the EU's common political direction. The European Council's summits are an additional institutional level, and are a place for loud and often shocking political statements on different issues, including immigration and asylum. However, due to their high political status and the chairpersons' desire to provide succession, the European Council's conclusions often contain far-going and ambitious political goals. This is perhaps the most important channel of the member-states' declarative policies that provides a wide coverage in the press, and is used as a mediator for the estimation of success of the departing presidency.

The European Commission that responds for the initiation of policies, the management and implementation of EU decisions. The role of the European Commission in migration and asylum policy is significant. It is quite different from the administrative institutions of the national governments. Its General Directorates are headed by Commissioners who are less dependent of and undermined by the national governments and voters. The Commission began to take a particular part in the issues of immigration and asylum-granting after the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (1993).

The Commission's influence has especially broadened after the Amsterdam Treaty (1999). It is an active supporter of the Common European system for asylum-granting that presumes uniform standards of assistance and protection, uniform procedures of estimation of asylum applications, and a uniform refugee status. The Commission came to play a more prominent role in the development of the common asylum policy (through the General Directorate for Justice, Liberty, and Security), and supports the increase of coordination of national policy. Its three General Directorates (of justice, of internal affairs, and of employment and social issues) have quite strong interest in migration policy. At the same time,

the role of other General Directorates (of foreign affairs, of expansion, and others) is also increasing.

The European Parliament that is the only elected body at EU level. The European Parliament's role has significantly increased in the recent years, especially after the application of the joint decision-making procedure toward certain aspects of migration and asylum policy (the Amsterdam Treaty, and the follow-up changes within the Nice and Lisbon Treaties). At the same time, it should be noted that there are difficulties in relations when it comes to dividing the powers between the European Parliament, and the European Council that represents the national governments. This is clearly manifested in the discussions over migration and asylum; not least because the European Parliament often demonstrated a pro-integrationist approach to the development of EU policy. This oftentimes came into contradiction with the approaches that came from "Europe – the besieged fortress". At the same time, one cannot ignore the eurosceptics, the political forces within the European Parliament that speak in favor of harshening the EU migration policy.

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) interprets the EU's laws and rules. Its competencies in the field of migration and asylum outside of the EU are, as a rule, limited by the European Union's internal limits. The Lisbon Treaty expands the power of the European Court in the field of migration and asylum policy.

In general, the EU's competencies on the issues of migration and asylum manifest in the following:

- The gradual transition toward the expansion of the EU's participation, noted especially through the European Commission's participation in the decision-making process;
- The increasing role of the European Parliament through the use of procedures of joint decision-making;
- The maintenance of a strong role of member-states in deciding of the direction the policy goes, but after Amsterdam, Nice, and Lisbon, the accent shifts toward inter-institutional negotiations;
- The inclusion of the issues of migration and asylum into the Lisbon Treaty in the form of "regular" issues, which means a joint solution between the European Council and the European Parliament, the European Council and the European Court.

4.2 Main Aspects of the EU Migration and Asylum Policy

Since the beginning of the European community (1957), migration has always played an important role in the system of integration processes. For a long time, the key mainstreams of the EU migration policy were the formation of a free internal market and, at the same time, the development of an effective control system of people on the European Union's outer borders.

Until recently, the main factors of formation of the EU migration policy, aside from the outside migration pressure, were the demographic situation created in most of the European countries, and the demands of the labor market. Internal European mobility was influenced by the European Union's expansion via those countries whose living standards were significantly lower than in the "old" EU member-countries. Among the demographic factors, the European population's fast aging was the main factor. The regulated inflow of additional human resources from abroad levels these issues somewhat, as immigration provides up to 40% of the European countries' population increase. The arrival of highly qualified immigrants and their input into the formation of the knowledge based economy has always been especially desirable. And even though the inflow of foreign populations brings problems for the European community just as it does benefits, under the conditions of an effective regulation, in it is seen as necessary for Europe's progressive development (Malinovs'ka, 2014: 4-5).

In the conditions of globalization of the world economy, in EU countries arose the issue of lack of labor resources, which resulted in the necessity to form a migration policy in regard to selective attraction of labor migrants. At the same time, the problem of employment of illegal labor force quickly increased in scale, and became a key problem that needed to be solved in the EU's migration aria.

On the way to harmonization of migration policy, both in internal mobility, and in regard to the regulation of foreign migration, the EU overcame a number of stages of consulting and treaties. By the beginning of 2014 "*one could state the EU's readiness to engage in comprehensive control over the border crossing processes with a positive balance for the economic and political development of the Union countries*" (Balice, 2016: 167).

An important step in the harmonization of the European states' policy in the field of migration was the Amsterdam treaty (1997), where a separate section was included, dedicated to the freedom of movement, asylum and immigration. With this document, the EU could now adopt the obligatory for the member-states legislation in the field of migration. In October 1999, at the Tampere summit (Finland), the heads of the EU states agreed to implement the Amsterdam treaty, including provisions in migration and asylum. A special program was adopted where the final and short-term goals on the creation of a joint system of migration management in the EU were defined. As Romano Prodi (the chairman of the European Commission) noted after the creation of the single market, the introduction of the single currency and the creation of the Schengen space, the harmonization of migration policy marked a new stage of European unification.

After the implementation of the "Tampere" program (2004), the next program of action until 2010 was established in Hague. In it, the following goals were formulated: to create a unified European system of asylum; to develop legal migration and combat illegal employment; to provide the integration of third country citizens; to develop the external political vector of migration policy; to perfect the management of migration flows. Aside from the development of the general legislation, the Hague program was focused on improving solidarity between the EU countries in solving migration issues, and provided the functioning of a number of financial programs for mutual aid (Collett 2009).

The first developed document on the EU's unified immigration policy was prepared by the European Commission in the year 2000. Considering the work force deficit caused by the decrease of the able-bodied population, especially of the qualified kind, the Message called for the introduction of a controlled attraction policy of economic migrants as the component of the unified European migration and asylum policy. It stated that immigration should not be seen as a panacea, but that it can still decrease the labor market's problems and contribute to the stability of the population's system of social aids. In the document, there were proposed the ways and methods of realization of the policy, whose central aspect is the collaboration between the member-countries and the close cooperation of all the interested parties, in other words, the governments, employers, worker unions, and of other civil society actors. Empathized also was the

idea that immigration policy must be followed by effective integrationist programs, and other things.

In December, 2005, after prolonged multilateral consultations, the Political plan for legal immigration was approved. Its adoption demonstrated the change of the EU's immigration policy – from a restrictive to a more pragmatic, open one. The goals of migration policy were supposed to be the use of migration potential for Europe's development, integration of those foreigners who are already in its territory, and a regulated attraction of new contingents of foreign workers.

In 2008, the principles of EU immigration policy were formulated; the necessary measures and tools for their realization were planned. The first principle was the creation of a transparent system of rules and procedures with the purpose of providing legal immigration. This presumed granting third country nationals with the necessary information on legal entry and stay in EU territory. Their rights were to be close to those from which EU citizens benefit (Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on an open method of coordination of the Community immigration policy 2001). According to the second principle, economic immigration must correspond to the EU labor market's needs, and it must contribute to economic growth not just in quantity, but in quality also (in professional and qualification composition). Its realization must contradict neither the migrants' rights, nor the EU citizens' preferential status on the labor market. Each EU member-country has the right to decide on the volume of economic immigration into its territory, and do this in close collaboration with its social partners, employers, and local authorities.

A no-less important principle direction of the EU's migration policy is the issue of integration of immigrants in the countries of their stay. This must be a two-way process that engages both the immigrants and the accepting country's society. The next principle that was at the base of the EU's unified immigration policy development was solidarity that presumes mutual trust and a just division of responsibility between the member-countries. With this purpose, a system of information exchange and estimation of migration policy on the national level, from the EU interest point of view, was created. Also, financial and organizational aid for the countries that experienced the highest immigration pressure was organized.

Thus, the integration process defined the main principles of the EU's migration policy that were directed at providing the Union's internal security – integrated border security and an adequate visa policy, in particular, the introduction of a unified visa label, the creation of visa centers that would issue visas for travelers into EU countries. The central question of security was the prevention of illegal migration.

In 2008, in the field of migration, five primary directions were identified: 1) organization of legal immigration in accordance with the priorities, necessities and capabilities of select countries, the provision of migrant integration; 2) prevention of illegal migration, provision of the return of illegal migrants into their country of origin or transit; 3) increase of border control effectiveness; 4) development of the European system of asylum; 5) intensification of collaboration with the countries of migrant origin with the purpose of providing a synergic interaction between migration and development (Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on migration 2001).

Thus, it was presented that the EU, alongside the process of developing an effective system of control over migration processes and the identification of the mechanism of attraction of qualified migration potential, developed a relatively working mechanism of acceptance and adaptation of refugees from the world's troubled regions. This meant that after 1999, in the EU there has been achieved significant progress in the formation of the unified system of asylum granting, at the base of which were the norms of the Geneva Convention of 1951, on refugee status. At the first stage, adopted were four directives that define the general minimal standards in this field. First of all, there is the Directive on the minimal standards for accepting asylum-seekers (Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003). According to this directive, the member-countries must provide the asylum-seekers with accommodations, food, necessary clothing and allowance for the period over which the asylum application is being reviewed. They likewise are obliged, in case of necessity, to provide these persons' access to medical services and psychological support, and their children's access to education. Asylum seekers likewise were guaranteed the rights to family unity, to professional education, and in particular cases – to employment.

The basic general standards also covered the procedure of reviewing asylum applications. In different countries it is significantly different as a result of the multitude of constitutional and administrative systems; however all must answer to the same demands of transparency and effectiveness. Obligatory is the provision of all the necessary information to the asylum seeker in a language that they understand, as well as of legal aid and the ability to appeal the decision taken on his application. The decision over one's application for asylum must be taken individually, objectively, and by a competent person.

The next document was dedicated to the elaboration of general approaches to the estimation of reasons for granting asylum and standardization of characteristics of the different forms of protection applied in European countries. This is the so-called "Qualification" Directive, effective since 2006 in all EU countries, with the exception of Denmark (Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004). Important is that aside from the Geneva Convention of 1951 on the status of refugees, the document is based also on the European convention on the fundamental human rights and liberties, and the EU Human Rights Charter. Thus, the member-countries are obliged to provide the protection not only of conventional refugees, but also of other persons in need of protection. In other words, apply additional forms of protection. The document states that protection may be applied for not only by those who are prosecuted by the government, but also by those who are suffering from the action of non-state formation and legally unrecognized forces.

The Fourth Directive in the field of asylum established the standards of temporary protection provided in the case of mass arrival of refugees as result of armed conflicts. This form of protection is applied when there is reason to believe that the standard procedure of granting refugee status will not be effective under the conditions of a big number of applications. The Directive contained the general approaches to the procedures of granting, prolongation, and lifting of temporary asylum, as well as the minimal standards for persons to whom this form of protection is given: granting a stay permit for a period of 1-3 years; providing with information; access to employment, accommodation, social aid and medical assistance, as well as child education; guarantee access to the standard procedure of obtaining refugee status. In case the situation in the temporary refugee's

home-country normalizes, procedures for assisting the refugees return home were provided.

A great importance for the formation of a unified European system of asylum holds the collaboration and mutual support between the member-countries. Seeing as how the refugee flows distribute unequally, i.e. some countries carry a bigger burden than others, in 2000, the European Refugee Fund was established with a budget of 628 million Euros for 2007-2013 (all EU countries took part except Denmark). It provided assistance in the organization of appropriate acceptance and support of refugees, contributes to the refugees' integration into the accepting society, and, if necessary – to their return home or relocation into another country. The Fund also financed immediate actions in case of an unexpected and massive arrival of refugees (Council Decision 2000/596/EC of 28 September 2000).

Alongside solidarity, there is also the principle of just distribution of responsibility for the refugees that was established by the Dublin Convention in 1990. The norms provided by the Convention were improved with the adoption of agreements, now known as Dublin II. These specify that the responsibility for application reviewing belongs to the country that issued the visa, or the country of first entry, however, they also take into account the presence of relatives, and the experience of residence in one country or another. The document also details the mechanism of transfer of responsibility over the asylum seeker between countries (Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003). In order to prevent the abuse of the system of refugee protection, during the procedure of determining an applicant's status it is necessary to check if the application has previously been given in another EU country (the EURODAC system, the unified fingerprint database of asylum seekers).

By 2006 the first phase of formation of the unified system for asylum granting was, for the most part, complete. At the same time, an analysis of application of the legislation has proven that asylum seekers from the same countries, who had similar stories of escape, could obtain different permits depending on what EU country they placed their application for asylum in. Despite the common legislation, the administrative practices remained different; furthermore, upon reviewing an application, the different countries' officials employed various sources of information on the situation in the asylum seekers' home country, which would influence their

decision. With the results of estimations of the practices, and by applying the according directives, the European Commission has developed the Political Asylum Plan where further steps that are supposed to lead to the introduction in EU territory of a unified procedure of providing protection to the refugees, establish the appropriate status and provide a document confirming it. At this stage, it was agreed to improve the standards of providing aid, the maximal decrease of distinction between the conditions of refugee stay in different countries, and to deepen the collaboration between member-countries in the field of refugee protection.

The forming component for the unified EU asylum policy is the attempt at practical collaboration of member-countries in this field, the harmonization not only of the appropriate legislation, but of administrative practices as well. In 2010 the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) was created, whose functions were to deepen practical collaboration, and provide support to those countries where the systems of refugee protection are facing the most pressure due to these countries' geographic location or due to a massive sudden inflow of immigrants; improving the implementation of EU legislation on granting asylum. The agency must provide information exchange between countries, spread forward experience, and also, collect, analyze and share information of the refugees' countries of origin. In response to the inquiry of those EU countries that have been facing difficulties in accepting refugees, the EASO can now coordinate the creation and direction of support groups that will provide technical help, namely translation, spreading of information on the origin countries, etc.

At the second stage of formation of the unified European asylum system, the mechanisms of identifying the country that is responsible for reviewing the refugee's application for asylum were clarified. The document known as Dublin III was adopted. It states that the procedure for transferring the asylum seeker to another party cannot last for more than 11 months. The applicant is guaranteed the right to appeal the decision of transfer, and the right for free legal assistance.

Thus, the EU was trying to create a working mechanism of refugee protection through solidarity and humanism, a mechanism that would improve with each new stage. However, the migrant crisis of 2014-2016 has significantly undermined the stable process of consulting. The entire process and practice accumulated in the previous years were threatened

to be shut down. The crisis became a crucial point, a serious test for the entire migration system. For the first time, in the backdrop of the current events, a number of EU countries have declared their preparedness to exit the Schengen system. This is fraught with the complete destruction of the European region's entire system of mobility.

The EU's problem of accepting and adapting the refugees is also being complicated factors that significantly increase public resistance to the migrants' arrival, seeing as how, first of all, the majority of the refugees behave as consumers, acting on the "everyone owes me everything" principle. They are certain that no country would refuse them asylum. And they are right, as Denmark was the only country to adopt laws that limit migration. Second, many immigrants and asylum seekers have no desire to integrate into European space, to adopt European values. On the contrary, they stand for maintaining their national and religious identity. Thirdly, considering the level of education and experience of gun handling, such migrants quickly begin forming criminal groups and threaten the locals' safety. Already, in the previously calm European cities there are neighborhoods which have been vacated by the natives due to the threats to their health and wellbeing, where only Africans and Asians remain. In this situation, when the threat coming from the migrants is bigger than the locals' desire to help them, the ultra-right parties, with their violent attitude toward the refugees, are gaining popularity among the common people of EU countries (Balice, 2016: 171).

The migration crisis (2014-2016) has undermined the entire Schengen system, whose key-principle determines transparent inner borders and strong outer borders. The previous Dublin system in accordance to which the refugees are the responsibility of that EU country in whose territory they first entered, is plainly ineffective and not working. The refugees did not want to stay in the first country of admission; they wanted to get to those countries where social benefits are more generous (see Annex I).

A difficult challenge for the EU has become the new demand in the migration field, to distribution of quotas for obligatory admission of asylum seekers in EU countries. However, this proposal was not a solution to the problem, but rather its aggravation, as a number of states, primarily of the Union's "new members" (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Czechia), did not agree with such a decision. It was revealed that the EU is an "asymmetric world".

Experts consider that it would have been more just and farsighted to employ other mechanisms, especially since they have already been developed and tested (Гулина 2017). In the European Union, there was a juridical mechanism of managing the mass inflow of humanitarian migrants into the continent – the 2001/55/EU Directive that appeared in the context of the Yugoslavian war, and a mass population exodus out of that territory. Today, it is difficult to answer why the European Commission did not launch the 2001/55/EU Directive on the temporary protection of persons migrating in a massive or increasing flow (article 2(a)) out of a country or a geographical region following armed or other types of conflict (article 2(d)) into the territory of European states (Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001).

Within the Directive there were included the mechanisms that would have allowed the prevention of unbalance of interests over the issue of humanitarian migrant admission quotas into eastern and central European countries. The mechanism can be launched for a period of up to one year, and its activity may be prolonged if necessary. The mechanism of temporary protection stops its activity when the countries of origin of the massive human inflows are recognized as "safe countries". Important is that within the 2001/55/EU Directive restrictive procedures are also included. Thus, the activity of temporary protection does not extend over persons who have a criminal past, who've violated and / or threatened the security or legal order of the EU member-states, as well as of those who've committed crimes against humanity and/ or the acting UN ideals (article 28 (1) a-b).

Currently, the process of transformation of EU migration policy is taking place in a search for compromise. The majority of the member-countries see it in the cessation of the illegal migration flow, and the decrease of the number of asylum seekers. The center of gravity in solving these issues is taken outside the EU. In the centers organized and financed by Brussels, the entering refugees will not only be registered, but will also be verified on how justified their desire to obtain asylum is actually is. Those who arrive for economic reasons must not have the possibility to illegally enter the European Union's territory.

Conclusion

The EU's migration policy has been forming for a long time in the conditions of evolution of integrationist policy, where the ideas of formation of favorable conditions for the arrival of qualified migration resource were put at the base, with the simultaneous solution of refugee issues through the provision of pleasant conditions for their adaptation and inclusion into the European environment. For a long time, illegal migration and the fight against it have been the only problem of EU policy. However, the European migration crisis (2014-2016) questioned the entire EU migration system, its Schengen zone. This is why the EU countries' leaders began the process of transformation of EU migration policy that, for the sake of providing its own effectiveness, must go beyond the European region and obtain a global character, arguably creating a system of migration control outside of the EU itself.

Annex to the chapter 4

WHICH EUROPEAN COUNTRIES OFFER THE MOST SOCIAL BENEFITS TO MIGRANTS? СОЦИАЛЬНЫЕ ПОСОБИЯ БЕЖЕНЦАМ В СТРАНАХ ЕВРОПЫ.

AUSTRIA
- 50 Euros/month spending money for those in public housing, plus meals or 5 Euros/day allowance to buy food.
- In private housing: up to 120 Euros per person or 240 Euros per family towards rent; 210 Euros a month for food and living expenses (100 for children); 150 Euros per year for clothes, 200 Euros/year for school supplies.
- Work permit issued once asylum application is approved.

BELGIUM
- Those living in refugee reception centres receive a weekly spending allowance of 7.40 Euros per adult. Some can also carry out paid work at the centre, receiving up to 185 Euros per month. After six months, people can apply for a work permit.

- Work permit issued once asylum application is approved; immediate family members can then also come to Belgium.

BULGARIA
- Once claims approved, refugees get work permits and same rights as Bulgarians, excluding voting and military service.

CROATIA
- Successful asylum seekers receive up to two years' housing paid for by the state if they cannot fund it themselves.

CYPRUS
- Right to work in certain sectors if a decision on an asylum claim is still pending after six months.
- Those recognised as refugees get travel documents and work permits, and can bring over family members. But Cyprus more commonly awards 'subsidiary status': same benefits minus travel papers and family reunification; must reapply every three years.

CZECH REPUBLIC
- No right to work in first year after applying.
- 360 crowns (13.29 Euros) a month for those in state facilities.
- On approval: full welfare benefits; financial support to get new qualifications and find accommodation; no right to vote.

DENMARK
- Asylum seekers can apply for work.
- On approval they get about half the monthly Danish unemployment benefit; can get additional money for passing a Danish language exam. Relatives can't join them in first year.

ESTONIA
- Grant of 90 Euros per month but must pay for meals. Clothes are provided.
- On approval: integration programme and same benefits as permanent residents, including welfare and pension.

FINLAND
- Cash grant of 316 Euros/month for a single adult and 267 Euros for partners and adult children; meals must be paid for. If meals are provided, cash grant is 93 or 76 Euros per month.
- Must do unpaid community service as step towards integrating or risk losing part of the grant; cannot work elsewhere for first 3-6 months.
- Can apply to receive up to 1,000 Euros to return home.
- On approval: three years' state-financed housing; full welfare benefits, schooling, day care and child benefit; language lessons and help with finding a job.

FRANCE
- Allowance of 11.45 Euros a day or 343.50 Euros a month while awaiting result of asylum process and applying for housing in one of some 300 asylum-seeker housing projects across France. Must pay for food from this allowance, but free or cheap meals often available from food banks.
- Free health insurance while application being reviewed.
- Cannot work for first 12 months.

GERMANY
- Free meals at reception centres plus 143 Euros per month in cash for "basic needs", rising after three months to maximum of 216 Euros. Government has agreed to extend period in reception centres to six months from three to keep cash payments at the lower level for longer. Berlin also wants to switch from cash benefits to payments in kind "as far as possible".
- Up to 92 Euros per child, depending on age.
- After 15 months, or once asylum request is approved: basic income of around 400 Euros/month plus costs for accommodation and heating.

GREECE
- Asylum seekers may move freely around the country. If homeless, they may ask to be hosted in a reception centre if there are places.

Able to work under conditions set by Greek law, with same security rights and obligations as Greeks.
- On approval: three-year residence permit.

HUNGARY
- From second month, 7,125 forints (22.76 Euros) per month in cash, about a tenth of average unemployment benefit.
- Those granted asylum can stay for two more months in reception camp, getting same benefits. Some financial support and housing subsidies available to those who sign an "integration contract".

IRELAND
- Under normal circumstances, asylum seekers can spend years in regional centres, receiving full board and a nominal weekly allowance but without the right to work.
- Ireland will accept refugees under the EU's plan and will ensure they get help with integration including 20 hours a week of language learning. They also have the right to work or study.

ITALY
- No right to work until asylum granted, or during first six months, whichever comes first.
- State pays 35 Euros/day for each person housed, but most of this goes to the centres providing the meals and shelter. Asylum seekers are entitled to 2.50 Euros per day pocket money. Classes in Italian provided in some centres.
- On approval: right to work; stay permit of one, three or five years; no cash or housing.

LATVIA
- Daily payment of 2.15 Euros a day while living at reception centre.
- On approval: monthly benefit payment of 256 Euros, or 76 Euros for those under 18.

LITHUANIA
- Monthly allowance of 10 Euros while living at reception centre; no

right to work until asylum is granted.
- Successful applicants can stay up to 18 months at reception centre where they get clothing, language and vocational training, plus up to 61.50 Euros for food.
- When they leave the centre, municipalities pay moving expenses and first 12 months of rent and utilities.

LUXEMBOURG
- Monthly grant of up to 225 Euros per adult, if applicant is not hosted in accommodation offering full board. If meals are provided, monthly allowance up to 25 Euros per adult.
- Can't work for nine months after applying. If asylum process takes longer, can work under strict conditions.

MALTA
- Men put into detention centres for up to 18 months. Women and children housed in open centres run jointly by Catholic Church and state.
- Very few are granted full asylum but some are given humanitarian status. Men can then move to the open centres where they can live until they find a job or move on.
- At centres, they get 130 Euros/month plus meals. Classes provided in English, computing, Maltese culture. Length of stay varies. State provides no further housing.

NETHERLANDS
- Asylum seekers receive shelter at government-funded reception centres. Each adult receives weekly allowance of 20 to 45 Euros for food and 13 Euros for other expenses.
- Can earn up to 14 Euros/week taking jobs within the asylum centre. Refugees are allowed to work 24 weeks a year outside the centre. A share of their salary goes to the asylum centre.

NORWAY
- Asylum seekers can apply for temporary work permit and get cash for basic needs such as clothing and toiletries.

- On approval: residence permit (normally for three years and renewable); travel documents; accommodation paid by the state for up to five years; money to cover food and living expenses for two years (extendable for a further year).

POLAND
- At reception centres, 20 zlotys (4.75 Euros) per month for toiletries and pocket money of 50 zlotys (11.89 Euros)/month.
- One-off cash grant of 140 zlotys (33.28 Euros) for clothes and shoes.
- Those who decide to live outside refugee centres (about two-thirds) are provided with money to cover their living costs. An individual receives 25 zlotys (5.94 Euros)/day, while a four-member family gets a total of 50 zlotys (11.89 Euros) towards rent, food etc.
- On approval of claim: monthly allowance up to 1,260 zlotys (300 Euros), rising to 1,335 (317.35 Euros) from October, for one year to cover accommodation, food, clothes, Polish lessons. Free health insurance and legal and psychological support.

PORTUGAL
- Allowed to work only once refugee application approved. Aid available according to individual economic situation; can apply to social security for minimum subsistence wage.

ROMANIA
- Can work after a year if application still pending.
- On approval: state aid of 540 lei ($136) per person per month for up to nine months.

SLOVAKIA
- In reception centres, pocket money of 40 euro cents/day.
- On approval: right to work or claim unemployment benefit.
- One-off cash grant of around 300 Euros.

SLOVENIA
- Asylum seekers in reception centres get financial help of 18 Euros per month. They are also allowed to work.

SPAIN
- Allowed to work six months after applying for asylum.
- Cash for basic needs: 51.60 Euros maximum/month for adults and 19 Euros maximum for children under 18; plus monthly transport card, up to 363 Euros per year for clothes.

SWEDEN
- Asylum seekers living in state housing or reception centres where food is provided receive 24 crowns (2.57 Euros) per day for single adults. Those living in accommodation paid for by the state but who have to buy food for themselves get 71 crowns 7.60 Euros)/day.
- On approval: two-year integration plan including Swedish classes and help with getting a job or work experience.
- Full-time programme participants get around 6,700 crowns (716.88 Euros)/month, more if they have children or for housing.

SWITZERLAND
- Social assistance averaging 1,200 Swiss francs (1.094 Euros) per person per month, 20 percent less than for Swiss recipients.
- Recognised refugees may work with a permit.

UNITED KINGDOM
- Accommodation tends to be private, paid for by the state.
- Weekly allowance of 36.95 pounds (50.35 Euros) per person to cover basic needs including food. Small extra amounts available for pregnant women, babies and young children.
- Not normally allowed to work.

If granted asylum: same benefits as British nationals.

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5

THE EU MIGRATION CRISIS (2014-2016): ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS

The goal of this chapter is uncovering the essence and specifics of the migrant crisis in the European Union (2014-2016), outlining the main measures for its resolution. Thus, the following chapter-structure is proposed: the first section shows the causes of increase of migration flows into Europe. The second section characterizes the volumes and directions of migration flows. The third section is dedicated to uncovering the main migration routes in the EU, and shows their evolution in the recent years. In the fourth section the qualitative characteristics of illegal migrants and refugees in the EU are given, noted is that the vast majority of refugees and irregular migrants are young males. At the same time, women make up to 1/3 of all migration flows. There have been found about 100, 000 unaccompanied children among the migrants during the course of the crisis. In the fifth section, an important aspect concerning the attitude of the European Union member-states' public opinion towards migrants and refugees is addressed. The sixth section lists the consequences of the migration crisis of 2014-2016 for the European Union. In the seventh section the Emergency measures and solutions, taken by the EU are analyzed. The eighth compartment is dedicated to the reviewing of the main priorities of long-term policy of flexible solidarity. In conclusion it is underlined that the effectiveness of the EU's migration policy depends on the solidarity of the EU members, collaboration with third (non-EU) countries, and transformation of EU policy from regional to global. At the end of the chapter, given is the literature on the topic.

The 2010's have been characterized by mass refugee, migrant flows into Europe. This phenomenon saw its peak in the middle of the second decade of the 21st century, especially in 2014-2016. Europe, the European Union in particular, has faced a migration crisis of unprecedented levels. How the crisis is manifested, what are its consequences for the European Union, for its migration policy, what are the EU and its member-states' authorities undertaking – these questions are the object this chapter.

By crisis (from the Greek work κρίσις – solution, turning point) we may understand "*A time of intense difficulty or danger*" or "*A time when a difficult or important decision must be made*" or simply some "*turning point of a disease when an important change takes place, indicating either recovery or death*".[1] In the context of a migration crisis, this means that the factors of expulsion / attraction produce migration flows of such scales that the destination countries are unable to adequately integrate with the existing tools, the existing migration policy.

5.1 Why migration flow has increased?

Among the primary causes and factors conditioning an increase of migration flows into Europe are:

Firstly, the contemporary world's gap between the poor south and east and the rich west and north has not only remained, but in fact widened. The poverty in many African countries is terrifying. Millions of people are living in horribly poverty, consuming less than 1 dollar per day. We should also note that there is a demographic boom and a population increase in Africa that is adjoined by a lack of workplaces. And this is taking place in direct proximity to rich and prosperous Europe, where the European Union that faces the aging of its population and a lack of workforce. As a result, millions of people are making a choice: they are joining international labor migration; they leave their homes in search of workplaces and a better life in the more prosperous and stable countries.

Secondly, in the contemporary world the ethnic, confessional, political, civil and armed conflicts not only remain, but are worsening. They are followed by increasing numbers of refugees, persons in search of asylum and humanitarian aid. First of all we should mention countries such as

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[1] See English Oxford Living Dictionaries.

Afghanistan, Iraq, a number of equatorial African states, Ukraine, Kosovo... In the recent years, revolutionary changes have taken place in a number of North African states (the "Arab spring"), that were often followed by an aggravation of interethnic conflicts, by civil war, an acute decrease of the population's living conditions, mass human mobility, an increase of the number of refugees and internally displaced persons in the world.

Thirdly, these processes have had a direct influence on the migration situation in Europe as well. The North African authoritarian regimes that harshly controlled their countries' borders and, objectively speaking, acted as a kind of "barrier" to the refugees and migrants going north, into Europe have collapsed. Today's situation in North Africa is analogous to that from the beginning of the 1990's in Eastern Europe (in post-soviet space), when the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc collapsed: the borders became porous, and this stimulated the growth of international labor and illegal migration from and through these countries. This affected the increase of illegal migration into Europe from northern and equatorial Africa.

Fourthly, there is the EU's miscalculation regarding to the specifics of the new migration situation in Europe. As noted by P. Vimon "*the explosive increase of migration caught the European institutions by surprise, despite the fact that it could have been foreseen*" (Vimon 2017). The coming storm was preceded by an increase of the number of refugees and internally displaced persons in Syria, where a civil war was raging. But herewith, there were three aspects that prevented an adequate estimation of the situation: the course and tempo of the events did not allow one to see the political background of the crisis; the migration boom was of a highly complicated nature, as was the Syrian crisis that gave birth to it; the European populists were persistently calling against interfering into the middle-eastern affairs.

The migration processes in the EU during the mid-second decade had nothing strange about them. The flows that came into Europe from Africa were mainly caused by economic reasons. Herewith, the migrants would reach Europe via the Mediterranean Sea, through the Italian islands Lampedusa and Sicily. The new wave of migrants however, came mainly from Syria. The roots of this migration were political reasons. The EU did not take note of these changes right away. The countries that were directly affected by the situation were the ones who had to deal with it. It was only at the end of the summer of 2015 that the EU came to help Italy (the naval

operation "Sofia"). The migration flow that came to Europe in the spring of 2015 was different in both cause and scale. Migration was primarily political: people were running from war and violence, they were saving their lives. Herewith, the most common were migrants from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. A new "Balkan" route had been laid out. Herewith, a high degree of determination to realize their goals was noted with the migrants.

The EU had already faced mass refugee inflows during the 1990's (civil wars in former Yugoslavian territory). What made the situation of 2015 so specific was that Europe faced a very strong inflow of refugees in a very short period; many EU countries ended up drawn into the process of refugee admission, and this made it a common problem for the entire EU; due to the specifics of the "Balkan" route, a number of states that are not EU members were also included into the collective decision-making process; the near-eastern migration flow was, for the most part, represented by Muslims and carriers of non-European traditional culture.

Fifthly, among the EU members there was no solidarity when it came to the adoption of common rules to solve the issue of settling the refugees. This lead to the overworking of migration services in certain countries (Kravchenko 2016).

5.2 Volumes and directions of migration flows

Due to the aforementioned reasons, numerous refugees from regions engaged in civil wars, armed, religious, and ethnic conflicts would infiltrate Europe, the European Union. Herewith, a tendency for the increase of the number of refugees and illegal migrants is clearly seen. Thus, in 2014, a number of 283.5 thousand refugees arrived to Europe. In 2015, according to the Office of the United Nations' High Commissioner for Refugees' data, the European Union accepted more than 1.5 million refugees (The Telegraph 2015).

Table 1: Number of illegal EU border crossings (thousands)

Year	No. of crossings
2010	106
2011	146
2012	77
2013	106
2014	283
2015	1.822
2016	500
2017 (January-October)	173

Source: TASS 2018.

In 2016, the number of illegal migrants and refugees in the EU decreased (Grishin V.I. et al. 2016). In 2017, their number went below that of 2014. The EU's agency of border control FRONTEX offers the following dynamic of illegal border crossings (see table 1).

Oftentimes, migration would be accompanied by death. The vast majority of the deceased are migrants that used the naval routes and drowned in the Mediterranean Sea. According to the International Organization for Migration's data, more than 3,409 people died in 2014 and in 2015 the number was 3,771 people (Medicins Sans Frontiers 2018). Overland routes, saw only one known deceased migrant, the one who was shot by a Bulgarian border police official. In 2017, due to the prevalence of naval routes of migration, the number of migrants who died crossing the Mediterranean Sea increased again – more than 2,800 people (TASS 2018).

Table 2: The number of illegal migrants on the main routes in 2017 (January-October), number of people per three main national groups.

Route	2017
West-Mediterranean route, through Spain (Morocco, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea)	7.383
Central-Mediterranean route, through Italy (Nigeria, Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire)	25.791
East-Mediterranean route, through Greece (Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan)	22.101
West-Balkan route, through the former Yugoslavia (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq)	8.437

Source: TASS 2018.

FRONTEX statistical data on migration into the EU in 2017 shows that there is a decrease of the volumes of illegal migrants and refugees. Undoubtedly, the real numbers are bigger. But the tendency is seen plainly – a decrease of the volumes of migration into the EU. Furthermore, a change in the structure of refugee flow is taking place. Namely, there is an increase in the number of refugees from Africa and a decrease of Syrian refugees, due to the increasing possibility of stabilization of the situation in Syria. According to statistical data of FRONTEX and OHCR of the UN for 2015, the average migrant is a Syrian male of 18 years of age, professing Sunni Islam. Today, the situation changed slightly. As before, mostly the males are 18 or older, who profess Islam, and travel to the EU. However, we should note that among the migrants there are many Nigerians, and almost 50% of the Nigerian population professes Christianity, which cannot leave the migrants' religious composition unaffected.

Furthermore, statistics show that the naval route to Italy (the Central-Mediterranean route) has yet again become the most popular among migrants. It is mainly used by the citizens of Nigeria, Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire, and Bangladesh. We should note that these migrants, unlike the Syrians who are running from war, will have a lot of difficulties proving that they are refugees and not economic migrants.

5.3 Main migration routes to the EU

The recent years' migration practice into Europe has shown a number of naval, land, and aerial migration routes into the European Union Migration mobility routes into Europe from African and near eastern countries (The Economist 2015).

It should be underlined that these routes are not used just by the residents of the countries from where the migration route begins. In these countries gather the migrants not just from the South (African) Mediterranean, but also from the countries located far to the south of the Sahara. The reason for this, as we already mentioned above is the porosity of north-African countries' borders that appeared after the collapse of the authoritarian regimes in Libya, Egypt, and other countries and regions. At the same time, representatives of near-eastern and south-east Asian, Iraqi, Afghani, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and other countries are widely present in migration

to Europe, the EU. These routes are as follows:

1. **West-African naval route**: it begins in west-African countries (Mali, Senegal, and Mauritania) and goes to the Canary Islands (Spain's insular territory located in the Atlantic Ocean near the African continent, but at the same time, at 3,000 kilometer distance from the mother country). In 2015, registered were 874 migrants.

2. **West-Mediterranean naval route**: mobility begins from the north-African countries toward the Pyrenean peninsula, through the Spanish enclaves into Morocco (Ceuta and Melilla); from there, to Spain or France (from Morocco or Algiers). In 2015, on this route, there have been identified 7,164 migrants.

3. **Central-Mediterranean naval route:** begins from Libya, Tunis, Egypt, and by sea, goes to Malta and Italy (the Lampedusa and Sicily islands). On this route there are many migrants from the African Horn and equatorial African countries. Since 2011, it is the main route for illegal migration from Libya. It was instrumental during the migration of 2013-2014. Between 2009 and 2014, more than 200,000 people have used it. In 2015, 153,946 migrants have been spotted on this route. In 2016 the number of refugees from Libya into Italy increased two-fold, and made up 24, 000 people. Since 2017, it is regaining popular, and is becoming the dominant route – among the identified routes of migration into the EU.

4. **East-Mediterranean naval route:** from Turkey (the Mediterranean coastline) toward Greece, the Greek islands. In 2015, this route was dominant. More than 800 thousand people used it to get to the EU.

5. **Circular land route**: from Albania to Greece. This route is characterized by an irregularity. In 2015 it was used by 8,932 people.

6. **West-Balkan land route**: in 2015 a land route was identified with two variants:

   a) *Primary variant*: Turkey – Greece – Macedonia – Serbia – Hungary – Austria – Germany (Zerohedge 2015). After Hungary closed its borders, the multi-thousand refugee flows from Hungary and Serbia were redirected to transit along the route: Croatia – Slovenia – Austria – Germany. In 2015, this route has been taken by 764,038 people. This turned out to be the main land route through the Balkans (Grishin V.I. et al. 2016).

b) *Additional variant*: Turkey – Greece – Bulgaria – Serbia – Hungary – Austria – Germany. More than twenty-five and a half thousand migrants were attempting to enter the Schengen-zone through Bulgaria (Republic of Bulgaria: Ministry of Interior 2018).

Furthermore, a number of eastern routes into the EU are also identified. Thus, the EU's eastern borders are crossed through the land borders with Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, and the eastern EU member-states (Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia). In general, the scale of illegal migration on all eastern borders is significantly lower than on any other migration route into the EU, and makes up 0.1% of the total number. These are the auxiliary/ secondary routes. In 2015, these routes were used by 1,920 people.

At the same time, in regard to the eastern routes, due to the big number of migrants that use them, we should note: the Ukrainian and the Arctic routes.

7. *The Ukrainian route* of migration has three variants:

a) *Ukrainian refugees:* the armed conflict in the eastern regions of Ukraine (Lugansk, Donetsk) resulted in numerous refugees and internally displaced persons. According to the data provided by the UNOHCR, in Ukraine there are more than 1 million internally displaced persons, and there are more than 300 thousand Ukrainian refugees worldwide. Most of them remained in Russia. A certain part found refuge in Belarus, Moldova, and the EU countries.

b) *West-Ukrainian land route*: at the same time, migrants from Afghanistan and south-eastern Asia are trying to reach the EU through Ukraine. They arrive to Russia by train or airplane, cross the Russian-Ukrainian border illegally, and attempt to cross into Hungary, Slovakia, or Poland, using Ukraine as a transit country. After 2014, this route has almost entirely lost its appeal, considering the context of the worsening relations between Russia and Ukraine following the 2014 events in Crimea and Ukraine's eastern regions.

c) *Ukrainian Black Sea naval route*: Illegal migrants arrive to Ukraine by sea from Turkey via passenger or transport ships. They

attempt to reach the EU, using Ukraine as a transit country, much like in the previous variant.

8. The Arctic route: through Russia - the events of October-December of 2015 have shown that Syrian refugees and migrants would arrive to Moscow by plane from Lebanon, Turkey, and Syria; from there they would take a train or airplane for Saint Petersburg. From Saint Petersburg they would go to Murmansk, where they would take a bus or train across the Cola peninsula toward the Norwegian border, crossing it either on foot or by bicycle, and would request refugee status in Norway (The Wall Street Journal 2015). Per total, about 6 thousand refugees and migrants crossed into Norway and Finland via the arctic route. Herewith, if Norway was primarily the destination of Syrians, who would complete their migration in about 3-5 days, then Finland was the destination of migrants from different countries, many of whom would previously stay in Russia over a prolonged period of time. As of the late 2015, this route no longer functions.

We should also note the presence of many air-routes of refugee and illegal migrant mobility from African and Asian countries toward many of the European Union's cities. Primarily, we can list Paris, London, Madrid, Vienna, and others.

The year 2017 helped identify attempts to open new routes into the European Union. This was the case of **9. West Black Sea naval route**: Turkey (the western Black Sea coastline) – Romania / Bulgaria. In the third decade of September, 2017, two boats that were transporting about 250 irregular migrants from Turkey were apprehended in Romanian territorial waters.

5.4 Characteristics of illegal migrants and refugees

When characterizing the volumes of contemporary migration into Europe, one should note that by ethnic composition, the majority of refugees are Syrians (every second refugee). In 2014-2016, they were dominant on all the primary naval routes, as well as on the West-Balkan and arctic routes.

This is, actually, not surprising: today, more than half of the country's population (about 14 million people) are forced migrants. Of them, more than 4 million people are refugees who reside primarily in the neighbor countries (Turkey – more than 2 million; Lebanon – about 1.2 million; Jordan – more than 0.6 million; Egypt – about 150 thousand people) (BBC 2015).

There are many refugees and asylum seekers from Afghanistan, Eritrea, Nigeria, Iraq, Somali, Sudan, Gambia, Bangladesh, and Senegal. The representatives of these countries in 2015 made up 90% f all refugees and migrants in the EU.

As practice shows, a significant part of the migrants are economic migrants who are attempting to enter the EU by pretending to be refugees. According to experts'' estimations, refugees make up a quarter of the total migrant inflow into the EU. Among the migrants, more than 70% are young men below the age of 35 (Kommerstant 2015a). About 30% are women and children – the migrants' family members. More than 70% are irregular migrants (The Guardian 2015). Furthermore, it should be noted that the migration crisis of 2014-2016 revealed a new phenomenon – an increase in the number of children travelling to Europe without being accompanied by parents of adults (RIA 2016).

At the same time, experts and mass-media have drawn attention to the danger of the EU being infiltrated by ISIS militants alongside the refugees (NTV 2015a). Thus, the British mass-media operated with a number of 4 thousand ISIS militants, who've allegedly already arrived to the EU from Syria.

The practice of admission of refugees and asylum seekers in Europe has shown that migrants were not evenly distributed among EU countries. According to Eurostat data, in 2014, the majority of EU migrants found refuge in Germany. The situation in 2015 was analogous. Germany accepted more than 600 thousand EU refugees and irregular migrants.

This is not accidental. *First of all*, the migrants did not want to simply come to the European Union, they strove to obtain refugee status in Germany, Sweden, and the UK. The year 2015 was demonstrative in this regard.

Secondly, Angela Merkel's government, leaning on the experience of the 1990's, when more than 2 million Yugoslav refugees were accepted to EU countries (UNHCR 2010), and the generally positive attitude of the German

public opinion toward refugees, offered to take in more than 800 thousand people.

Thirdly, we consider that the German Councilor, when making the decision, was not driven only by humanitarian principles, but by political interest also. This decision helped reduce the pressure, lowered the chances of appearance of an open conflict and of centrifugal tendencies inside the EU, between the community's leadership and the national governments, who resisted the inflow of migrants and were ready to transpose onto others the responsibility to solve their problems. The conflict did manifest, but only affected a number of the new EU members, the central European states (Slovakia, Czechia, Romania, Hungary, and Poland).

The migration crisis has shown that different EU countries have a different migration load. Thus, in 2014, the most asylum seekers in relation to the population (per 1 million people) were accepted in Sweden (8.365 people) and Hungary (4.337 people) (Geller 2015).

In general, it can be noted that the percentage of asylum seekers per an EU member-state's population is not significant – 0.11%. A higher index is in Sweden, on Malta, and in Hungary. However, this is not the highest index of refugees in the world per 1000 refugees in the accepting country. In 2014, Sweden and Malta could barely make the top 10 list of countries by this index (Mepeghana 2015).

5.5 Public opinion in the EU on immigration

The European public opinion is far from being uniform in regard to refugees and new migrants into the European Union. Alongside the desire to support the migrants, to provide them with feasible aid, one can encounter both neutral and negative, sometimes hostile attitudes among the populations of certain EU countries (RBC 2015). This is especially true for the new EU members, the former socialist states (the Baltic States, the Visegrad group, Romania, and Bulgaria), where the traditions of tolerance and solidarity are only beginning to take root in people's consciousness. Furthermore, in these countries, people are concerned with losing their national identities, with work, with being lost among international communities, Muslim culture, and terrorism inside their countries (Borarosova 2018; Mosnyaga V., Tsurkan V. and Moshnyag G. 2016).

However, not all is simple even the mass consciousness of populations of the EU-15 countries. On the one hand, tolerance towards migrants and refugees is one of the EU's key narratives, to be against migration is to be a racist, a sympathizer of radical right-wing views and positions (Collier 2016). On the other hand, in EU countries, the mass consciousness is rather ambiguous, and is fed by people's fears. Migrants are often associated with radical Muslims, militants of ISIS, the Al-Qaeda, or other terrorist organizations. People are afraid for their and their relatives' lives. We should note that the negative attitude toward refugees is likewise influenced by the existing problems on the labor market, especially the sector and specialized particularities, by terrorist acts, and by the events of the New Year's Eve of 2016 in Koln (Germany). One can also not ignore the socio-cultural differences that are caused by the environment of origin, the different level of development of traditionalist and post-industrial societies, and by lingual and professional skills. One should not forget also the issues of sanitation, the hazard of infectious disease, the increase of criminal and administrative violations (The Independent 2015).

Sociological research conducted in 2014 in the seven EU countries with the biggest population (Business Insider 2015) has shown that people differentiate between migration inside and outside the EU. They *are concerned with migration outside the EU*, from 40% in Poland to 86% in Greece. In between them are Germany (44%), Spain (47%), the UK (55%), France (57%), and Italy (80%). At the same time, migration inside the union causes less concern with people: from 25% in Poland to 57% in Spain. An index that is slightly lower than in Spain has been found in the UK, Italy, and Greece (likewise, more than 50% of concerned respondents) (Pousther 2015).

People want to see fewer immigrants in their country because:

1) *Immigrants today are a burden for our country because they take away our jobs and social benefits*: Germany (29%), the UK (37%), Spain (46%), France (52%), Poland (52%), Italy (69%), and Greece (70%). In other words, the increase of negative attitude towards immigrants and refugees in the EU was overlaid by the economic crisis of 2008-2011 as well. All this had a significant influence on the support of populist parties who would additionally include the issue of freedom of mobility within the EU of EU citizens in their discourse on migration.

2) *Immigrants today are more involved in crime than the other social groups*: the UK (20%), Poland (21%), Spain (25%), France (36%), Italy (45%), Germany (48%), and Greece (51%).
3) *Immigrants today want to differentiate themselves from our society*: Poland (42%), the UK (47%), Spain (48%), Greece (48%), France (54%), Germany (59%), and Italy (77%) (Pew Research Center 2014).

The polling conducted in these same countries in 2015 has shown that under the influence of mass inflows of refugees and irregular migrants into the EU, people's opinions are becoming more negative. Thus, only in Germany (66%) and the UK (53%), more than half of the polled persons consider that *immigrants are making the country stronger*. In the rest of the countries, the index is significantly below 50%: Greece and Italy –18% each, Poland – 24%, France – 44%, and Spain – 47%.

It should be noted that this kind of attitude toward migration and immigrants from outside the EU was registered before the tragic events/ terrorist attacks in France, Belgium, and the UK. Today, the situation is changing, and with various EU elections, the changes on the EU members' political arenas show this clearly (news.ru 2015).

5.6 Consequences of the migration crisis for the EU

The European Union faced a large-scale migration crisis. "*Unlike the migration waves of the previous decades, the current crisis is becoming a test of resistance not only for individual countries, but for the EU as a whole*" (Kommersant 2015b).

Firstly, this manifested through the inability to reduce and bring under civilized control the multi-thousand inflows of refugees and irregular immigrants into the EU countries.

Secondly, it manifested through the weak functionality of the existing measures and mechanisms of refugee and irregular migrant flows regulations. There were many violations of the provisions of documents (the "Dublin accords") that regulate EU practice in the field of asylum: on granting refugee status by the first country of entry into the EU; on temporary refugee status, etc.

Thirdly, many EU countries questioned the EU's prerogative in the development and implementation of policies in the field of asylum and others, and therefore began to introduce their own means of control, that contradict or go beyond EU policy (self-implementation of border control along the EU's internal borders (eight EU countries); changes in the country's Penal Code: illegal crossing of the EU border is not an administrative but a penal offense that is punishable by up to three years in prison (Kommersant 2015c).

Fourthly, there's the violation of the main EU principles on the security of the EU's external border. Namely, this was identified in 2015, in Greece's policy, which was unable to provide control over, and security of its own, and the Community's external border.

Fifthly, solidarity is weakening within the European Union. As underlined by P. Schultze "*already are the fundamental values of Acquis Communautaire ("Community Achievements") moved to second position, whereas national principles are beginning to take prevalence. There is a shortage of solidarity between the member-states, especially among the countries of central Europe, and the desire to share responsibility. The true crisis is supporting the trend that is current in all the member-states: citizens are losing faith in the European Union. The process of European integration is at a crossroads. It is obvious that if the EU institutions and the national governments will not be able to propose a convincing solution to the issue of regulating the migrant inflow, then the popular movements and political parties that are against the idea of a united Europe will be in benefit. This is a troubled time, and taking on others' responsibilities, searching for those who are guilty, and projecting guilt are all characteristic, whereas the conspiracy theory spreads with the speed of lightning*" (Rethinking Russia 2015).

Sixthly, migration renewed the political agenda, drawing out integration and security topics. Additionally complicating the discussion are the representatives of populist movements who are bringing in the question of freedom of movement within the EU of the citizens of its member-countries. Under the influence of the near-eastern migration wave, the chiefly internal issue of citizens' freedom of movement within EU borders affected the common political agenda in many of the participating countries.

Migration has sped up the changes on the European political arena, adding support to the populist parties, and significantly reducing the number of

supporters of the ruling parties. Under the influence of the migration crisis and the changes that are happening in the European Union's social life, anti-migrant attitudes and skepticism are growing in the public opinion of the EU states. In a number of EU countries, the populist and right-wing parties that hold anti-migrant positions, have won in presidential, parliamentary, and regional elections (Vimon 2017).

Seventhly, BREXIT has turned out to be a negative response to the uncertainty of European Union policy, the disbelief in the capability to successfully solve the problems related to the migrant crisis, and the desire to independently – only on a national level – avoid these problems.

Eighthly, in the conditions of the migration crisis, the influence of institutions such as the Council of Europe begins to increase (Jańczak 2018). It is assumed that this is a positive consequence, one that is to contribute to the increase of activity of the higher national authority bodies, as well as to the increase of the population's trust in the communal European institutes that will be regarded by the EU member-states' populations as their national interest representatives and spokespersons, and not of Brussels', or of supranational political forces and bodies. At the same time, the EU countries still have deep political disagreements on the issue of migration. More so, as experts note, the differences between the European countries have actually increased due to the internal political pressure, and the concern of the population, who considers migration to be a threat to its security and social unity (Vimon 2017).

5.7 Emergency measures and solutions

The European Union was not ready for such migration challenges. Europe's reaction was caused primarily by the necessity to solve the issue as quickly as possible. The EU countries, for the first time in their history, were forced to join their forces in search of a solution. The European Union's policy, especially on the initial stages, was a reaction to what was happening. This kind of approach was defective as it relied on the spontaneous self-exhaustion of migration flows, on the problem's self-solution. The practice of 2015 has shown however, that such estimations are not viable. The problem's self-solving through the exhaustion of migration resources does not happen.

We consider that only with October-November, 2015, does the EU begin to modernize its policy, to change accents and priorities, to "play not just on its own field". In the November of 2015, in the February and March of 2016, the European bodies (the European Commission, the European Council) adopted a list of measures to overcome the crisis.

The European leaders have agreed to block the Balkan migration route, to tighten security of the EU's external borders, and to make an agreement with Turkey, who was, and still is a transit country for the overwhelming majority of refugees from the Middle East. Thanks to these measures, the Europeans managed to regain control of the situation, and the migrant flow was reduced significantly.

With the help of temporary measures, the EU was able to restore control over the external borders and brought an end to the rushed actions of certain individual member countries. Among the adopted measures are:

1. Strengthening and consolidation of border control, of FRONTEX activity, of national border police and coast guard bodies on securing the European Union's external borders. A sum of one billion Euros was allocated for this in 2015 alone to improve border management (Kommersant 2015d).

2. Rescuing the refugees and illegal migrants at sea; countering illegal immigration into the European Union. For this purpose, the naval forces of NATO, and the coast guard are conducting permanent patrolling operations across the water basins and the European Union's sea borders. They are rescuing the drowning refugees. Herewith, the ships that were used for illegal migration and human trafficking are sunk (the "Poseidon", "Triton", "Sofia" and other operations).

3. Building of walls along the EU's external land borders, aimed at creating an obstacle on the illegal migrants' way, at decreasing illegal migration into the European Union (The Independent 2015; RBC 2015). We should note the building of such walls / fences in the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in Morocco; on the Estonian-Russian border, in the Balkan countries; on the Greek-Turkish border; on the Bulgarian-Turkish border; on the Hungarian-Serbian border; in France's Pas-de-Calais; at the entrance to the Eurotunnel, and others. Herewith, the financing of such constructions comes from both national and European funds (Business Insider 2015).

4. The existing practice revealed a branched smuggling network that makes a lot of profit on refugees (NTV 2015b); the presence of coordination

in the refugees' and irregulars' mobility into Europe. In particular, this concerns the provision of the same equipment to irregulars and refugees, the existence of specific information within the social networks that warns of the undesirability of movement to Germany through Bulgaria (racism and xenophobia, the hostility of the Bulgarian population towards refugees and migrants). Of this also testifies the fact that the refugees and irregulars from Serbia would only move towards Hungary but not Romania, who is also an EU member and has a border with Serbia. While Hungary was overridden with flows of thousands of refugees who wanted to reach Germany, the Serbian-Romanian border was relatively calm, and the customs maintained its usual routine. It is unlikely that all refugees understand political geography on a professional scale, or the specifics of Romania and Hungary's membership in the Schengen-zone, the procedure of the European Union's functionality, etc.

There was the activation of the Interpol / Europol in the process of identification of refugee-related criminal business, of combating organizers of illegal traffic of migrants. The measures taken in accordance with the EU's decisions have made using the Balkan route meaningless, and interrupted business of illegal migrant traffic: now, when the initial migration procedures can only be done in Turkish territory, for the irregulars, the route through the Western Balkans ends in a Greek dead-end (Vimon 2017).

There was the general activation of activity of special services for the counteraction of illicit entry into EU countries and of the activity of militants of terrorist organizations. For this purpose, it was proposed to trace not only the entry of suspicious citizens from third countries into the EU, but also the departure to third countries, and the return from them of EU citizens who are suspected of collaborating with terrorist organizations (DW 2015).

5. The admission and distribution of refugees in EU countries in accordance with migration quotas that are defined by a number of objective indicators (the country's population, its economic potential, its GDP, and other). The European Union had previously tested and used this mechanism of distribution of refugees during the Yugoslav wars of the 1990's. Indeed, back then, the EU took in more than 2.2 million refugees, most of who were distributed to Germany and the UK (Boswell and Geddes 2011: 36). In other words, the number of refugees is comparative, and this experience can be legally used.

However, the situation today is more difficult. Firstly, the refugees are showing true intention, realizing their own plans; they are not satisfied with what and where they receive with the status of temporary refugee. They aim to reach Germany, Sweden, or the UK. They are not satisfied with Hungary, Slovakia, of any of the other less prosperous EU countries. Secondly, the former Yugoslav refugees were from Europe, in other words, they were from "our" continent, shared "our" traditions and culture. That had a soothing effect on the European public opinion. The Bosnian and Kosovo religious affiliation did not scare anyone. Thirdly, the EU countries' populations were not yet afraid of terrorist attacks conducted by Al-Qaeda, ISIS, or other militants.

Table 4: The quotas for refugee distribution in EU countries, proposed by the European committee (thousand people)

Country	Resettlement of 40.000 refugees under the European Commission's May plan	Resettlement of 120.000 refugees under the European Commission's September plan
Bulgaria	0.6	1.6
Sweden	1.4	4.5
Finland	0.8	2.4
Estonia	0.7	0.4
Latvia	0.5	0.5
Lithuania	0.5	0.8
Poland	2.7	9.3
Czechia	1.3	3.0
Slovakia	0.8	1.5
Austria	1.2	3.6
Netherlands	2.0	7.2
Belgium	1.4	4.6
Luxemburg	0.6	0.6
Germany	8.8	31.4
France	6,8	24,0
Portugal	1.7	3.1
Romania	1.7	4.6
Croatia	0.7	1.1

Spain	4.3	14.9
Malta	0.3	0.1
Slovenia	0.6	0.1
Cyprus	0.2	0.3

Source: Kommerstant (2015b).

Refugees were to be resettled from Italy, Greece and Hungary. Note that the UK, Ireland and Denmark are not involved in the resettlement plan of refugees but as shown later, they made also certain commitments.

The refugee distribution quota system was, accepted by the governments of most EU member-states. Voting against were only Hungary, Slovakia, Czechia, and Romania; Finland refused to vote. It should however be noted that other countries have also shown their discontent, that is, the conflict began to show. The reason here was less the fear of migrant quotas and more the unwillingness to transform the quota mechanism into a permanently repeating series («to be continued»). And this kind of prospect was real due to the continuous inflow of refugees and irregulars.

6. The quick and quality reviewing of each application for asylum. In 2014, there were reviewed about 360,000 applications for asylum (DW 2015). Leading the list of countries with the most registered applications were Germany (each fourth asylum seeker), France, Sweden, and Italy. Positive decisions were reached in 45% of the cases. The highest indexes were achieved in Bulgaria (94%), Sweden (77%), Netherlands (70%), and Denmark (68%). The same procedure will be enacted in regard to the asylum seekers who arrived in 2015.

Herewith, with should note that into consideration are taken the country of the applicant's origin, the presence of a factual threat to their life and safety. The overwhelming majority of refugees from Syria, Eritrea, and Iraq are receiving positive responses (between 88% and 96%). A positive response is also given to 2/3 of applicants from Afghanistan and Somali.

In Russia and Belarus on one side, and in the Western countries on the other, the attitude toward Ukrainian citizens' applications for asylum is different. If in Russia and Belarus these applications are seen as justified in more than 90% of the cases, then in Poland, the UK, France, Belgium, and Finland – it is so in less than 10%. In Canada, the USA, Germany, Italy and Czechia this index is between 35% and 65%, but it is still lower than

in Russia and Belarus. Applications by Ukrainian citizens were submitted in a total of 67 countries; however the majority of them were submitted in Russia – 94%. In Germany, there were 2,700 submitted application, in Poland and Italy – 2,100 each, in France – 1,400 (UNHCR 2014).

The low index of positive decisions for the Ukrainian refugees is explained by the fact that upon review, the applicant's residence in Ukraine is taken into account. In regard to the eastern regions' (Lugansk, Donetsk) residents, where an armed conflict is taking place, the index of positive decisions is high. Such people make up ¼ of the total number of Ukrainian asylum seekers. The rest are residents of other Ukrainian regions, those that were not touched by war. Obviously, these people are not given a positive response.

Table 5: EU asylum approvals by country of origin (in %)

Country	%
Syria	94
Eritrea	90
Iraq	88
Afghanistan	66
Somalia	60
Nigeria	27
Pakistan	27
Ukraine	25
Kosovo	1
Serbia	1

Source: Christian Action Network (2015)

7. Deporting the migrants who could not prove the legitimacy of their request of being granted refugee status in the EU (pro.tonkosti.ru 2015). For example, Germany plans to deport about half a million of such migrants. According to Kommerzbank of Germany experts' estimations, the accommodation of asylum applicants, the verification of their applications, and the deportations of economic migrants will cost Germany 27 billion Euros.

However, there rise the questions as to the viability of realization of this decision. The issue of human rights arises, and that of protests of human

rights organizations, who will address the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The experience of the mid 1970's, when Germany strove to deport all the Turkish migrant workers, has shown that it is not very easy to do. The situation today is different, of course, just as it is less beneficial for the irregular migrants in comparison to the labor migrants of the 1970's. However, there is another nuance – where would these people be sent to? It is necessary to obtain the support and permission of the migrants' countries of origin.

8. Blocking migration flows in the countries of migrant origin. Providing financial aid to the African states who agree to accept their citizens who've been deported from Europe. The EU proposed 2 billion dollars for this. However, this measure remained a simple idea because the leaders of African states (namely the president of Senegal Maki Sall) consider that this sum will not be enough for the whole of Africa (yoki.ru 2015). In other words, it is not possible to attain an understanding and agreement with the governments of the origin countries.

9. As one of the measures of organizing the migration flows and combating illegal migration, the European bodies are considering the temporary (two year) cancellation of the Schengen-zone (pro.tonkosti. ru 2015). Herewith, one should remember that such actions are fraught with denying the whole essence of the European Union that was built on the principle of freedom of movement of the workforce and people. It is easier to give up something than to reintroduce it, as the issue of national security will constantly get in the way of such a decision. The decisions on the migration crisis were formulated in the final report of the European Council, adopted on the 18th of February, the 7th and 18th of March, 2016. In these reports, one can point out three main directions.

Firstly, the countries that took in most of the migration inflow, namely Greece, will be given support by the EU, including financial and expert support, which will facilitate humanitarian aiding of the refugees, and the observance of administrative procedures of border control and reviewing of asylum application in accordance to EU rules. Holding centers are being built, where the newly arrived migrants will be quickly verified, and divided into those whose asylum applications can be reviewed, and those who will not be allowed further access. Additionally, transit centers are being organized, in which the candidates for asylum and other forms of international protection will be sent.

Secondly, in accordance with the adoption by the EU countries of the obligation to re-adhere to the Schengen rules, and to introduce a strict border control, additional resources are allocated to profile services, including the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX) and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO). At the same time, in an accelerated fashion, the EU created a new agency for the protection of its external land and sea borders.

Thirdly, the EU signed a treaty with Turkey that clearly defines the rights and obligations of both sides in regard to the inflow of refugees and migrants, who travel to Europe through Turkey. In accordance with this treaty, those migrants who illegally arrive to Greece from Turkey will be sent back to Turkey, whereas Europe will only accept those migrants, whose applications for asylum will be registered and approved in Turkish territory. Likewise, in accordance with the treaty, for every migrant that Europe sends back to Turkey, it will have to take in one of the migrants whose application for asylum received approval in Turkey.

At the time, the Turkish authorities promise to block contraband and human trafficking channels going into Europe. The EU, on its side, will take care that the Syrian refugees' life in Turkey is improved – they obtained the legal right of employment, and their children can study in Turkish schools. In exchange, the European leaders agreed to compensate Turkey with 6 billion Euros in 2016-2017, to cancel the visa requirement for Turkish citizens who would travel to the Schengen-zone, and to renew negotiations on Turkey's membership in the EU. The EU officially renewed its strategic partnership with Ankara, promising to conduct two-way high-level meetings yearly. However, the solution to this problem is tied to the development of democracy in Turkey.

5.8 Main priorities and flexible solidarity

The scales and intensity of migration flows in 2014-2016 have shown the limitedness of national approaches to solving the problem.[1] In order to

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[1] As noted by experts "*the participant-countries had a choice of three behavior options: to strictly follow the European rules, risking to drown under the wave of refugee status applications, - practice has shown that the principle at the base of the European system of asylum granting (the first EU country where the migrant finds themselves is obliged to review their petition to be recognized as a refugee), turned out to be impractical under the conditions of a mass migrant inflow; to close its borders and to thus transpose the responsibility on its neighbors;*

avoid the repetition of the migrant crisis in the future, there is need for an integral and realistic EU migration policy, one that is based on the uniform understanding by all the countries of the kind of migration Europe needs.

The EU countries must manifest a flexible solidarity that will allow the development of such components of complex migration policy as the regime of asylum granting, border control, refugee distribution schemes, legal migration and social adaptation of migrants. They must discuss the topics that they have, as yet, done their best to avoid: - Should the migrant distribution scheme around countries have an obligatory or recommendatory character? – Are the migrants to be accepted permanently or temporarily? – Should the principle of financial solidarity be introduced? – Should the mobility of the workforce be limited? (Vimon 2017).

The realization of a universal migration policy will require the use of all the measures listed in the agenda on the issues of migration that was proposed by the European Commission in 2015. Namely, the following is necessary:

- To create based on an existing European Asylum Support Office (EASO), an authorized agency for refugees that will organize the issuing of social aids and benefits to migrants;
- To strengthen border control and to optimize the visa regime along the perimeter of the Schengen-zone, to form new forces for the defense of land and sea borders;
- To introduce a common migration regime, based on the existing treaty between the EU and Turkey, and to advertise its observance as the single safe and legal means of migration;
- To gradually introduce the approach to legal migration that will take into consideration the already existing experience – for example the rule of issuing of the different categories of labor visas, including the 2009 "blue cards", introduced for qualified workers.

The EU must strive to a maximum simplification of the visa procedures. For this, the Union countries are required to review the existing process of visa-regime simplification and to try to unify the conditions of visa agreements regardless of the countries with and the reasons why these

to allow the migrants the freely move through their territories without supervision" (Vimon P. (2017). Migration in Europe: overcoming the crisis of solidarity. - Moscow, the Carnegie Moscow Center, c.8).

agreements are being made. The unification of visa procedures – with a clear differentiation between short- and long-term visas, and possibly the introduction of a European version of the American Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) – will increase transparency, make the EU's visa policy more pleasant, and therefore will present the third countries with more clearly defined criteria for collaboration.

In the opinion of the participant-countries, the all-European policy must not spread to such things as legal migration and social integration of migrants. The EU should best stand back and only take careful steps that, in fact, turn out to be far more effective than any resolute measures. In the field of labor migration, the EU could take upon predicting the state of the economy and the existence of workplaces, which would help the participant-countries better understand the state of their own labor markets. With the help of pilot projects, launched with the approval of the participant-countries on particular industry markets, it should be possible to test how applicable and how functional the EU's proposed approaches are. In what concerns the national identity and social integration of migrants, the EU could partake in expert estimation and pilot projects in the fields of education and professional preparation of migrants.

In the EU's external policy strategy that was proposed on the 28th of June, 2016 by the high representative of the European Union on foreign affairs and security policy, the importance of work "*with international partners for the sake of unity and a common responsibility before the world*" is underlined (EEAS 2016).

An example of such partnership is not the treaty with Turkey, but rather the policy of close collaboration that was carried out by Spain in the 2000's, and that was based on permanent dialogue, positive stimuli, and the genuine desire to conciliate the interests of both sides. We should note a number of basic principles of relationship with partners that will help the EU countries promote flexible solidarity and feel the necessity of shared responsibility. First of all, the EU must analyze its previous experience in the realization of assistance programs with the purpose of development that are directly tied to the issue of migration.

An interesting option for the European countries that stand for a higher degree of openness of migration policy – circular migration: migrants with long-term visas travel freely between their native country and the

country of their temporary residence. A three-way collaboration where the migrants, assisted financially by the European funds, undergo tutoring in non-native African countries, and later return home, also deserves development. This contributes to the strengthening of direct "south-south" collaboration between African countries and brings a potentially valuable input into the continent's economic future. In what concerns irregular migration, considering the rather ineffective agreements of irregulars' readmission, the EU should take a careful look at the achievements of certain individual member-countries' obtained through two-way treaties. Herewith, when providing the African countries with assistance for the purpose of development, the EU should not expect that it will neutralize the underlying causes of these countries' economic troubles (Vimon 2017).

Conclusion

Contemporary Europe has faced a migration crisis of unprecedented scales. Initially, the policy that was carried out by the EU to solve the migration crisis had a reactive character, was late, and limited to the search and use of organizational and political measures that were tested out in the 1990's. The transition toward a proactive model of solving the migrant crisis gave way for certain grounds for optimism. Following the undertaken urgent measures, the European Union managed to successfully exit the migrant crisis.

The European Union should take into consideration that the proposed measures are characteristic only of emergency situations. They cannot provide an ultimate solution to the problem. For a successful solution of this problem, there needs to be developed and introduced a prospective migration policy; a policy of flexible solidarity, that takes into account the interests of the Community, its individual states, the migrants, and the accepting societies.

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6

MIGRATION AS THE SECURITY THREAT

Migration is closely related with organized crime. Human rights violations are often one of the push factors, human traffickers and organized criminals help to smuggle refugees beyond borders. Migration is related to document fraud, corruption and also natural criminality related to socio-economic standard of refugees and migrants. On the other side migrants are often also targets of criminality due to hate crimes. There is an issue of cultural proximity, adaptation and integration. There might be also link between migration and terrorism. Migration and reference to criminality is often misused by populist and radical parties. Are refugees really criminals? For this reason presented chapter helps to explore various aspects of security threats linked to migration by using fact based approach supported by statistics.

The deteriorating security environment is one of the key push factors of migration. For centuries people migrated to escape wars and avoid conflict, persecution and physical confrontation. However, migration itself is linked to various security threats and may serve as a vehicle for new security threats and challenges mostly associated with organized crime, terrorism, ethnic violence, excluded communities, racism, poverty spread etc. This chapter discusses migration as a security threat and its implications for EU society, especially in relation to criminality, terrorism and political radicalization.

The concept of security is hard to define, as security is a multi-dimensional phenomenon. For example, David Baldwin in his famous study published in 1997 proposes further specification useful for scientific usage with *"respect to the actor whose values are to be secured, the values concerned, the degree*

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of security, the kind of threats, the means for coping with such treats, the costs of doing so and the relevant time period" (Baldwin 1997: 17). In other words Baldwin suggests that many factors are entering our analysis of security which makes the concept hard to define. This is especially true if we take into account the mutli-dimensional phenomenon such as migration and consider its security implications within unique *sui generis* entity such as European union.

The Baldwin's specification is partially built on Wolfers attitude towards security as an ambiguous term. Arnold Wolfers distinguished between security in the objective sense as the absence of threats and in the subjective sense (as the absence of fear that some acquired values will be attacked (Wolfers 1962 149). In this perception there is a threat which might be evaluated in the objective sense and which causes some emotional reaction based on fear that the threat may materialize and destroy or damage acquired values. The relationship between the existence of threat and its perception is very important also for understanding of migration crises and its impact. However, the relation is not direct as the perception of the threat is influenced by many other factors specific factors such us experience, capacities to deal with the threat, knowledge of the threat etc. Some threats might be virtual and thus non-existent but perceived as real and serious from the subjective perspective.

This contribution deals with key threats associated with migration from non-EU countries: criminality, terrorism and political radicalization. The chapter discuss the relation between migration and criminality, migration and terrorism and migration and political radicalization from both, objective and subjective attitude towards security.

6.1 Criminality related to migration

One of the most often associations related to migration from non-EU countries is criminality. Poor immigrants with often exotic cultural and non-Christian background are sometimes associated with an increase in the criminal rate, violence or organized crime. However, criminality is related to migration in many more aspects as migrants are often victims of criminal gangs of traffickers. They might be both victims and perpetrators. This chapter explores both dimensions of criminality associated with migration.

The push-factors for migration might be various. Among them strongest are related to war and high level of violence which comes together with absence of the rule of law and security. Escaping war or migration in general might be good business for various groups involved in illegal activities. This is due to fact, that migrants escaping war zones have inflated perspective about money and are able to pay highest amount possible to move their families into the safety. Similarly, high price is made by the danger and possible consequences from being caught by security forces or killed on the way. The prices vary due to routs and means of transport. For example a Syrian migrant travelled in three weeks from Syria to Dubai and from Dubai to Sweden for approx 3,000 Euro which is around six times higher than average (Malm 2015). This option is however, considered "five star package" offered by migrant traffickers. Without appropriate documents the amount needed might be much more higher. For example to get a fake passport or ID card may cost another 2,000 Euro per item (Malm 2015).

However, majority of migrants are not able to use planes and have to rely on ground and sea routes. During the refugee crisis of 2015 the majority of Syrian migrants paid around 700 Euro on average to pass Mediterranean sea between Turkey and Greece on a boat operated by traffickers (Malm 2015). In 2017 the Guardian reported, that an Ukrainian man was convicted for transporting 30 migrants from Turkey to Sicily on a yacht. Each of the migrants paid 8,000 Euro. This is however not the highest amount. It is known that some Middle Eastern families paid 100,000 Euro to get into Europe (The Guardian 2017). Migration thus can be a very profitable illegal business without any guarantee for migrants that traffickers to keep their promises.

Overpriced tickets, documents faking, corruption and bribery are not the only problems as same migrants may fall in the hands of armed groups and gangs. Migrants are held as hostages and their families demanded to pay ransom, sometimes traded as slaves, tortured or forced to sexual slavery. In 2017 CNN reported about slave auctions in Libya where slaves are traded at least on nine locations including Zuwara, Castelverde, Sabratah, Garyan, Kabaw, Alrujban, Alzintan, Sabha and Gadamis, where slaves are traded for 400 USD (CNN 2017) The video presented by CNN also shows brutal torture of immigrants: a stripped man lying on the ground while trafficker burns a plastic bottle and drips hot plastic on his body, bodies of migrants full of

scars and burns and some appearing dead (CNN 2017). Migrants are often torturing while calling to their families to pay ransom.

As warned by International Organization for Migration the Slave market is booming alongside migration routes connecting Niger, Libya, Sudan, Ghana, Gambia, Somalia and other countries connected to Sub-Saharan route (IOM 2017). These armed groups often re-sell immigrant slaves and increases the price they had to pay or work off to get freedom. As reported by BBC slave traders may cooperate with local police might be involved in the sell-out the prisoners for slave market (BBC 2017). Trade with migrants seems to becoming complex problem in states of Sub-Saharan Africa which suffer lack of control and rule of law on its territories. In poor countries with the absence of security and opportunities this inhumane business is one of few opportunities how to get money. Moreover this form of organized crime may have close connection to funding of terrorist organizations.

If we leave aside issues related to trafficking and slavery, we can focus directly on the criminality related to migrants and borders. Universal Declaration of Human Rights says it its article 14(1), that: "*Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.*" This article may be interpreted as the right to leave country where a person may face human rights violations and persecutions not related to non-political crimes: "*This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.*" (Article 14, par. 2). In this case a citizen does not have to comply with domestic law about leaving the country. This Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights shall be put in connection to "non-refoulement principle" which is codified in the Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: *"Contracting State shall expel or return "refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion".* This means, that every persecuted person has the right to leave a country where human rights might be violated and put the life in danger while the state party of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees cannot expel the person and put in danger in the state of origin.

This does not mean, however, that the person has automatically the right to the asylum which is subject of national rules and procedures which may

significantly vary and migrants may face mandatory detention, indictment for illegal borders crossing. This is usually related to crossing borders out of selected entry points, using selected entry points out of office hours or without respect to the purpose of the entry point or intended avoidance of the control on the entry point. This however raises question about how not to violate the law of the safe state especially when the safe state has borders with an unsafe state. The only possible way how to avoid illegal crossing is to use official entry points. However, this seems to be impossible as entry points are connected and it is thus necessary fist to pass official exit point controlled by authorities of unsafe state who are involved in persecuting

For this reason civilized states are obliged to help refugees and illegal border crossing (without appropriate documents or entry-points) is considered as a part of the asylum procedure which is aimed at revealing motives for entry. In the case that economic reasons dominates the entry, then the state may consider entry and stay as an illegal. However, if reasons are related to persecution, human rights violation and refugees match the criteria set by international obligations, then the state is obliged to initiate legal steps leading to asylum, subsidiary protection, temporary protection or another forms of protection, such as humanitarian etc. Nevertheless, these steps do not simply mean that the state is responsible to keep refugees on its territory (see Honusková 2015). In other words, nobody is illegal before authorities decides based on intention for border crossing. In the case that border crossing was done in order to find shelter against persecution, then violation of law related to VISA and illegal border crossing shall be pardoned.

6.2 Criminality of migrants

Migrants are also perpetrators of crime. However, measuring criminality of migrants might be very tricky activity due to changes in methodology, scope of the crime indictments, relative numbers etc. This section is based mainly on data from the Germany, and thus might not be attributed to migration criminality in general. However, the analysis may provide us some picture how does the structure of criminality of migrants looks like. Germany is good example due to various reasons. First, majority of migrants from the 2015 wave went to Germany which become the biggest target country for hundreds of thousand refugees from Middle East. Second, Germany is a

leading EU country, associated with good standard of democracy and rule of law. This is necessary for the quality of police forces and legal system enforcing security. Third, Germany is known for its precision. This is valid for statistical work: Germany collects data about crime of Germans, non-Germans and refugees. For these reasons Germany is good country which provides a picture about criminality of migrants.

As of 2016 in total 2,022,414 offences were made in Germany from which approx 30,5 % (616,230) were perpetrated by non-German suspects or 8,6 % (17,438) were made by suspected non-EU migrants (Bundesministerium des Innern 2017: 75). In other words, migrants from non-EU countries are causing in total 8,6 % of offenses against law and order. There are some crimes which are more related to non-EU migrants than is average. As table 1 shows, 75,8 % of pick pocketing in Germany is made by non-Germans and non-EU immigrants cause 35,1 % of pickpockets. Similarly almost exclusive crime related to non-German nationals is forgery of documents where 49,5 % of all cases is made by non-German nationals and 21,5 % by non-EU migrants or various types of fraud, especially aimed at transport benefits (fare without tickets) where non-Germans cause 46,4 % offences or 18,8 % among non-EU migrants. On the contrary, relative low among non-EU migrants is coercion (3,2 %) or drug offences which are associated with 6,1 % of total drug offences in Germany (Bundesministerium des Innern 2017: 75). These numbers are surprising as they are merely related to migrants' status and lack of money.

Table 1: Offences in Germany in 2016

Article	Description	Total	Suspected			
			Non-Germans			
			No. of cases	Share from total %	Migrants	
					No. of cases	Share from total %
890000	**Total Crime without illegal border crossing**	**2.022.414**	**616.230**	**30,5**	**174.438**	**8,6**
000000	Offenses against Life	3.765	1.276	33,9	453	12,0

100000	Offenses against sexual self-determination	33.533	8.698	25,9	3.329	9,9
111000	*Including: Rape and Sexual Assault*	6.476	2.512	38,8	963	14,9
200000	Cruelty Offenses and offenses against personal freedom	631.399	192.215	30,4	61.676	9,8
210000	*Including robbery*	28.120	11.525	41,0	4.023	14,3
220000	Mayhem	484.769	153.163	31,6	52.078	10,7
222000	*Including Dangerous and serious bodily injury or Female Genital Mutilation*	149.567	56.252	37,6	22.341	14,9
224000	*Including Intentionally simple bodily injury*	340.100	103.528	30,4	33.254	9,8
232000	Forced marriage, stalking, deprivation of liberty, Coercion, Threat	163.894	42.236	25,8	10.588	6,5
232200	*Including Coercion*	59.752	10.849	18,2	1.912	3,2
232300	*Including Threat*	90.952	28.972	31,9	8.336	9,2
3***00	Theft without aggravating circumstances	383.256	152.157	39,7	51.719	13,5
4***00	Theft under aggravating circumstances	96.833	42.986	44,4	12.768	13,2
435*00	*Including Burglaries*	17.152	7.296	42,5	1.946	11,3
****00	Total theft	446.426	179.980	40,3	58.400	13,1
*26*00	*Including Shoplifting Total*	261.922	118.945	45,4	44.036	16,8
*90*00	*Including Pick pocketing Total*	8.992	6.814	75,8	3.153	35,1
500000	Property and counterfeiting offenses	540.635	188.831	34,9	57.076	10,6
510000	*Including Fraud*	435.148	152.363	35,0	45.183	10,4
515000	*Sub-including Smuggling of benefits*	162.397	75.403	46,4	30.681	18,9
515001	*Sub-category transport benefits fraud*	159.982	74.302	46,4	30.155	18,8
517800	*Social benefit frauds*	20.266	6.781	33,5	2.564	12,7

540000	*Including forgery of Documents*	53.300	26.361	49,5	11.464	21,5
600000	Other offenses (StGB)	514.748	111.695	21,7	26.178	5,1
673100	*Including Insult on a sexual basis*	28,619	8.427	29,4	3.201	11,2
730000	Drug offenses	245.731	60.587	24,7	14.965	6,1
892000	Violent crime	181.509	69.163	38,1	26.810	14,8
899000	Street Crime	192.775	59.423	30,8	17.844	9,3

Source: Author, based on Bundesministerium des Innern (2017), p.75.

It is important to note, that majority of the offenses are made by recidivists or people who commit more offences at the same time. As pointed by the J. Huggler the statistics shows, that approx 40 % of offences are made just by 1 % of migrants (Huggler 2017). This implies that just very small portion of non-EU migrant are involved in legal offences.

How is the criminality rate among Germans in comparison with non-Germans and Migrants? According to the German Statistical office in 2016 there were living 82,67 million inhabitants in Germany out of which 10.039.080 were non-Germans, including 4.279.770 from the EU28 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2017a,b). As of the criminality statistics from 2016 we know, that in total 2,022,414 offences were made in total and 616,230 were made by non-Germans (Bundesministerium des Innern 2017: 76). This means that the criminality rate per 100,000 among Germans is 1936 offences while among non-Germans it is approx. 6,138. This derives us to the conclusion that criminality among non-Germans is approx. three times higher than among Germans.

The higher rate among non-Germans may be influenced by several factors including cultural proximity or age composition of the group of non-Germans. Migration groups are often composed of younger people among whose criminality rate is usually slightly higher than among average population without discrimination to nationality or race. In other words younger people are more often perpetrators of crime and age composition of migrants may favour crime in a natural way.

Among non-EU immigrants most of the offenses in 2016 were committed by Syrians (11,8 %), Afghans (10 %) and Iraqis, who were responsible for 7 % of all offences committed by non-EU migrants (Bundesministerium des Innern 2017: 76). As table 2 suggests, some types of offenses are related to low economic income of migrants.

Table 2: Selected crimes among non-EU migrants in Germany (2016)

Group	Total	Robbery	Mayhem	Theft	Fraud	Smuggling of benefits	Drug offenses
Non-Germans	616.230	11.525	153.163	179.980	152.363	75.403	60.587
Non-EU migrants	174.438	4.023	52.078	58.400	45.183	30.681	14.965
Syria	20.699	365	11.990	6.535	6.434	4.963	1.559
Afghanistan	17.466	181	8.001	2.670	3.892	3.257	1.044
Iraq	12.202	159	4.763	2.564	2.706	2.172	488
Albania	9.882	184	1.625	6.084	2.456	1.532	382
Algeria	8.332	529	1.750	5.211	2.887	2.433	1.343
Morocco	8.266	560	1.886	4.544	2.786	2.304	1.236
Serbia	7.684	160	1.172	3.500	2.931	775	229
Iran	7.251	115	2.512	2.071	1.178	936	671
Kosovo	5.039	101	1.071	2.332	1.370	723	221
Somalia	4.595	95	1.788	788	1.197	908	372

Source: Author, based on Bundesministerium des Innern (2017), p.76.

Table 3: Criminal offenses per 100.000 in Germany (2016) by selected non-EU nationals

Group	Size of the group	Total Offenses per 100.000	Robbery per 100.000	Mayhem per 100.000	Theft per 100.000	Fraud per 100.000	Smuggling of benefits per 100.000	Drug Offenses per 100.000
Non-EU migrants total	5.759.310	3.029	70	904	1.014	785	533	260
Syria	637.845	3.245	57	1.880	1.025	1.009	778	244
Afghanistan	253.485	6.890	71	3.156	1.053	1.535	1.285	412
Iraq	227.195	5.371	70	2.096	1.129	1.191	956	215
Albania	51.550	19.170	357	3.152	11.802	4.764	2.972	741
Algeria	21.320	39.081	2.481	8.208	24.442	13.541	11.412	6.299
Morocco	75.855	10.897	738	2.486	5.990	3.673	3.037	1.629
Serbia	223.100	3.444	72	525	1.569	1.314	347	103
Iran	97.710	7.421	118	2.571	2.120	1.206	958	687
Kosovo	202.905	2.483	50	528	1.149	675	356	109
Somalia	33.900	13.555	280	5274	2.324	3.531	2.678	1.097

Source: Author, based on Bundesministerium des Innern (2017) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2017a,b).

Crime looks also different from the perspective of individual nationalities. As delivered by German Statistisches Bundesamt, there are approx. 18,6 million people in Germany with foreign background and approx 10 million people labelled as "Foreign population" including 1,5 million Turks, 783,085 Poles or 637,845 Syrians (Statistisches Bundesamt 2017a,b). If we consider the size of the national groups and compare with offenses, that we can get criminality stats related to nationality per 100.000 people. Table 3 provides very interesting results:

The above table Q reveals several important facts. First, it seems that Serbian and Kosovan non-EU nationals are not responsible for much criminal offenses comparing to other nationalities. This may be due to cultural proximity and well managed integration in the familiar environment and historical links to Germany e.g. Serbian Lausitz Community. On the other hand there are some nationals causing alarming level of crime. This is the case of immigrants from Algeria whose offences are 12 times higher than average and in relation to selected crimes the level is even higher. For example per 100.000 inhabitants Algerians have more than 30 times higher level of offences than average of non-EU immigrants or are 24 times more often involved in theft. The number suggest that Algerians are at war with Germany.

These number, however, might be misleading as they compare the number of offenses to size of the group and multiplies by 100,000. First, the Algerian group is quite small, accounting roughly for 21 thousand individuals which may lead to discrepancy. Second, factors involved is a fact, that usually more offences are perpetrated by one person, while this mathematic calculation presumes that Algerian community contributes to criminality equally. This might be connected to another aspect: that size of the community has been underestimated in official numbers and Algerian migrants residing in Germany illegally were not considered. However, even when these three effects will be eliminated, the proportion of Algerian nationality on offences in Germany is unproportionally high. This may be caused by several factors including cultural and religious diversity or the fact that these nationals are less likely to gain asylum or subsidiary international protection. This may cause illegal stay and drive them to organize crime, robbery, thefts, crime or drug trade as above statistics suggests.

It has to be stressed that Syrian refugees are on the average with small exception regarding Mayhem, which is almost double contrary to average. However, drug offences or robbery is almost absent among Syrians leading to the conclusion that there is good promise for integration and further work with Syrian nationals.

6.3 Migration and radicalization

Migration (especially from non-EU countries) may have also other negative effects related to radicalization and extremism. From more direct perspective migration might be related to terrorism, despite this link is still somehow weak or may contribute to rise of hate crimes. Indirectly migration when not managed may contribute to environment vital for terrorism (excluded communities and no-go zones) and political radicalization among political parties and citizens. This part thus deals with the issues.

Terrorism

Since the beginning of immigration crises in 2015 security experts and politicians warned that among hundreds of thousand refugees passing Schengen borders without documentation and leaving fingerprints might be terrorists. These expectations were supported by the existence of the intent of the Islamic State to remove terrorism from Middle East to Europe. Terrorist attacks in Paris or Brussels added urgency to the link between terrorism and migration. One of the terrorist from Paris attacks "Ahmad al-Mohammad" (most probably fake name based on Syrian Passport) blew himself up at Stade de France. Following investigations revealed, that he come to Europe in a group of refugees who were registered, photographed and fingerprinted on Greek island Leros (BBC 2016). Despite the fact that the majority of attackers were of French or Belgian citizenship, the journey of Ahmad al-Mohammad suggest that some radicals might have travelled to Syria or Iraq and will seek to return and conduct attacks in Europe. The likelihood of this possibility has even increased after the defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Young radicals with some ties to Europe may attempt to return with fake identities.

It is, however, very hard to estimate how much terrorists, radicals or former fighters came to Europe in between 2015 and 2016 when borders were to some degree porous. Even if the percentage were very little, then we can still estimate that the number will be in hundreds or few thousands. As investigations of the Paris attacks showed, Salah Abdeslam succeeded to smuggle at least 13 trained terrorist to Western Europe via Budapest, where they went in a group of refugees from Serbia (Ouest France 2017). This creates pressure on the capacities of the intelligence services and necessity to adopt measures at the EU level. So far, these measures mainly involved (European Council 2018):

- Push for Improved firearms control based on the directive on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons;
- New directive on combating terrorism aimed at criminalisation of terrorist offences;
- Reinforced checks at external borders control by updated Schengen borders code;
- Appointing new commissioner for security union to ensure implementation of the EU agenda on security;
- Measures based on road map improving information exchange in the area of Justice and Home Affairs;
- Revised guidelines for the EU strategy for combating radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism
- Establishment of the European counter terrorism centre;
- Fight against online radicalisation;
- Strengthened cooperation with third countries;
- Adopting EU counter terrorism/foreign fighters strategy focusing on Syria and Iraq.

The list of above adopted measures is not definite as most of the counter-measures were adopted at the level of individual EU member states who updated their national strategies to fight terrorism and radicalization, revived national plans and its implementation. Various countries adopted counter-terrorism packages to deal with the treat.

Excluded communities

Another threat related to migration and related to terrorism are excluded communities creating a vital environment or shelter for terrorists. The perpetrators from the Paris attacks – Abdelhamid Abaaoud and Salah Abdeslam - were living and hiding themselves in Moelenbeek, a one of 19 parts of the Brussels region.[1] Molenbeek counts approx. 100,000 citizens and is a city within city with majority of Muslims. Despite some anti-immigrant and populist politicians claims, that Moelenbeek is a "no-go zone" where police is afraid to enter, in reality nothing at the first sight indicates that Molenbeek is the cradle of radicalism in Western Europe.

The problem of excluded communities is not related only to Belgium. Almost all European Capitals have sub-urban districts inhabited by minorities or groups with lower social standard. The life in these districts to some degree determines the success of the individual: darker skin, exotic origins, not fully learned language and address in the CV are often creating barrier for integration and acceptance from the side of majorities society and often leads to discrimination, marginalization, ignorance and exclusion. Life in excluded communities is frustrating and frustration is a vital condition for radicalization targeted against majority society and western institutions. Radical Islam offers an alternative.

Radicalization process within marginalized communities is often parallel and unnoticeable to majority society. Plans of terrorist attacks in Paris were developed without notice and after the attacks the environment of Molenbeek provided safe haven to Salah Abdeslam for four months. Unsolved problems of excluded locations and groups may create parallel societies hostile to majority society, democratic values and rule of law. Political and civic vacuum is often filled by radical groups and radical interpretation of Islam with the central role of Sharia representing alternative value system.

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[1] However, many other radicals had connections to Moelenbeek: this is also the case of Hassan el-Haski who was connected to 2004 Madrid bombings, Mehdi Nemmouche who was involved in Jewish Museum of Belgium shooting, Ayoub El Khazzani who perpetrated the 2015 Thalys train attack or Oussama Zariouh who detonated himself during failed attack in June 2017 on the Brussels Central Station.

Hate crimes

Another important issue related to migration are hate crimes (including violence motivated by religion, race or xenophobia in general) whose number in Europe is increasing. Just between 2015 and 2016 hate crimes in Germany which were inspired by Islamism rose by 13,7 %. However, it is interesting that in the same period also hate crimes motivated by extreme right rose by 14,3 %. These were often related to arson against facilities helping the refugees (Huggler 2017). Hate crimes are not problem related to Germany but might be observed also in other countries.

For example, in Sweden the number of hate crimes dropped from 4,224 to 3,786 between 2008 and 2010. However, nowadays is again increasing as it reached 4,746 in 2015 (Brottsförebyggande rådet2017). Great part of them are "Islamophobic". As of 2009 there were just 194 islamophobic attacks, but in 2015 the number increased to 558. Together with attacks due to sexual orientation is it some of the most frequent form of hate crimes. Nevertheless, some of the attacks have Christian-phobic or anti-Semitic background, representing 338 cases, resp. 277 cases in 2015 (Brottsförebyggande rådet, 2017).

Even a rapid increase in hate crimes is recorded in the UK. The statistics about hate crimes in England and Wales suggests that the number of offences between 2015/16 and 2016/17 rose by 29 % from 62,518 to 80,393 cases involving 84.597 motivating factors as some hate crimes are not driven by one factor (Home Office 2017: 4). Majority of hate crimes committed were due to race (62,685, some were due to sexual orientation (9,157), religion (5,949), disability (5,558) and transgender (1,248) (Home Office 2017: 4). The increase in number of hate crimes is constant and closely related to migration.

Political radicalization

Migration may also fuel rhetoric and programmes of political parties provoke new waves of nationalism, populism and other political concepts aimed at anti-immigration. This is case of various parties in Europe which become stronger after 2015 immigration crisis. The success of the right-wing AFD in Germany is a good example of how migration has become

political capital. For the first time in German history there will be present in the Bundestag people openly denying holocaust. In this sense the political impact of migration might be similarly important as consequences of mismanaged immigration crisis.

Similar situations are in other European countries where immigration helped far-right wing parties and populists to enter national parliaments as fear from migration might be used for mobilization. In 2018 the Italian populist and euro-sceptic Five Star Movement won Italian elections by securing almost a one third of votes. Similarly, in 2017 the populist ANO movement and nationalistic SPD (Party of Direct Democracy) under the leadership of Japanese born leader Tomio Okamura entered the Czech parliament. Elections took place also in Austria, where the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) under the leadership of Heinz-Christian Strache gained 26% of the popular vote. Similarly in the Netherlands, the party of Geert Wilders placed second during the Dutch parliamentary elections in March 2017. In 2016 Slovaks elected the neo-fascist People's Party – Our Slovakia to the parliament. Migration played an important role also during French presidential elections in 2017 and allowed right-wing Marine Le Pen to get 33,39 % of votes during second round of elections. Migration played an important role in all of these elections (Parties and Elections 2018). In other words, migration become increasingly an important topic which enhanced anti-immigration rhetoric among parties.

As the Eurobarometer survey shows, immigration continues to present important issue for political mobilization. As of September 2017 in total 38 % EU-28 citizens perceives migration as the most important threat, followed by 38 % to terrorism and 17 % to state public finances (European Commission 2017: 7). The perception among countries vary. Migration as a threat is the most important challenge for citizens in Estonia (62 %), Czech Republic or Hungary (58 %) or Denmark (52 %). In other countries such as Portugal (20 %), Croatia (29 %) or Ireland (32 %) migration plays not so important role like terrorism which had much more important standing among threats (European Commission 2017: 7). Unsurprisingly, migration is seen for the country the biggest challenge in Germany (40 %) and in Belgium (29 %) where migration scored as first. However, the survey revealed that unemployment is seen as dominant issue within the state (25 %) for EU-28, while immigration scored second (22 %), slightly

higher than health and social security issues (20 %) (European Commission 2017: 11). The data shows, that citizens takes the threat and national issues seriously and that even three years after migration crisis migrations plays very important role.

Conclusion

Criminality is closely related with the migration and migrants often plays central role as victims and sometimes also as perpetrators. Human traffickers misuses tragedy of migrants for their own business where overpriced tickets are not the only problem. Unfortunately, with increasing number of states which are unable to enforce rule of law at their territories, human trafficking and migration becomes source for slavery and slave trade.

At the level of target countries migration is related to various problems including crime, terrorism and radicalization of political parties. Research in this chapter showed, that criminality of migrants is not tremendously higher than that of native inhabitants which was demonstrated on the case of Germany. However, crime rates are still approx. three times higher than among average population and significantly vary due to nationality. Also, the research has shown, criminality of Syrians and Afghans is in norm while some other nationalities tend to be a greater problem in relation to criminality.

Migration plays a rather indirect role in terrorism as the direct links between migration and terrorism is weak. Migrants are not terrorists but some terrorist might be hidden among migrants as the case of Salah Abdeslam showed. Yet, when the state fails to manage migration and successful integration then new problems related to excluded communities or minorities may create vital environment for radicalization and extremism. Two factors which extends the gap between majoritan society and excluded minority which may result in terrorism.

The situation in some countries is alarming and migration constitutes important topic for mobilization of scared or concerned voters. Far-right parties and populist movements succeeded to gain popular support and complicate the political landscape in various countries. Even three years, after the immigration crisis migration is of serious concern among many

Europeans. Potential of these anti-immigration and usually anti-EU parties has not disappeared. However, the strictly nationalistic and restrictive politics may led to another danger of suppression of freedom and disrespect of human rights. In this sense the political impact of migration may have similar consequences as mis-managed consequences of migration crisis.

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7

Migration, Integration and Multiculturalism

The arrival of immigrants throughout history has led to some form of multiculturality, from the spread of food, fashion, and sport. Integration policy is part of migration policy. Despite the criticism of recent decades, multiculturality or multiculturalism is a ideology and policy of respecting of cultural, ethnical, lingual or religious differences. The following chapter explores integration and multiculturalism and assimilation as approaches for migration.

Integration policy is part of migration policy. Integration is a dynamic two-way process which requires adaptation of foreigners on one side, as well as creation of vital conditions for integration of foreigners on the other side. Integration of migrants into majority society currently becomes one of the most sensible social problems in various EU countries. As a solution of coexistence, specifically culturally different minorities from developing countries, with major population, appears to be multicultural integration policy. Issues of migrant´s integration are discussed in multiple concepts. Basically it is understood as gradual integration of migrants into societal system of destination country. Bergerová, Divinský (2008, p. 14) state this definition of migrant´s integration as follows: "*Integration of migrants into the society is a long – term, multidimensional and dynamic two – way process based on reciprocal respect of laws and duties of migrants, as well as majority society*". Migration policy, in terms of integration is more intensive struggle for human rights, law of tolerance, humanity, action against discrimination. Conditions for implementation of immigration policy were created on regional and local levels of EU nations. As Bergerová and Divinský (2008)

claim, we can find three dimensions of integration of migrants into society: Socio – economical, judicial – political and cultural – religious. Furthermore, there is a claim that integration of migrants into society is a complex phenomenon and represent long-term process. Process of integration should be executed on local, regional and state level, while dominant role in implementation of integration policy have state authorities. Supplementary activities rely on NGOs, unions of migrants, etc. Various countries across Europe apply different manners in integration of migrants. Bergerová and Divinský select four main principles that will be used in the following sections:

1. Segregation model integrates migrants only in economic sphere. Basic assumption is that migrant would return back home after some time.
2. Assimilation model allows migrants to integrate faster into majority society, but they lose their own culture.
3. Integration model in the narrower sense is a compromise of two – way adaptation. Migrants contribute into creation of the culture, while majority society respect it. Rules are given by majority.
4. Multicultural model fully accepts culture of migrants. Migrants are distinguished from local citizens, who on the other hand offer many advantages to migrants.

Certainly a key factors of proper integration is knowledge of language in the destination country. As such, good written and spoken command of language allows migrants to educate and to prepare for a life in a new country. Another key factor of implementation migrants into the society is their value on a labor market. According to Jančo, Mokrá and Siman (2009, p. 12) "*access of migrant to the performance of qualification in other member state can be obstructed by three main barriers shown in the form of member state´s requirements which concern: access and accommodation of migrant in the area of a member state, nationality of the migrant and professional qualification.*" According to Tužinská (2009), process of integration of migrants contains cultural dimension as well. As has been pointed out in the chapter on the push and pull factors of migration; migrants come from the countries with different culture, institutions, habits and it is obviously necessary for them to learn and adopt many things after their arrival to

the destination country. The arrival of immigrants throughout history has led to some form of multiculturality, from the spread of food, fashion, and sport. At its basic understanding, multiculturality is based on relations of cultures in a globalized World and is connected with race, ethnicity, and in recent years gender and sexual equality as well. It leads to equality and respect, tolerance and cooperation (Mistrík, 1999). This is at the heart of multiculturalism.

Multiculturalism. Coined by Canada in 1965 became well used in Europe during the 1980s when Europe became the destination of non-European immigrants (Barša, 1999). Since the turn of the century it has encompassed this definition, "*multiculturality is a real condition of contemporary World, where existed, exists and will exist many culturally, ethnically, linguistically and religiously different groups of people*" (Prucha, 2006 p. 252). While, multiculturalism according to Barša (1999) means racial, lingual and ethnic diversity of society, where exists two or more units, whose opinion and behavior form typical consciousness of collective identity it may lead to equality and respect, tolerance and cooperation (Mistrík, 1999). Despite the criticism of recent decades, multiculturality or multiculturalism is a ideology and policy of respecting of cultural, ethnical, lingual or religious differences (Lajčáková, 2006). The following chapter explores integration and multiculturalism and assimilation as approaches for migration.

7.1 Migration

Although migration is not a new phenomenon in Europe, it has arguably never been under such scrutiny. While Europe has undergone several previous migration 'waves' since the 1960s, the most recent that took place in the summer of 2015 has challenged the European Union to create a policy that effectively and efficiently deals with the humanitarian and political crisis that has occurred. The term migration policy is a bunch of all policies which coordinates or by direct or indirect way regulates flow of people transiting through international borders and subsequently their movement in the country of origin. As Barša and Baršová (2005) claim, migration policy regulates flows of migration, defines regulations in prevention against illegal migration, as well as visa issuing, protection and control of borders. Moreover, there is the claim that migration policy is "*one of the pillars of*

migration management, set of goals, strategies and practical steps in managing of flows of foreign immigrant to the country" (Bargerová , Divinský 2008, p. 20). The creation of migration policy is affected by interests and needs of the specific destination country. Main priorities are economic prosperity, cultural, political and other aspects. Concerning current economic situation we can see that countries are more open to immigrants compared to the years with worse economic situation. If a country is in good economic situation, it can create even more benevolent criteria and become more open in order to support flow of new foreign labor force (Ševčík, 2011).

There are some problems with migration as well. The European Union needs migration, however at the same time the EU have to deal with the various problems with it. Internal migration inside the EU has been characterized by movement from poor regions towards more developed regions due to better job possibilities. Lipková (2007) says that the EU countries were not hit by typical reasons of migration such as war conflicts, political persecution or natural disasters. The main reason of migration in the EU is economical. The most massive group of migrants are people from poor regions moving to more developed regions, followed by minor group of people moving from developed countries into poor regions. Typical profile of such person is a member of the company management working for foreign company. Rapid growth of internal migration inside the EU exploded after 2004 when ten new countries joined the EU. Although ten new countries became members of the EU, transition period was applied and it took few more years until labor market was fully liberalized.

While in recent years immigration policy was very open and immigrants were welcome, due to many problems connected with migration forced politicians of some countries to change their mind concerning migration. Different opinions of EU member states differs mainly between poor and rich countries. On the other hand, we can see different opinions on migration in economically weaker countries such as Hungary or Greece. This has led to a migration policy of the EU that has been changing in recent years due to two main reasons. One of them is demography of European population, while other reasons are interests of specific EU countries. European Union as third the largest World power experiences according to Lipková (2007) "long – term decrease of economically active population and until 2050 it might decrease by 10 million of people (Lipková, 2007).

This means that qualified labor force from abroad will be very demanded, what would cause further immigration from non – European countries. Gestnerová (2004) claims that demographic injection for the EU countries can not be represented only by internal European countries, but only from non – European countries.

The problem of migration also contains a social dimension. Countries like Greece and Italy are on the edge of a humanitarian crisis due to a massive flows of migrants coming to the South of Europe. Refugee crisis and migration will bring significant economic aspects. This has been on display since the summer of 2015. As Buchálková (2015) quotes Kraemer, "*decisions of politicians in the question of refugee will mostly affect further development.*" National interests of specific countries can be an obstruction which limits reaching of quick and collective reaction. This could also lead to greater support of populistic, or even xenophobic parties which denies continuing of economic reforms. The tension between a native population and immigrants, between an ethnic majority and minorities is not new or unique. It has existed for centuries. This tension in a broader context is often discussed in terms of survival or preservation. This "survival" narrative typically is about the meaning and depth of assimilation. More often the contrasting views on nature and culture create a romantic nationalism. Moreover, when discussing cultural assimilation it should be noted that a culture can spontaneously adopt a culture or through force weaker cultures are integrated. In the following section this is explored in more detail by the criteria by Bergerová and Divinský.

The first is a segregation model. In this model, migrants are integrated only in economic sphere. Basic assumption is that migrant would return back home after some time. To aid in the work and return, often there exists a geographical separation of different population groups, but sometimes also the spatially expressed division between housing areas and workplaces as well as disparate spatial distribution of neighborhoods known as residential segregation. on the process of segregation in terms of mobility and dynamics of individuals and groups in the city. It is important to note that in this model, the underlying ideological aspects of the idea of the people's home is present. For example, social hygiene, the concept of society and the city, the view on worker housing, as well as notions about The Other, place in a relevant historical light ethnic residential segregation.

As key aspects to understanding how the patterns of ethnic residential segregation occur class relations and race relations are necessary. In the formulation of processes of residential segregation in general and of ethnic segregation in particular there is present decisive politics. In general, though the segregation model within popular imagination is that of the Seasonal migration, backward migration or commutation may be included in transitional migration (Uherek a spol., 2004). This does not apply to the immigrant who arrives and then remains within the host nation.

The second model is that of assimilation, which allows migrants to integrate faster into majority society, but they lose their own culture. This model is normally discussed within the confines of cultural assimilation. This can happen either spontaneously or forcibly. And while a culture can spontaneously adopt a different culture or older and richer cultures forcibly integrate other weak cultures within immigrant and various ethnic groups who have settled in a new land, cultural changing occurs. This happens because it is assumed that relatively tenuous culture gets to be united to one unified culture occurring through contact and accommodation between each culture. Moreover, immigrant assimilation is a complex process whereby immigrants not only fully integrate themselves into a new country, but lose aspects, perhaps all of their heritage too. While, people from different countries contribute to diversity and form the "global culture" that allows for culture combined by the elements from different countries. This "global culture" can be seen as a part of assimilation that causes cultures from different areas to affect each other. New culture and new attitudes toward the origin culture are obtained through contact and communication. Furthermore, social scientists rely on four primary benchmarks to assess immigrant assimilation:

1. Socioeconomic status. This is an individual or family's economic and social position in relation to others, based upon income, education, and occupation defined as an individual's economic and sociological combined total measure of work experience.
2. Geographic distribution, meaning the locality of ethnic and linguistic groups.
3. Second language attainment, that refers to is a language that is learned in addition to one's own native language, since a person's first language is not necessarily their dominant language.

4. Intermarriage, understood as a marriage allowed only outside a social group.

William A. V. Clark defines immigrant assimilation as "*a way of understanding the social dynamics of American society and that it is the process that occurs spontaneously and often unintended in the course of interaction between majority and minority groups*" (Waters, 1999). While, Clark is discussing the United States, similar social dynamics within a society can be applied to Europe broadly, and specific E.U. nations. In Germany is attractive, Slovakia is not among the target countries because Slovakia is a country in the EU where foreigners seek to go least. Furthermore, research on the classical questions of immigrants' economic assimilation, such as in terms of wages (Chiswick, 1978; Borjas, 1995; Hu, 2000; Algan et al, 2010), occupations (Chiswick, 2002; Green, 1999; Chiswick and Miller, 2009), participation to welfare programs (Borjas, 2002; Borjas and Hilton, 1996; Riphahn, 2004). Numerous papers also look at social and cultural dimensions, such as fertility adjustment (Blau, 1991; Fernandez and Fogli, 2009), perceived national or ethnic identity of immigrants (Dustman, 1996; Bisin et al., 2008; Constant, Gataullina, and Zimmermann, 2009; Manning and Roy, 2010), socialization (De Palo et al, 2007), or citizenship acquisition (Bueker, 2005; Chiswick and Miller, 2008). Interestingly enough, what emerges from this literature is that assimilation is a very complex phenomenon, taking place along some, but not all dimensions. For example, though it may happen with employment, language improvement, or citizenship acquisition, it does not necessarily happen with religiosity. Furthermore, assimilation may also be extremely diverse.

The Integration model in the narrower sense is a compromise or adaptation. Integration, arguably is defined as providing immigrants with equal chances to access opportunities available to native-born. This reflects the extent to which receiving societies are willing to accept immigrants, and provide them with equal rights to express their behaviors and preferences, while potentially preserving and fully expressing of their differences.[1]

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[1] To quote the Home Secretary Roy Jenkins, 1966: "*I do not regard [integration] as meaning the loss, by immigrants, of their own national characteristics and culture. I do not think that we need in this country a 'melting pot', which will turn everybody out in a common mould, as one of a series of carbon copies of someone's misplaced vision of the stereotyped Englishman... I define integration, therefore, not a flattening process of assimilation but as equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance*".

Migrants contribute into creation of the culture, while the majority of society respect it. Rules are given by the majority. Sweden is an example of this point. Integration of immigrants in the labor market is to a large extent limited by rigid labor law, which includes the strong status of trade unions and their control over wages, and last but not least, the "last in - first out" principle applied to the recruitment and redundancy of new employees. Trade unions themselves are an impediment to the successful integration of immigrants into Swedish society and to the labor market. Not only do they control the minimum wage level for the vast majority of jobs, but they even have the right to veto the permanent residency. Integration is significantly impeded by the fact that immigrants or asylum seekers do not have the right to apply to the labor market without being granted a residence permit, or the approval of an asylum application, which is currently almost one year. Over the entire length of this period, new immigrants are an excessive burden on the state budget and taxpayers (Bylund, 2016). However, the benefits for a nation of integrated foreigners are observable, whether it be the melting pot of ethnicity of the United States and the U.K. or the mosaic of Canada and Germany.

Finally, the multicultural model fully accepts culture of migrants. Migrants are distinguished from local citizens, who on the other hand offer many advantages to migrants. Being a highly debated topic, the definition of multiculturalism is also debated according to different perspectives. According to the post-multiculturalism literature multiculturalism is "*characterized as a feel-good celebration of ethno-cultural diversity, encouraging citizens to acknowledge and embrace the panoply of customs, traditions, music and cuisine that exist in a multi-ethnic society*"(Kymlicka, 2010, pg.98). As the tone suggests, post-multiculturalism over generalizes multiculturalism and adopts a superficial view towards it. According to Kymlicka, this perception of multiculturalism was applied in the first stages of Western multiculturalism policies and this perception of multiculturalism is summarized as "the 3S Model" (Alibahai-Brown, 2000, pg. 17). This 3S model encompasses the early years of especially British multiculturalism and signifies "*saris, samosas and steelbands*" (Alibahai-Brown, 2000, 17). As the name suggests, this view only focused on several aspects of a culture, food, clothing and music in this case, thereby "*trivializing and de-politicizing immigrant cultures and identities*" (Kymlicka, 2003, 163). Kymlicka states

this type of recent understanding of multiculturalism does not only promote a tokenist understanding of multiculturalism but also de-politicizes and generalizes the different types of multiculturalisms according to the content. While it allows the migration of individuals or even entire groups, through this immigration it brings about social and cultural diversity or even division somewhere else.

If we approach the issue of multiculturalism nominally, starting with the meaning of the notion culture, we see that multiculturalism discourses use the term culture at least in two clearly distinct senses. On the one hand, they utilize it in a very broad "integrative" sense, referring to the practice of self representation, attribution of meaning rooted in a specific group identity. From this perspective, cultures are defined equally as practices of attaching meaning and significance that pertain to racial or gender identity, various occupational categories or sexual preferences. Moreover, The general confusion related to multiculturalism is also fueled by the fact that various particular identities, social subgroups and cultures raise different types of claims and often assert them on totally different levels of the broadly interpreted social sphere. These claims can refer to the educational sphere (e.g. such as "gender studies"), the economic sphere (claiming affirmative action for some particular community) or the political sphere itself (such as demand for special representation e.g. women's rights movements). This confusing diversity of claims is what mostly explains the puzzlement related to multiculturalism today. It is appropriate now to look at the positives and negatives of migration, described as 'pro' and 'con' in the below stated section.

7.2 The Pro and Con arguments of Migration

In Europe, the conversation and the search for solutions have been mostly about how to assimilate (or for those who find that term offensive, how to *integrate*) a growing Muslim presence. In the U.S., there have been discussions about the smaller Muslim population, but the emphasis is primarily on immigrants from Latin America, mostly Mexico and their children. Whereas the old giant immigrant waves, the Germans, Irish and Scandinavians in the mid-1800s, and then the Ellis Islanders from Eastern and Southern Europe, and the Middle East from the 1890s on—were

"Americanized" through government action, the political and educational elites with the post-1965 wave of mostly Latin Americans and Asians decided not to replicate. In Europe the inter-migration that characterized the few decades after the Second World War led to by the late 1970s and 1980s immigration wave of migrants from Africa and the Middle East. By the end of the twentieth century the idea and acceptance of globalization has led to new ideas and cultural models.

The export of ideas and cultural models can indeed trigger the attitude of cultural resistance and stimulate many people to rise and try to protect national cultures against the "McWorld" or "Americanization". However, since 2010 and new immigration waves to Europe, there is decidedly an 'identity' clash, if not arguably 'civilizational' too.

Therefore, the democratization of society, the spreading of the egalitarian spirit, the gradual eradication of rigid differences between castes, estates, social classes, genders through their social roles has caused disruption. But since social roles are no longer appointed unequivocally or quasi-institutionally as in earlier times identities themselves are no longer protected by customary right, representational institutions, privileges and by the system of rigid social prejudices. The main cause for this is the fact that contrary to counter opinion; human identity, including group identity, is of dialogical nature, which means that it depends on recognition by others[1]. This recognition is observed or negated with the host society and its view on the positives and negatives of migration.

Pro

Despite the general rancor and exposed fault-lines in the structure of the Schengen countries and the rest of the EU, multicultural society has many positive aspects. But much is overlooked because it already belongs to the daily life. Traditional gateways, such as state institutions are set up to help immigrants with legal aid, bureaus, and social organizations to name a few. Additionally, an enlargement of the labor force in Europe that is in need of you unskilled workers to balance out the aging population. The pension gap is potentially filled with the contributions of young new workers. As such, economic growth can be sustained, job vacancies and

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[1] see: Charles Taylor: Nationalism and Modernity, in: Ronald Beiner (ed): Theorizing Nationalism, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1999, 219-245.

the skills gap can be filled. Additionally, while host nations are enriched by cultural diversity there is also the energy and innovation that immigrants bring. The education system can be transformed and the entrepreneurial spirit from immigrants strengthens the host countries economy through small business activity. Finally, for the European Union, as a political bloc, arguably an unmeasurable benefit of 'doing the morally correct thing'' and helping in a time of crisis leads to a healthy image translated into both soft and economic power.

Con

With positives there inevitably are negatives or at the very least the potential for them. While unskilled workers may be a benefit, workers with relatively low pay may provide incentive for employers to ignore productivity, innovation and training schemes. Moreover, this as the potential for migrants to be exploited. State institutions may be put under extreme pressure by increased population. The very real possibility of unemployment rise with unrestricted immigrants. Friction with local communities, a facilitation of organized crime and people trafficking. These cons may be extreme examples, but there is also the negative consequences on the home nations that experience an economic disadvantage with loss of workers, and highly trained people in vital industries such as health care. Lastly, within the 'spirit' of multiculturalism, identity politics has evolved towards a segregationist society.

Conclusion

The following chapter explored integration and multiculturalism and assimilation as approaches for migration. It was not intended to indicate what approach was better or preferred. Instead, the review of both integration and assimilation is vital to understand the present situation since this topic has assumed more importance since the summer of 2015 as the the European Union has been challenged to create a policy that effectively and efficiently deals with the humanitarian and political crisis that has occurred with the large immigration movement. As such, what does an integration policy as part of migration policy look like. Integration is a

dynamic two-way process which requires adaptation of foreigners on one side, as well as creation of vital conditions for integration of foreigners on the other side.

Often presented as integration verses assimilation models as solutions there is not 'best' answer. With the integration model in the narrower sense it is a compromise or adaptation. Integration, discussed in the above sections provide immigrants with equal chances to access opportunities available to native-born. However, this model occurs within the confines of cultural assimilation. This can happen either spontaneously or forcibly. And while a culture can spontaneously adopt a different culture or older and richer cultures forcibly integrate other weak cultures within immigrant and various ethnic groups. And while assimilation occurs most frequently there is a strong relationship between possessing citizenship and economic outcomes, language and citizenship, language and perceived discrimination, as well as between perceived discrimination and trust. Therefore, immigrant assimilation is interdependent with the attitudes and acceptance of immigrants on the part of the native-born.

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PART II

8

WESTERN RESPONSE

This chapter deals with the response of Western part of the EU. Similarly to other chapters in this part of the book the selection of the countries is partially arbitrary. The chapter focus on the position of several states which played during 2015 crisis key role. This is especially the case of Germany which played central role in the crisis and attempts to solve the issue. Neglected can not be also the role of France or the UK, which belongs to strong EU actors and the role of Benelux countries with strong influence on EU policies and national experience with migration. Ireland, as the "island behind island" match this group of states in natural way. It is important to note that in this block there are countries with great immigration experience: UK, Belgium, Netherlands and France are former colonial powers and despite Germany had little access to colonies it has historic experience with economic migration. This is also the case of Luxembourg and Ireland.

8.1 Germany

Among countries discussed in this chapter there is a unique position of Germany which is in especially in the Central and Eastern Europe seen as the troublemaker especially due to misconduct of Angela Merkel who "invited" refugees to Europe. This is, however, a rather simplistic explanation and easy to find culprit. Instead, Germany played very pro-active and constructive role in finding solutions of the crisis. Yet, some issues were misunderstood.

For example Robin Alexander (2017) provides in his book a detailed insight how the decision from 4th of September 2015 of Angela Merkel

was taken. He researched that the order to stop immigrants coming from Hungary trough Austria to Germany on the borders were on the table and that there were enough police forces to stop migrants at the borders. However, nobody were able to accept responsibility over possible pictures in the press on which German police beats immigrants while trying to pass the borders (Alexander 2017). In this sense closing the borders would have political consequences as German state power would be seen as violent and not solve the problem. On the contrary, thousands of immigrants would accumulate on the closed borders in Austria with degrading conditions creating pressure on the Austrian and Hungarian governments. Moreover, there was the possible risk that migrants would alternate the route and split in to the various streams passing through, more north, through the Czech Republic. From this perspective Angela Merkel made a de-escalating decision, which was, however, not sustainable.

Open borders strengthened pull factors and motivation of the remaining refugees on Balkan route to pass into Germany while the "doors remained open". The possibility that even Germany or Austria may close its borders was seen as possible complication as refugees had already some experience from Serbian and Hungarian borders. Later on in September and November 2015 nobody dared to close the borders and refugees were arriving in the thousands per day questioning security measures as there might have been hundred of fighters associated with the Islamic State.

Matthias Mayer (2016) sees four main reasons behind the open borders in Germany. First, he mentions several surveys in which the vast majority of Germans are comfortable with the idea that Germany shall become a country of immigrants which contributes to "Wilkommenskultur". Second, he highlights the role of Angela Merkel who became the face of the migration crises which has been tuned into her personal political project. Third, there was the general impression that it is too late to turn back as the number of migrants was rising. And fourth, he argues that positive attitude to refugees might have been perceived as a solution to Germany's unfavourable demographics and labour shortages when refugees were seen as the working force needed in some sectors (Mayer 2016).

The first and last two reasons create the context of Angela Merkel's political leadership. She played a card, appealing on values such as solidarity and dignity on one side, while providing strong determination and self-

confidence to Germans, especially that in the former Western Germany. Her strong words "*Wir schaffen das*" (*We will do* or *we will manage*) delivered at the Bundespressekonferenz on 31. August 2015 become both symbol of German attitude and source of criticism for anti-immigration parties (Pegida, AfD) and sceptic states (Die Zeit 2015).

Chancellor Merkel was a rational player. She was not just a "refugee taker" but actively tried to search solutions for the roots of migration. As she expressed: *"If we don't fight the root causes of flight, then people will say, and a very large number will say, that they want to resettle in places that offer more security to them"* (Washington Post 2015). Despite being labelled as the most powerful woman in the world the prospects of using the power of Germany or the EU were limited as the cause of migration were out of control even for superpowers. Or, on the contrary, were caused by the failure of superpowers to stabilize the situation in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and other parts of the world. Direct intervention into the conflicts seemed to be unrealistic.

Instead, in the searching for realistic solution of the immigration crisis Germany played an important role in communication with Turkey and significantly contributed to the agreement on EU-Turkey Statement to end flow of irregular migrants on 18th march 2016 (European Council 2016). It was just in time as the relations between countries significantly worsened. First, in late March 2016 mutual relations were cold-dawn by the so called Böhmermann affair when German comedian and satirist Jan Böhmermann heavily offended and libeled Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in his defamatory poem. The offensive poem divided the society between a group defending freedom of speech and the conservative group considering poem as act of inappropriate insulation violating the protection of personality (see Das and Graefer 2017: 3). Erdogan later filed charges against Böhmermann and German government had many issues to explain.

Another important aspect was that on 2nd June, 2016 when the German Parliament passed resolution recognizing the 1915 Armenian Genocide which is not recognized and denied by Turks. For this reason in many cities Turks started protests and Turkey recalled its ambassador in Berlin. The relations deteriorated further after the failed coup in summer which was followed by a purge within the Turkish military, administration, universities and persecution of journalists who were often forced to flee the country and apply for asylum in Germany.

The German attitude was dividing Europe. While Central and Eastern European Countries expressed criticism, western leaders supported German attitude. For example Emanuel Macron said, that *"Chancellor Merkel and German society as a whole lived up to our shared values; they saved our collective dignity by taking in refugees in distress, housing and educating them"* (Aline 2017). This words came from the leader of the country, which had more conservative attitude to the refugees than Germany but is still very supportive to the EU solution based on compulsory relocation quotas.

8.2 France

The French attitude has been strongly influenced by French President Francois Hollande who was in the middle period of his five years term in the office when the Migration crisis broke out in summer 2015. Hollande backed the EU proposal for redistribution of asylum seekers to other EU countries in order to ease the pressure on EU border countries who were primary countries for Asylum proceeding due to Dublin System. His attitudes were strong as he warned sceptical countries of the Eastern Blok which tried to avoid or bypass compulsory relocation quotas: *"Those who don't share our values, those who don't even want to respect those principles, need to start asking themselves questions about their place in the European Union countries"* he said (Washington Post 2015). Similarly disruptive were his addresses towards the UK. It was not a good time to remind UK neighbours about solidarity amid the referendum about "Brexit". Hollande said: *"Everyone must understand: you can't ask for solidarity when there's a problem and then exempt yourself from doing your duty when there is a solution"* when pointing to Franco-British cooperation regarding migrants trying to cross Channel Tunnel to reach UK (Reuters 2015). His pressure on other countries was far from being insincere or superficial. On the contrary.

President Hollande actively made commitments to accept more refugees. From the early beginning France was prepared to take 24,000 refugees as part of EU plans and after the Paris attacks he advocated help to refugees: *"Some people have tried to draw a connection between the movement of refugees from the Middle East and the terrorist threat. This link exists because people from Iraq and Syria live in areas controlled by Islamic State and are killed by*

those who attack us." (The Independent 2015). This attitude was, however, dividing society and served as a ground for criticism which contributed in the increase of popularity among far-right. For example Marine Le Pen said: "*We can no longer take in anyone. That's the reality*" (Reuters 2015a) and fuelled opposition towards the establishment, immigration and EU membership. Due to the fact that Hollande faced similar problems as Angela Merkel in Germany , the two nations became natural allies in searching for solutions at the EU level during negotiations with Turkey.

8.3 The Netherlands

The situation in the Netherlands was slightly different than that in France or Germany. This is due to several aspects among them rich experience with migration (both negative and positive), austerity and terrorism changed political position of the people to more conservative and sceptical attitude. At least since Theo van Gogh was assassinated in 2004 the country is sensitive about migration. For this reason Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte from the Liberal Party was under pressure from both public and anti-immigration Freedom Party and its leader Geert Wilders. For this reason in late March 2015 Rutte presented a position paper suggesting closing EU borders for refugees and asylum seekers (The Irish Times 2015). This position indicates some departure from liberal principles in reflection to criticism.

The departure from a liberal position was visible also within government policy where it caused considerable tension. The coalition composed of conservative-liberals (VVD) and social-democrats (PvdA) decided in the late 2015 to toughen its asylum policy and cut the funding for shelters providing bed, bath and food for migrants who fail to qualify as refugees (Reuters 2015b). While VVD proposed more radical solution without exceptions, PvdA argued for some minimal level of care and their members were showing more solidarity. It is important to say that position of VVD was strongly influenced by the populists as the Rutte was from the early beginning forced to balance Geert Wilders. For example in pre-elections of 2017 he stressed that migrants shall be normal or gone (The Telegraph 2017). In this proclamation he tried to present himself as moderate alternative to Wilders who promised to close all mosques, ban Quran or close borders to asylum seekers. It was not easy to compete as Wilders tried

constantly to label Rutte as "*the man of open borders, asylum tsunami, mass immigration, Islamisation, lies and deceit*" (The Telegraph 2017).

The pressure from populists acted as the force leading towards pragmatic attitude in searching of the solutions for immigration crisis. Rutte was realistic about borders and urged other EU statesman in doing resolute actions in order to prevent failure of integration project and Schengen: *"No one wants to kill Schengen, but if it is only a fair weather system then it cannot survive"* (The Guardian 2015). However, similarly to others, he saw importance in focusing on the causes of migration and the role of the EU in stabilization of Middle East and Northern Africa.

8.4 Belgium

Situation in Belgium was somehow different than that in neighbouring countries and situation in the multicultural Brussels was somehow more positive than in other parts of Belgium divided between Dutch speaking Flanders and French speaking Wallonia. Most of the refugees arrived to Brussels and found shelter in Maximilien Park where provisional refugee camp was established. The tent town near the Belgian immigration office hosted more than 1,000 people before being deconstructed and refugees replaced to different locations or volunteer families (The Independent 2015). The emergence of Maximilien, a city within a city, showed significant impact of immigration crisis on Belgium and lack of capacities. Already in August 2015 representatives from Centers for Public Social Action (CPAS) requested government to unlock additional funds to re-open structures closed in 2013 to provide shelter for migrants. In total, there were 6,000 CPAS in 562 districts in the Wallonia and one third were still closed since 2013 due to savings and relatively small number of migrants (Dugulin 2015). The migration, as in many other parts of Europe presented great challenge within internal politics.

Prime Minister of Belgium Charles Michel declared the effort to deal with migration crisis at the place of its origin: *"We need to develop a strategic partnership with Turkey. Syrian refugees must be able to work in Turkey. And humanitarian assistance must be strengthened, not only in Turkey but also in Jordan and Lebanon for example. We must also work hard towards ensuring a more dignified and safe reception of refugees close to conflict zones."* (Michel

2015a). In this sense he was supporter of the EU-Turkey deal. At the same time he supported EU relocation mechanism as Belgium was relocating migrants internally for already several months and for this purpose created several thousand places (Michel 2015b). In general Belgium supported multilateral approach an in the Joint declaration Gäichel IX (Gäichel is traditional platform for yearly meeting between the government of Belgium and Luxembourg which dates back to 28 April 2004) Belgian and Luxembourg prime ministers stated that migration crises must be solved on a basis of common European policy on migration. Both representatives highlighted the effort to second expert to Europol, Frontex and European Asylum Support Office. Moreover, they highly appreciated EU-Turkey declaration and supported mutual implementation and commitments (Michel 2016).

Despite pledges, the Belgium government was passive in the implementation of the EU relocation mechanism. As pointed out by Philippe Dam (2016) Belgium lags behind European solidarity with asylum seekers as from the planned 3 812 asylum seekers allocated to Belgium the country has received only 206 after more than one year of implementation (see Dam 2016). As pointed out further, Belgian leaders were justifying their inaction by saying that Greek and Italian partners were not able to prepare complete files, but there was evidence that several thousand people were ready for relocation (Dam 2016). The passivity may have been caused by practical and political factors, similar to other countries. First, a practical reason is that Belgium had enough problems with its own asylum seekers and fully used its administrative capacities within a divided state. Second, is political: after terrorists attacks in Paris and Brussels it was evident that atmosphere turned to be in favour of refugees which might have been exploited by opposition parties. Similarly to other states Prime Minister Michel was forced to adopt realistic attitude resting on pro-EU approach while delaying acceptance of further immigrants.

8.5 Luxembourg

The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg has the image of the richest EU country with very pro-European attitude and for the whole EU history it has been a state whose elites becomes EU leading figures. For example, one of them is

Christian Social People's Party leader Jean Claude Juncker. A traditionally open country, also generous to solve the refugee crises and volunteered to accept 300 refugees which was one of the highest intake of refugees per capita (Politico 2015). However, despite generosity accepting migrants from Syria and other parts of Asia, anxieties and scepticism among local population which become more sensitive or "anxious" in contact with newcomers was caused. Despite no anti-immigration party in Luxembourg, the immigration crisis raised the question about the identity of Luxembourg which is being influenced by several other nationalities. However, even for refugees Luxembourg is not favourite destination due to very expensive life and demanding requirements for successful integration requiring the knowledge of at least two languages (Politico 2015).

In general the inflow of refugees was well managed in Luxembourg. However, still there were some issues regarding delays in processing asylum claims due to understaffed administration, some systematic issues regarding the flow of information or issues related to examination of the claims in order to prevent uncertainty. Luxembourg also had some limits in the identification of the most vulnerable persons (see Council of Europe 2017). These problems are however, minor to that compared in other countries.

As the pro-active country within the EU with ambitions for helping others, Luxembourg became a hawk in pursuing common rules and criticised others for passivity. For example, in September 2016 Luxembourg's foreign minister Jean Asselborn said that Hungary should be temporarily or even permanently expelled from the EU for treating asylum seekers "worse than wild animals" (The Guardian 2016). He stated oral war between Luxembourg and Hungary and Hungarian foreign affairs and trade minister Péter Szijjártó labelled Asselborn as "an intellectual lightweight" and his comments considered as "sermonizing, pompous and frustrated" (The Guardian 2016). It was also minister Asselborn who urged the European Union to take its obligations seriously as the winter was coming and situation for some refugees become critical. He said: *"Instead of constantly thinking up new schemes for reception centres outside of the European Union, we would be better off implementing what we have already agreed on"* (Euractiv 2017). During the crisis, Luxembourg acted as exemplary EU member who urged others to behave accordingly.

8.6 United Kingdom

The UK as a former colonial superpower has a very rich experience with migration and many UK cities are multicultural and cosmopolitan. Yet, the response of the UK government to the 2015 refugee crises was criticised. For example, in January 2016 the BBC informed, that the group of 27 UK charities including Oxfam wrote a letter to the Prime Minister to urge him to take proportionate share of refugees. They wrote that: *"Last year's announcement that the UK will resettle 20,000 Syrian refugees over five years was a welcome first step, but given the numbers of people searching for safety across the globe, this response is clearly inadequate: it is too slow, too low and too narrow. ... The UK can and should be doing much more to ensure that refugees are not compelled to take life-threatening journeys or forced into smugglers' hands"* (BBC 2016a). However, the UK government spokesman said, that UK is working on the commitments and that before Christmas the country welcomed approx 1,000 refugees. Moreover, he said that UK government continues to resettle refugees directly from the countries neighboring Syria in order to prevent them to undertake dangerous journey on sea which may lead to drowning tragedies (BBC 2016a).

UK has been committed to take 20,000 refugees under the Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Programme by 2020, but the government also promised to accept more unaccompanied child refugees from camps in the countries neighboring Syria. According to the BBC, also Scotland and Northern Ireland offered help to accept thousands more refugees (BBC 2016b). The focus on children was a priority for the UK government but also caused disagreement. In its initial promise David Cameron agreed to take a further 3,000 children refugees from the Middle East but his attitude was criticised by his Home Secretary, Theresa May, who stressed that children shall be taken from within the Europe. While in office as the Prime Minister Theresa May later adjusted the number of resettled children to 350 (The Guardian 2017).

It has to be noted that the UK commitment was rather voluntary and had elements of solidarity with EU countries due to Tony Bair's opt- out from the Amsterdam Treaty. As a result the UK adopted common EU visa and asylum policy instruments on a voluntary basis. This was also the case of EU relocation mechanism where the UK opted-out thus was not bound by

concrete numbers. And despite the fact, that more than 25 thousand people claimed asylum protection in the UK in the first 12 months (11,600 received asylum), in comparison to per capita, the UK has one of the lowest rates at 30 applicants per every 100,000 residents (measured between January and October 2015) compared to 1,450 applicants per 100,000 residents in Hungary or 323 in the Germany (BBC 2016b).

Domestic issues, however, did not prevent UK representatives to criticise the EU response as weak and lamentable. For example chairman of the British parliament's Home Affairs Committee Keitz Vaz said, that *"The atrocious conditions in migrant camps within and on the borders of the richest countries on earth is a source of shame"* and that EU did almost nothing to combat people trafficker (Business Insider 2016).

For the UK one of the key priorities were to secure its borders especially with France. June referendum on Brexit complicated the issue of UK border regime with both: the EU (France) and in regard to Northern Ireland.

As of 2017 the UK government announced the new 75 million GBP package aimed at securing the Central Mediterranean route to Europe so less people will risk dangerous journey to Europe. Some part of the money will be used as preventive measures to tackle diseases, lack of food, water, medical care and employment opportunities which serves as push factors for migration (UK Government 2017). If we consider, that this help will be split among several countries, it is a little contribution to the prevention of migration. Yet, from the UK perspective securing Mediterranean route seems to be rational as this is the main corridor leading to the UK via France.

8.7 Ireland

Ireland is also a country associated with migration, especially due to famine or economic crises which led to emigration to the UK or the USA. For centuries poor Irish farmers became migrants who left the country to search for better life behind the Atlantic Ocean. Nevertheless, since the 1990s some Irish cities experienced high inflow of immigrants. Next to the UK citizens, there are high numbers of Polish, Brazil or Romanian migrants in the Ireland.

Similarly to other countries the response of Ireland was slow. Despite in September 2015 the Irish government committed to take 4,000 refugees

(within Irish Refugee Protection Programme which was established in 2015) as of September 2016, a year later, only 331 were accepted by Ireland: 38 people from Syria who have been brought from camps in Greece and 293 people from the camps in Lebanon who came under UN resettlement programme (The Irish Examiner 2016). As pointed out by the director of the Migrant Rights Centre Ireland Edel McGinley, Ireland was accepting refugees at the rate of 40-60 per month, but it was required to take approx 160 per month in order to fulfil existing commitment (The Irish Examiner 2016). The initial lax response led to criticism.

A more detailed picture is provided by Usman Sharif (2016) who investigated Ireland's Response to the EU Migrant Crisis in 2015-2016. He concludes that despite clear legal framework the response of the country was weak, due to geographic position out of main migration routes and challenging implementation of government's obligation due to human rights, security considerations and negative public opinion (Sharif 2016: 13). Similarly to other states, Ireland had a cautious attitude and due to sensitivity of the issue was also passive to act beyond minimal international requirements.

For example, in a press conference in Vienna in August 2015 German Chancellor Angela Merkel mentioned Ireland among countries that are not participating in the common European asylum policy. Her criticism, however, was countered by Irish Minister for Justice Frances Fitzgerald who stressed that Ireland made obligation proportionally greater than other countries to take immigrants. (The Irish Times 2015). She also stressed that since the Treaty of Amsterdam, Ireland is party to the protocol which allows opt in to asylum policy measures on a case-by-case basis in order to safeguard the common travel area Ireland shares with the UK but she also highlighted that impression that Ireland has made a decision to opt out measures to alleviate crisis is wrong (The Irish Times 2015).

Conclusion

It is evident that five EC founding states (Germany, France, Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg) together with the UK and Ireland which might be considered as Western Europe were far from being naive refugee takers. Instead, in all countries some sort of pragmatism might is observed and

even in vastly pro-European Luxembourg, the migration crises raised mixed feelings despite a generous attitude. In almost all countries pro-EU forces supporting common approach on the EU level were balanced by euro-sceptic and anti-immigration voices which contributed to moderate approach and pragmatism of country leaders who had to balance their communication and steps taken. Migration had important impact on the politics within all Western countries and presented political capital.

Among these western countries UK and Ireland have comfortable position as they are separated from the continent by the sea and they may more effectively control their borders. Moreover, they have opt-out from the common migration and asylum rules and thus EU relocation quotas. Nevertheless, both countries showed solidarity to help the EU to face migration crises. The scope and speed of the help is another issue and also in this way both countries showed difference between initial proclamations and reality.

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9

RESPONSE FROM SOUTHERN EUROPE

In this chapter positions of Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Malta, Cyprus and Croatia are presented. Despite these EU members having different length of EU membership they each share geographic location with direct access into Mediterranean Sea and they are transit countries on the Southern "Mediterranean" way or Balkan Way into Europe. Spain and Portugal are former colonial powers with some experience with migration from the New World, or from Africa via Gibraltar or various islands in the Mediterranean sea or the Atlantic Ocean (especially Canary Islands). Similarly, an important role in the region is that of Italy with special link to some African countries. Due to various islands in the Mediterranean Italy is a significant gateway to Europe. This is also the case for two island states Malta and Cyprus which for centuries served as the crossroad between continents. Greece is the connection between Europe and Small Asia and the beginning of the Balkan route on which migrants often pass Croatia, which is mainly seen as transit country.

9.1 Portugal

Portugal from the early beginning showed warm attitude towards refugees, especially that of Syria. However, similarly to other countries, the reality was slightly different as refugees complained about the lack of support from state authorities and often aimed to continue to Germany or Sweden to meet their relatives or simply have a better standard of living (Portugal Resident 2015). For this reason despite an open approach Portugal

had problems to meet EU quotas. Prime minister Antonio Costa said that Portugal could support 10,000 immigrants but later formally pledged 4,600 which is still much beyond official quota (News Deeply 2017a).

Portugal has a generous immigration policy. It offers 18 months free housing for immigrants, a stipend of 150 Euro per month and free access to language classes. Despite this motivation immigrants refuse to stay and as pointed out by the media, approx 40 % of accepted migrants leave the country within 18 months (News Deeply 2017a). The reasons is in lack of established migrant communities. There are also administrative obstacles and poor services regarding immigration and third, there is bad situation at the job market which requires good language skills which is problem as many new arrivals does not speak Portuguese or English. Moreover, refugees are often placed in rural areas where they face isolation and language issues (News Deeply 2017a). In other words, a warm welcome did not meet the realities of migration schemes.

It is however, questionable why Portugal had kind attitude and opened itself to migration at the time when other countries build fences and tried to torpedo relocation mechanism?

There is a multiplication of several factors which met each other in the case of 2015 refugee crisis. These includes historical experience with migration, the role of Catholic culture and solidarity with the EU. As for history Portugal received only small number of refugees. During the war period Portugal served as the last stop of migrants leaving old continent to the USA (Remaque's The Night in Lisbon). However, during the Salazar era (1933-1974) only few refugees settled in Portugal. Some refugees returned in late 1970s and 1980s when his rule was over. The refugee crisis broke out in the country in 1975 when around 1 million refugees come back to their mother country from Latin America or Africa. The *retornados* presented about 10 % of the country's population (Politico 2016). In the 1990s Portugal become a safe place for refugees from Kosovo or Guinea-Bissau, however the number of applications were low. Between 1975 and 2015 it was just fewer than 18,000 applicants and just 1,605 refugees got the asylum (News Deeply 2017b). Portugal had not big experience with migration compared to neighboring Spain and migrants historically coming to Portugal were victims of war or Portuguese who had been persecuted by the Salazar regime, which left a footprint of solidarity within Portuguese

society. The solidarity became imperative within Portuguese society if we consider also the help of European union provided to Portugal at the time of Economic crises when country slides down to similar problems as in Greece.

Similarly, there is strong influence of the Catholic church in Portugal and pro-refugees stance by Pope Francis resulted in more pro-active approach at the level of local communities (News Deeply 2017b). Also, the civil sector were active and several influential NGO's were established including Plataforma de Apoio aos Refugiados (The Refugee Support Platform) running under the Instituto Padre António Vieira. Openness to refugees made sense also from demographic and economic perspective as some regions are depopulated and become economically underdeveloped.

The Economic crisis had important impact on Portugal and its society. It is estimated that between 2011 and 2014 in total 485,000 people left the country, including 200,000 as permanent migrants. Due to these numbers approx 20 % of Portuguese citizens live abroad which makes Portugal the country with highest proportion of emigrants (The Gate 2017, see also Marques and Góis 2017: 65-82). Depopulation and underdevelopment of some regions did not contribute to economic stalemate. Also for this reason the prime minister of Portugal António Costa announced a plan to enrol 2,000 Syrian students at Portuguese universities who may later work as farmers or forestry experts (The Gate 2017). It is evident that Portugal sees migration as part of the solution for domestic problems.

This attitude seems to be also politically sustainable as opposition towards this approach is weak. Portuguese National Renovator Party (PNR) which is something like Portuguese version of French Front National did not succeed in the 2015 election. Despite the best electoral results since its foundation in 2000, the party got only 0,5 % and did not make it to the Parliament (Election Resources 2015). Even parliamentary opposition does not question basic principles of immigration policy and EU rules. On the opposite: centre-right opposition sees open borders as essential aspect of working EU and migration as part of the solution (Politico 2016). In this regard Portugal is one of few exceptions in the EU where refugees are welcome and migration as positive phenomenon, mainly due to own experience.

It is important to stress that it is not only the attitude of government or citizens which makes Portugal favourable to refugees. In 2015 Portugal

scored second after Sweden in the MIPEX (Migrant Integration Policy Index) rating measuring openness to integration. In the eight separate areas measured under the index Portugal was rated excellent in labour market mobility (91 %), access to nationality (86 %) or anti-discrimination measures (88 %) while considerably low in healthcare access (43 %), education (62 %) or permanent residence (68 %). Portugal scored 74 % in political participation and 88 % in family reunion which overall made second place among 38 observed countries (MIPEX 2015). However, even the above stated variables do not present enough pull factors which is outweighed by a relatively high unemployment rate which serves as push factor for domestic population to migrate. Economic factors together with absent communities makes Portugal rare target country for migration.

9.2 Spain

In general, Spanish citizens have positive attitude towards migration. This is due to its own historical experience build on the 1980s immigration which boosted the labour market and contributed to economic growth and development. For a long time immigrants provided valuable services and represented about one-fifth of the employed population. At the same time the number of migrants rose from 1,5 million in 2000 to 6,5 million in 2009 and within the same period Spain's foreign born population increased from less than 4 percent to almost 14 % (Arango 2013: 1). Years in a closed Franco regime created after the fall a political culture favourable to migration, similar to that of Portugal.

However, the situation in Spain is slightly different than that of Portugal. This is due to bigger size of Spain which makes the country more important within EU political system and also due to geography close to Gibraltar and having two exclaves (Ceuta and Melilla) in Africa. As a bigger country of the EU other states and EU institutions made considerable pressures on the Spanish government to accept immigrants under EU relocation mechanism despite having problems with "its own" refugees. As of 2015 Spain was asked to take approx. 15,000 refugees despite having its own forecast of 17,000 asylum applicants for 2015 – three times more than a year before (El País 2015). For this reason Spain showed a rather cautious attitude. Deputy prime minister Sáens de Santamaría stressed, that there will be limits on Spanish solidarity

(El País 2015). This cautious attitude has been changed in the following weeks after then prime minister Mariano Rajoy met with Angela Merkel and received a visit from David Cameron. At the same time the world has seen the images of a Syrian child who drowned in the sea (El País 2015).

Spain was a relatively active player. Prime minister Rajoy tried to persuade other EU leaders that only "global" EU policy may lead to successful management of migration crisis and delivered a document presenting Spain's policy recommendations including active cooperation with third countries in the economic area which may prevent migration flows. Spain offered its experience in work with African Governments which are based on mutual cooperation with Morocco where bilateral agreement helped to reduce influx of migrants (El País 2015).

Later on Spain criticised the EU pact with Turkey. Spanish foreign minister José Manuel Garía-Margallo said, that: "*Spain will only accept … an agreement that is coherent, compatible to the international law, and that is extraordinarily respectful towards the human rights of the persons that need to flee from their home country*" (Politico 2016b). This negative approach come after Pedro Sánches, a leader of the Socialist opposition, asked Prime Minister Rajoy not to support the deal (Politico 2016b). This happened just one week after Sánchez failed in his bid to replace Rajoy as a prime minister following December's inconclusive elections (Politico 2016b). For this reason a negative stance seemed to be form of consensus.

Under the common EU relocation mechanism Spain pledged to get 17,337 refugees from Greece and Italy. However, until September 2017 only 744 refugees were received so far (see Bris and Bendito 2017). This might be especially due to Spain's own refugees coming via the Mediterranean route. It is important that the number of Sea arrivals constantly increased. In 2014 there were 4,632 sea arrivals, a year later 5,283, in 2016 there were 8,162 and in 2017 in total 22,103 refugees (UNHCR 2018). To this number we shall add also Land arrivals including 7,084 in 2014, 10,980 in 2015, 5,932 land arrivals in 2016 and 6,242 land arrivals in 2017. As of 2017 (May) most arrivals are from Morocco (19,4 %), Algeria (18,3 %), Guinea Cote d'Ivoire (13,4 %) and Gambia (9,7 %) (UNHCR 2018). Most of them are economic migrants.

The Migration crisis in Spain is not yet over due to increased activity on the Mediterranean route. Moreover, the borders of Ceuta and Melilla makes

the situation for Spain more complicated as these two exclaves are often used as entry points to Spain and are on the way to Libya. For example, in Autumn 2017 a group of African migrants clambered up 6 meters tall fences topped with razor wire to enter Ceuta. It is estimated that around 1,000 citizens from sub-Saharan countries are waiting for the opportunity to pass (Sunday Express 2017). Other sources sees the situation less dramatic as the numbers of arrivals via naval routes are not high compared to previous years.

For example as of August 2017, in total 4,000 people arrived by land to Ceuta and Melilla on the Moroccan coast, which is not different than 6,000 arrivals in 2016 and far below 11,000 arrivals in 2015. Similarly, the total number of irregular migrants arriving by sea to Spain is not high: 8,162 in 2016; 5,312 in 2015 compared to 39,180 in 2006 who arrived on Canary Islands. Via the Strait of Gibraltar most people come in 2001 when Spain was reached by 14,000 migrants via this route (The Conversation 2017). The number suggest that there were much greater excesses in the history and that Spain will manage the influx of immigrants. However, due to "busy years" it seems that capacities are full and at maximum use.

It is important to stress that Spain is not in a good economic condition as it suffers from high unemployment which reach among foreigners at about 40 % which then serves as a push factor for secondary migration (Izquierdo, Jimeno and Lacuesta 2015: 7). Migrants often uses their networks or utilizes its acquired citizenship and migrates further in Europe to seek better job opportunities (see Ramos 2017). The study presented by Izquierdo, Jimeno and Lacuesta (2015) suggests that Spain might be at the edge of a brain drain and face similar effect like Portugal. In this aspect the solution of migration crisis in Spain goes hand in hand with decreasing unemployment in order to provide economic stability.

9.3 Italy

From the southern states Italy is traditionally one of the most exposed to influx of immigrants. This is especially due to its geographic location to Tunisia, Algeria and Libya, a central hub of the Mediterranean route. However, Italy is a target country also for migrants from Egypt, even Greece. The Ports of Lampedusa, Palermo, Pozzallo, Augusta, Catania, Messina or

Crotone are well known for arrivals to Italy. The number of Sea arrivals in 2014 was 170,100 which later remained almost stable with 153,842 in 2015 and 181,436 in 2016 or 119,369 in 2017 (UNHCR 2018). However, it is important to note that since August 2017 there are considerable less refugees going to Italy. Nevertheless, their composition, is mostly that of economic migrants, as majority is composed of Nigerians (15,5 %), people from Guinea (8,3 %), Cote d'Ivoire (8,1 %), Bangladesh (7,6 %) or Eritrea (7,2 %) (UNHCR 2018). From the statistics it is evident that Southern Mediterranean route became of greater importance after Balkan route become closed.

Italy has been target country but mainly a transit country for many migrants going to Europe who sought safe passage from south to north of the country, which is much economically developed and in the beginning lacked border controls with Austria or Switzerland. According to Politico, the safe passage from south of Italy to North costs around 500 Euro (Politico 2017). Due to better economic opportunities migrants do not stay in the south but migrate north of the country or try to pass to Switzerland or Austria to Germany. However, despite this, Italy remains after Germany the state of highest number of asylum applications. For example, as for 198,000 applicants registered in 2017 Germany counted for 31 % and Italy for 20 % (cca 127 000 applicants), followed by France (14 % or 91,000), Greece (57,000 or 9 %), the UK (33,000 or 5 %) and Spain with 30,000 applicants counting approx for 5 % (Eurostat 2018).[1]

It is important to note that Italy has been strongly criticized for lax approach from the side of state authorities in preventing migration and slow or benevolent registration process. This criticism has been voiced also at the EU level. For example the Foreign Minister of Austria Sebastian Kurz said to his Italian counterpart Angelino Alfano in Vienna that Italy should stop allowing illegal migrants from reaching mainland as by this step is Italy allowing them to migrate further to Europe (Euronews 2017). The illegal migrants going to Austria caused tension between Italian and Austrian government of Sebastian Kurz said, that rescue operations in the

[1] If you Compare data from UNHCR (2018) and Eurostat (2018) you can find out, that in 2017 there were approx. 8,000 more asylum applications submitted in Italy than is the number of Sea Arrivals. This data discrepancy may be caused by three factors. First, not all sea arrivals were counted and thus the number of applications might be in reality higher. Second, there might be time delay before arrival and asylum application. Third, we have to consider returnees from other EU and non-EU countries who came back to Italy.

Mediterranean "should not be a ticket for Central Europe" and presented the option to deploy up to 750 troops at the Brenner Pass (Euronews 2017).

Multilateral relations also are complicated. At the EU level Italy has been a close ally to Germany which pushed forward the redistribution quotas and reform of the Dublin system. As noted in the earlier chapters, this position did not met expectations of V4 states who were resistant to relocation. The Italian Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni said, that it was time for "solidarity to manifest itself" and expressed confidence that there is a space for a good compromise to be found regarding the Dublin regime (Daily Finland 2018). Gentiloni's position is fully rational as Italy faced unprecedented influx of refugees due to unfavourable geographic position and Dublin rules about asylum procedure eligibility based on first Schengen country entered by refugees. The setting of the system together with unprecedented numbers put also the government credibility into question.

Italy may be considered as one of many countries where migration had important impact on the rise of popularity of populist, anti-EU or in general anti-immigration parties. Populist Five Star Movement under the leadership of Luigi Di Maio was the real winner of the Italian elections which was held in March 2018. However, also radical parties such as neo-fascist CasaPound Italy (CPI) had considerable success. The party did not make it to the Chamber of Deputies but under the leadership of Simone Di Stafano succeeded to gain 310,793 votes (cca 0,94 %) compared to just 47,691 votes during 2013 elections (Election Results 2018). The stronger position of Five Star Movement may negatively influence relations with the EU and contribute to more nationalistic politics.

As Politico proposed, Italy has been left alone in dealing with the crisis and needed to solve it by three steps. First, claim ownership of the Libya reconciliation and stabilization process; second, launch a systemic program of forced repatriation for economic migrants; and third, to negotiate with African countries agreements on aid and job creation in exchange for commitment to fight illegal migration at the place of origin (Politico 2017). All of the solutions presented, however hold some limits as stabilization of Libya is very expensive, which requires direct involvement with considerable capacities. Forced repatriation is also costly and demanding in the terms of administration and logistics and re-negotiating the agreements

with all African states involved in the crisis is time demanding and requires consensus by all EU countries.

From the data there it is evident of significant drop in sea arrivals since summer 2017. This drop might be caused by several things. Due to ongoing war in Libya some smuggler groups and smuggler networks had to postpone their activities as they were forced to leave coastal cities which were taken by local militias. As pointed out by the New York Times, this is also the example of the National Guard or Sabratha Brachn, with its ties to internationally recognized Libyan government which most probably contributed to disruption of smuggler activities (NY Times 2017). This is, however only one of many factors. It is also important to note that Italy provided assistance and training to Libyan coastal guards and prevented ships operated by various NGOs to conduct rescue operations off the Libyan coast (NY Times 2017). Nevertheless, it may be also possible that the migration influx is influenced by other causes including spread of negative experience of failed asylum applicants or simply by changes in the migration routes.

9.4 Greece

From all Mediterranean states Greece was most exposed to Sea arrivals. Greek Ports of Lesvos, Chios, Samos, Leros, Kos, Rhodes and Kastellorizo are well known especially among refugees escaping Syrian or Iraqi battlefields. From just 42,038 in 2014 the number topped at 856,732 in 2015 and then fell to 173,450 in 2016 and just 29,718 in 2017 (UNHCR 2018). The composition was in 2017 very similar to 2015. As of 2017 the majority of refugees are from the Syrian Arab Republic (41,1 %). They are followed by refugees from Iraq (20,8 %) and from Afghanistan (11,6 %) (UNHCR 2018). There is high probability that majority of migrants in Greece are non-economic migrants as their places of origin are in the areas of ongoing conflicts.

The immigration crisis hit when Greece was unprepared. As pointed out by Dimitris Skleparis (2017) the Greek immigration policy in 1990s and 2000s was rather reactive then proactive and Greek government had passive attitude towards irregular migrants who were somehow absorbed by the informal labour market (Skleparis 2017: 2). When inflow of refugees increased the SYRIZA-led coalition government in Greece attempted to

depart from reactive migration policies set by the previous government, however the departure was not successful as the Balkan route became closed and the EU signed the deal with Turkey (Skleparis 2017: 2). This led to the situation that high number of refugees stayed within Greek territories, but without interest to stay in Greece, instead looking only for limited ways to leave the country. As pointed out by Traunder and Neelsen (2017) an estimated 62,000 refugees remained on Greek territory (Traunder and Neelsen 2017: 180).

The high number of refugees staying in Greece created another push on the government which tightened the rules for asylum, detections, deportations, and external border controls policies (Skleparis 2017: 4). In April 2016 the Greek Parliament adopted a new law No. 4375/2016 which partially reflected EU-Turkey Statement and created a double standard within Greek asylum policy as applicants searching for international protection who arrived to Greek islands on 20th March 2016 or later followed a different procedure than applicants who come before. This created many uncertainties about the legal status of refugees and raised questions about violations of their rights.

Regarding the solution of the crisis the most important moment seems to be the Brussels meeting from 25th October 2015 where Greece agreed to cooperate on issues such as permanent exchange of information, limiting secondary movements, supporting refugees and providing shelter and rest, management of the migration flows together with other EU member states, improving border management, tackling smuggling and trafficking, monitoring, etc. As for capacity measures, Greece agreed to increase its reception capacity to 30,000 places by the end of the year and support UNHCR to provide rent subsidies and host under the family programmes for at least 20,00 more people creating five "hot spots" with additional capacities (European Commission 2015). From this perspective Greece made one of highest political commitments for accepting refugees among EU member states.

In this sense, Greece may be seen as being passive within the immigration crisis, but this is a wrong perception. However, there is also another point of view that the Greek government was not proactive enough to use European Commission's AMIF (Asylum Migration Integration Fund) and ISF (International Security Fund) money to soften the crisis. Daniel

Howden and Apostolis Fotiadis (2017) pointed out that despite this, funds are complicated to access and SYRIZA was preoccupied with resolving the state's debt crisis and showed little interest in these funds and European Commission officials had no one to talk in Athens (The Guardian 2017).

As presented by Sophia Kalantzakos, Greek people and political parties during the crisis showed maturity, self constraint and a constructive approach to handle the crisis while other countries in the EU talked about security threats, financial constraints or economic instability (Kalantzakos 2017: 6). She stresses that party leaders such as Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and even opposition leader Kyriakos Mitsotakis made many statements highlighting the humanitarian dimension of the crisis. For example, during his strong criticism of the EU response Alexis Tsipras said that he is ashamed by Europe and that *"the waves of the Aegean are not just washing up dead refugees, dead children, but also the very civilization of Europe"* (New York Times 2015b). His words were said at the time when several incidents resulting at casualties at sea were reported.

However, we cannot say that immigration and inflow of refugees had a positive impact on political consensus in Greece. Due to the influx of immigrants Greece served as a natural laboratory for measuring the line between immigration and support for far-right wing parties such as Golden Dawn. As presented in study by Elias Dinas et al. (2017) vote shares for Golden Dawn moderately increased by 2 percent points at the islands which faced massive influx of refugees just before the September 2015 elections which is 44 percent increase at the average (Dinas et al. 2017). However, in general the party did not succeed to transform migration crisis into political capital as it reached just 7,0 % of the popular vote in September 2015 elections (379,581 votes) which is same percentage as during 2012 May elections when Golden Down secured in more votes (440,966 votes) due to economic crisis (see Macklin 2018).

The image of passive Greece within immigration crisis is misleading. As of March 2018 it is estimated that there are still 45,000 refugees and migrants standing in the country. Since 2016 Greece received EU emergency support funding worth of 605,3 million Euro (European Commission 2018). However, this money is just a little contribution if we consider more than the 1 million refugees coming via Greece since 2015.

9.5 Malta

Malta is located approx. 400 km north from Tripolis or the same distance south-east from Tunis between the Italian island Lampedusa and Southern cape of Sicilia which places the island country in the middle of the refugee crisis. However, the number of arrivals is not critical: as of 2014 there were just 568 Sea Arrivals to Malta and in 2015 only 105 (UNHCR 2018). For years Malta was a stop for migrants using Mediterranean naval route to Europe. For this reason Malta had already experience with migration before outbreak of migration crisis. As noted by BBC the first ships started landing on Malta in 2002 and resulted in indifference and in last few years also in outright racism among society (BBC 2015). This situation resulted also into feeling that Malta which has one of the highest per capita acceptance rates is saturated with migrants (for example in 2005 Malta has taken in more than 4,000 migrants). Partially, this saturation becomes an important part of the country policy towards the EU. As pointed out by Cetta Mainwaring (2012) Malta was the only EU country which maintained an 18-month mandatory detention policy towards all irregular migrants upon their arrival (see Mainwaring 2012) which led to the full use of Maltese capacities and request for help. Situation further dramatized after the fall of Gaddafi regime in Libya. The war in Libya and following instability resulted in high influx of refugees and Malta asked for help and criticized others not sharing the burden of immigration (Mainwaring 2012).

This position was reflected also in July 2013 when Prime Minister Joseph Muscad changed his rhetoric and threatened to push back migrants to Libya to create pressure on the EU states to act (BBC 2015). For this reason migration policy in the EU-Malta relations were of significant importance already before the outbreak of immigration crisis.

The resistant attitude of Malta towards taking refugees in late 2014 resulted in criticism from Italy which questioned the lack of solidarity and the fact, that despite Italy is taking thousands of refugees Malta is not accepting any. Italian representatives gave several examples when immigrants were rescued closer the shores of Tunisia or Malta, but were taken directly into Italy. The situation escalated when Carmelo Abela, a Maltese Minister for Home Affairs and National Security between December 2014 and June 2017, said, that there was informal collaboration between Malta and Italy that all

saved migrants would be disembarked in Italy. This statement came as a shock for Italian government as it was never discussed before (Independent 2017). As there was no explanation why all migrants goes to Italy migration remains complicated issue in relations between Italy and Malta.

However, the perspective on Malta as an uncooperative partner is misleading. Malta was first and last state in 2017 which fulfilled its obligation under EU relocation mechanism by accepting 131 refugees (see Malta Today 2017). The moment for Malta came during the Council presidency in the first half of 2017 when Malta proposed new ways how to send more migrants back to Africa. The plan involved safe camps in Egypt, Libya and Algeria run by humanitarian organization such as UNHCR or IOM (Politico 2017b). This plan seems to be consensual but has some international law limits as it poses some legal and also security challenges. The countries identified are not fully safe and migrants may be exposed to the risk of human rights violations which prevent their removal.

9.6 Cyprus

Compared to Malta, Cyprus is in the different position and for years refugees tried to avoid Cyprus. This is especially due to the law on Cyprus which prevents most of the asylum granted bringing their family members on the island (see Ekathimerini 2015). This undermines attractiveness of Cyprus as a target country. Similarly, Cyprus is far from EU mainland which makes Cyprus not suitable as transit country. Moreover, immigration and asylum law is very strict: as of 2014 just 3 % of applicants were granted refugee status allowing to live and work legally in the country and 56 % were granted subsidiary protection with less rights associated (Ekathimerini 2015). Due to strict conditions refugees knows not to register or apply for asylum and better try to avoid landing on Cyprus at all. For this reasons At the same period there were no Sea Arrivals to Cyprus due to distant geographic position. The situation changed in the following years.

There are, however other factors making Cyprus an unflavored destination on the migration route. The country is not in the Schengen which makes it technically more isolated from other EU states (if we do not consider geographic isolation). Moreover, due to economic crisis which hit the banking sector on Cyprus the labour conditions are somehow

complicated and makes Cyprus less attractive for economic migrants. Immigrants are often perceived in a racist way or labelled as "enemies" which leads to discrimination on the market (see Alecou and Mavrou 2017: 110). In other words, migration to Cyprus results in very limited options. This was also the case for Syrian refugees, who attempted to apply for asylum on the UK military base on Cyprus and somehow escape from the island. This, however, led to an impasse.

Despite the UK-Cyprus memorandum of 2002 that makes clear that asylum seekers arriving directly on the sovereign base area are the responsibility of the UK, the UK refused to take responsibility. According to Guardian (2016) the UK Ministry of Defence said that 114 people who came ashore are the responsibility of Cyprus and if they will not seek asylum within Cypriot authorities they will be sent to Lebanon from which their boat arrived (The Guardian 2016). It is however a question whether there will be any progress as there were already one example in history. In 1998 a group of 67 Kurdish and Iraqi refugees arrived in the British base area and they are still there "embroiled in a legal limbo" (The Guardian 2016).

However, the Memorandum stress also the obligation for the Cyprus. For example, article 9 stress that Government of the Republic of Cyprus will grant free medical care, welfare benefits equivalent to those given to the citizens of the Republic of Cyprus, The right to apply for a work permit in accordance with the relevant laws of the Republic of Cyprus, the access to education and according to article 8 asylum seekers arriving directly to Sovereign Base Areas may move freely throughout the island of Cyprus (Memorandum of Understanding 2002). In this sense landing at British bases may bring more ways for asylum seekers.

The above mentioned case of 114 applicants is an exception from the rule. Thanks to isolated position and completely different situation than on the Greek islands Cyprus had no trouble to manage rather rare influx of immigrants. This was one of the reasons why Cyprus threatened the deal between the EU and Turkey. As evident Cypriot policy has been determined by tense relations with Turkey over the divided island. There is, however, another reason why Cyprus saw EU-Turkey deal as problematic. With the closed Balkan way and Turkey as safe harbor the migration route has changed. With the EU-Turkey deal Cyprus has increased its attractiveness among Syrian refugees. This may be the reason behind the rise of asylum

applicants in a not very perspective country. In between September 2014 and October 2017 around 1,400 people arrived in Cyprus on boats and large number of refugees came also through the Turkish Cypriot breakaway state in the north. While the number of asylum application dropped between 2016 and 2016 in Europe by 54 % Cyprus was a rise of 43 % at the same period (Cyprus Mail 2017). With ongoing fortification in Europe and restricted migration options Cyprus may in the end become an interesting place to migrate.

9.7 Croatia

The last state dealt within "Southern perspective" is Croatia which is the youngest EU member state located directly on the Balkan route. Between Serbia, Hungary, Slovenia and Austria. Especially "Croatian Inland" including regions of Slavonia and Croatian Uplands was exposed by high influx of refugees en route from Serbia to Slovenia. The crisis in Croatia started on 16 September 2015 when Hungary closed its borders with Serbia which lead to redirection of migration flow on the Croatian territory and ended on 8 March 2016 when Balkan countries started to apply the Schengen Border Code. As pointed by Šenada Šelo Šabić (2017a) during this period over 700,000 people passed through Croatia, of which just 178 applied for asylum (Šabić 2017a: 31). Croatia become one of the main transit countries for Syrian refugees.

Croatia managed thecrisis well. It has build winter reception and transit center in Slavonski Brod with a capacity to provide accommodation of 5,000 places per single night and organized also free of charge transit over its territory (Šabić 2017a: 31). However, later there were some problematic issues as well.[1] For example in 2017 Human Rights Watch reported that there were some forced "push backs" made by Croatian police to remove refugees from Croatia back to Serbia (HRW 2017).

During the immigration peak between September 2015 and March 2016 Croatian authorities had imminent interest to speed up transit of refugees through the territory and tried to avoid creation of "hot spots" which will make the burden more permanent. For this reason authorities urged migrants to continue towards Hungary or Slovenia which in the end

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[1] Detailed development of the crisis in Croatia has been described by Tajana Sisgoreo (2016).

resulted in disputes with these countries due to newly imposed burden on them. Hungary build up barbed wire fences, Slovenia stopped traffic from Croatia and started to return refugees and Croatia had to close every border crossing but one with Serbia in order to manage the inflow (CBC 2015). Closed borders resulted in traffic complications.

During the critical period Croatia experienced also parliamentary elections which has taken place on 8 November 2015. The elections resulted in slight victory of HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) party under the leadership of Tomislav Karamarko, who criticized previous prime minister Zoran Milanović also for weak response to immigration crisis. Zoran Milanovič had dual stances during the crisis: one hand he promised to guard country's interest but also maintaining open border policy that is humane to immigrants. This was under criticism of Karamarko from the first day as he proposed more restrictive approach to border policy and involvement of armed forces in protecting them (The New York Times 2015a). Migration was, however, not the only issue in the country which suffered relatively high unemployment and only slowly has recovered from the economic crisis.

The Croatian political discourse was influenced by several factors which are well summarized by Šenada Šelo Šabíć (2017b). She stresses that the Croatian experience with its own refugees in the 1990s has played important role in empathy of local population with refugees from war torn nations. Moreover, Croatia as the youngest EU member is not yet part of the Schengen and it is matter of international prestige to show more open attitude than countries which are member of the EU and Schengen, but have very restrictive policy such as Hungary (Šabíč 2017b: 59). These determinants contribute to the image of the country that is willing to share the burden with other EU countries. The active and constructive involvement of Croatia, under given circumstances, prove that Croatia is a responsible EU member.

Conclusion

This chapter dealt with "Southern" response to the migration crisis and highlighted the unique position of every country and showed slightly different perspective than that of western countries. This is because southern countries are not usually seen as target countries but they serve

as a gate to Europe and serve as transit countries. The position of Portugal is unique due to welcoming and generous attitude towards migrants which, however, have only limited reasons to stay. This is due to problematic situation on a labour market, lack of significant communities outside major cities and limited knowledge about Portugal in general. Bad labour market situation is also issue for Spain which already experienced some migration peaks due to Canary Islands.

A much more complicated position is that of Italy which is used mainly as a gateway to the north which caused tension with Austria. Similarly to Iberian Peninsula, the labour market in the South of the country faces challenges and as economic situation is better in the north it servers as important pull factor for intra-country migration. Somehow, a special position is in Malta which experienced relatively small number of refugees inflow, but due to size of the country Malta is for a long time one of the biggest per capita refugee takers and its restrictive migration policy with long detention period has been used as powerful tool within foreign policy towards the EU and Italy. All four countries have something in common. They are part of the Mediterranean route which is now (mid 2018) used mainly by economic young male migrants from all over Africa who migrates to find better life in Europe.

The situation of Malta is very different than that of Cyprus. Cyprus has been for long time seen as not perspective target country due to bad economic situation and also bad transit country as it has distant geographic location from the EU mainland and is even not part of the Schengen. Moreover, it is distant also from Syrian coast which makes island country better protected against low quality or improvised vessels. However, even on Cyprus we observe some change in the last two years. This may be attributed to the closed Balkan route and deal between EU and Turkey in which Cyprus has played its natural role and pursued its national interest towards Turkey which still occupies northern part of the island. A territory, from which refugees also arrive to.

Among all countries, the situation in Croatia is different as its refugee crisis story is linked solely to the Balkan route. Croatia has been fully hit in the autumn of 2016 and spring 2017 when faced unprecedented migration flow. Despite initial problems, Croatia succeeded to manage mass migration without significant failures and compromising European values.

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CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN RESPONSE

This chapter deals with the response of Central and Eastern European part of the European Union. As stated in the other opening sections of this part; the selection of the countries is partially arbitrary. The chapter focuses on the position of several states that played a role during the 2015 migration crisis. This is especially true for Hungary and Austria playeing central roles in the crisis and attempts by Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, to solve the issue. Neglected, but no less important are Bulgaria and Romania, who as EU actors can influence policies because of their geographic location. It is important to note that in this bloc there are countries with significant immigration experience: Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania as former Warsaw bloc nations underwent their own migration in the 1990s following the 1989 Revolutions. and return to democratic rule. This is highlighted in 2004 and 2007 as they joined the EU. Therefore, each has historic experience with economic migration.

The European Union has set up an allocation mechanism, which is based on Member States' reception capacity. Due to reasons of coming to European countries to gain opportunities and benefits from its welfare system, some of member states adopt legal measures. Despite this, during the period under review (from 2015 until 2017) only 20,000 refugees have been relocated out of the initial target of 160,000 (Huddleston-Mikaba, 2017, pg. 3). The system of emergency refugee relocation quotas, which the European commission presented as a key component of an EU-wide solidarity reform known as Dublin, has not reached any consensus among

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member states. The issue was viewed in the respective states through a prism of sovereignty and security. With the latter being more prevalent as a mainstream politicians' fear from the reaction of voters if they publicly support the entry of refugees. The Visegrad Four countries refused to share the burden of taking in asylum-seekers. Their opinion was expressed when Hungary, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic had voted against the relocation mechanism in 2015. The fragmentation of Europe is seen by statements made by opposite parties, advocacy of adopting commitments regulating migratory flows, and a desire to have a tougher stance on protecting the EU southern border.

At present, the issue of migration as a crisis is not only in the 'West' of Europe such as the United Kingdom, France or Germany, but the crisis and specific migration policy to deal with this is also part of Central and Eastern European countries of Austria, Slovenia, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland (the V4), Romania and Bulgaria. As a group, the V4 is a cultural and political alliance. As this brief chapter outlines, the politics of the migration narrative in these nations have played an important part in the wider continual E.U. response.

The numbers of legal migrants are essentially accurate and reliable. One the other hand, reliable statistics of illegal migration do not exist and the number of illegal immigrants can only be estimated in V4 countries on the basis of police records, numbers of detained immigrants or documented reports from non-profit organizations (Hening, 2007). Contrary, most Western European countries where population data are used to calculate net migration, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have published a registered net migration rate since the 1990s (Palát, 2014). Legal or illegal migrants have very difficult integration into the host country's majority society for several reasons. In the first place, the migrant must learn the written and unwritten rules of the country and must adapt to them. At the same time, the migrant retains his / her culture and national identity, has his / her cultural habits, religious conviction or typical clothing (Palát, 2014). However, access to migration is not similar throughout the European Union countries as has been described in this part of the book. Each geographical region of the E.U. has differences that may help and also hinder migration.

In 2016, the survey focused on public opinion on accepting migrants. Out of countries surveyed, Slovakia ranks fifth from the end. From the V4

countries Hungary was worse was even worse at second to last. The Czech Republic was in eighth place from the end, Poland 16 points ahead of them. The European Union has criticized Hungary for building a border fence with Serbia and Croatia. However, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has strengthened his position in the country and, thanks to strong populism, has once again become the premier for the next parliamentary term. Such a policy while not popular amongst policy-makers in Brussels has been supported within Hungary. This domestic support is found elsewhere within the V4 countries who refuse the mandatory quotas as they argue it is contrary to law. In the V4, politicians and political parties who use migration policy and migrants to pursue populist goals.

10.1 Austria

Austria, arguably located in the heart of Europe, is a modest sized nation of nearly eight and half million people. Historically, it has been thought of refugee friendly since it welcomed thousands of Hungarians in 1956 and did so again during the Prague Spring of 1968, letting within its borders thousands of Czechoslovaks with the most recent being during the Balkan war of 1995 as thousands of former Yugoslavs were let into the country. Keeping with this reputation, the capital city of Vienna has long been a cultural melting pot with international cooperation and inter-religious dialogue occurring.

Therefore, it is not a surprise that Austria would play an important role in the refugee crisis in 2015, serving as a transit country for refugees and migrants heading to Germany and elsewhere along the Western-Balkans Route. Indeed, as the first western European country that migrants pass through on their long overland journeys from Iraq and Afghanistan, but mostly Syria. All must begin their attempt to be granted asylum at the Traiskirchen centre just outside the capital, Vienna. By the end of 2015, more than 90,000 people had applied for asylum in Austria, more per capita than Germany or Sweden (Pongratz-Lippitt, 2016).

Austria, though is a destination state as well, with over 29,000 asylum applicants over the course of twelve months prior to July of 2016 (Rohac, 2017) making Austria the of the highest numbers on per-capita basis in the European Union. It is without a doubt true what Cardinal Christoph

Schönborn, president of the Austrian bishops' conference commentated that Europe was facing its greatest humanitarian challenge in decades, meanwhile he criticised the failure of EU countries to share the refugee burden. "*There is a willingness to help people,*" said Dr Jutta Henner, director of the Bible Society in Austria, who works with asylum seekers in Traiskirchen and across the country. However, since the end of 2017, Austria and its new government had decided to erect border fences and restrict the number of asylum seekers this year to 37,500 (Oltermann, 2016) effectively ending the open-door policy of the previous Austrian government and widely urged by world leaders such Merkel and Pope Francis.

In fact, with the election of the right-party, Austria has stated its plans to use its presidency of the European Union from July 2018 to shift the focus from resettling refugees within the EU and towards preventing further waves of arrivals. This perhaps will be met with some relief from other Central European states, such as the V4, who have been at odds with other members of the bloc over immigration.

Austria's new chancellor, Sebastian Kurz, who campaigned on harder stance on immigration has pledged to use his good relations with other central european nations to bring the two sides together. This departure from the prior Australian government is welcomed in Budapest and Warsaw. Moreover, Kurz has argued in favor of a system where migrants rescued in the Mediterranean are returned to Africa, while Kurz has pledged to stop altogether illegal immigration, saying "*protection (of borders) alone will not solve the migration question but the decisive question is what happens to people after their rescue - so are they brought to central Europe or are they taken back to countries or origin or other safe regions where they can be provided for?*" (Reuters, 2018) which in practical terms represents an overhaul of the union's so-called Dublin asylum regulation, deemed crucial to head off a repeat of the 2015-16 migration crisis. This is important as an exploration of the nations that comprise the Visegrad Four indicates nations that are vocally opposed to the Dublin system and are least popular nations for migrants.

10.2 Slovakia

Slovakia is the least popular country among migrants. This is the result of a survey that took place in early 2017. Slovakia finished in last place with

a table of seven applicants per million inhabitants, whereas on the opposite end, Germany has 2,890 applicants per million inhabitants (Eurostat, 2017). Migrants do not want to come to Slovakia for several reasons. The first reason may be the hate rhetoric of government officials on full display in the 2016 parliamentary elections. Refugees are not, according to politicians, welcome. The other reason is a strict asylum policy. On the former, the elections were not the first time that populist topics had taken center stage in pre-election debates.[1] The issue of migration to the top of the agenda effectively displaced concerns about unsolved structural problems[2]. The anti-refugee pressure and rhetoric were not the only factors influencing the decisions of the country's leadership. The government also came under pressure to act following the death of 71 migrants in Austria - near the Slovak border - in August 2015, the government was under pressure to act. However, this only again indicated that Slovakia's relationship with the migration crisis, exposes the lack of historical engagement with migration and Islam in general, and a public sector inadequately prepared to cope with the strategic and practical challenges arising from the situation. Slovakia assumed the role of EU presidency (July 2016 – December 2016), and contributed constructively to discussions on this issue. On option is Slovak participation in voluntary resettlement under the EU-Turkey agreement, with the first 20 people scheduled for resettlement, according to government sources[3] by end of 2016 and another 200 planned before the end of 2017. These numbers were not met.

Nevertheless, the aim of the migration policy of the Slovak Republic is to protect the national interests of the Slovak Republic and to achieve the migration objectives and priorities as well as the process of their provision by the individual actors involved in the implementation of the migration policy and the creation of conditions in the area of human, of the competent institutions in this area, the active participation of the Slovak Republic in the development of the law of the European Communities and

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[1] In 2002 Roma issues, including the "Irresponsible rise of the Roma population" was what SMER campaigned on. In 2010, the dual citizenship of Slovak Hungarians was the attention. In the last presidential elections, the leader of SMER Robert Fico accused his opponent, and current president, Mr. Kiska of being a member of the Church of Scientology.

[2] "Refugees as the main social problem", http://www.webnoviny.sk/slovensko/clanok/995382-najvacsim-spolocenskym-problemom-pre- slovakov-su-utecenci/.

[3] Slovakia promises a 'sustainable' EU migration policy, http://www.politico.eu/article/slovakia-promises-a-sustainable-eu-migration-policy- refugee-crisis/

the European Union in the field of migration, with harmonization of the legislation of the Slovak Republic with the law of the European Communities and the European Union in the area of migration, the development of the institutional framework necessary for the implementation of policies in this area (Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic, 2018). To this end, the Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic has issued the New Start guide in the Slovak Republic, where information is processed for aliens seeking asylum. The aim of the guide is to familiarize strangers with the cultural customs of our country in order to understand each other. The handbook is written in a simple and comprehensible way, based primarily on the practical experience of migrant workers, but also on the suggestions of aliens who have identified themselves as to how and when it is most important to become acquainted with their arrival in the new country (Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic, 2018). It is appropriate then that pursuant to the national interests of the Slovak Republic, the purpose of their migration policy is creating appropriate conditions of legal migration, Fighting against illegal migration should be secure by strengthening border control. And on the international level Slovakia as part of global partnerships, can contribute to the adoption of the unified European asylum system.

Within in the field of migration and further harmonization; legislation of the Slovak Republic with the law of the European Communities and the European Union in the area of migration, developed the institutional framework necessary for the implementation of policies in this area (Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic, 2018) applying the following principles to migration policy:

1. Principle of sovereignty - ensures the right of the Slovak Republic to protect its national interests and to regulate migration, i. taking into account the maintenance of social stability and the protection of the traditional way of life based on the economic and social possibilities of the Slovak Republic, respecting the obligations arising from international treaties and documents and creating the conditions for stepping up the fight against illegal migration and terrorism.
2. Principle of legality - is based on respect for the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, international treaties and documents, the laws of the European Communities and the European Union and the

legislation of the Slovak Republic governing the subject area, with emphasis on guaranteeing, respecting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms.

3. Principle of regulating legal migration - creates space for the adoption of legal migration regulation procedures in accordance with the interests of the Slovak Republic, especially with regard to the state of economic, political and cultural stability of the society as well as the situation on the labor market and the structure of employment through the state migration policy controlled and regulated immigration.

4. Principle of active cooperation with the European Union - the accession of the Slovak Republic to the European Union, emphasizes the provision of a unified asylum policy and the creation of permanent solutions related to the implementation of migration policy in cooperation with international organizations and non-governmental organizations.

5. Principle of non - discrimination represents the provision of equal opportunities for all aliens who are legally resident in the territory of the Slovak Republic and excludes the possibility of discrimination and the granting of any privileges and benefits to individual persons.

6. Principle of flexibility - foresees the creation of a space for innovation in the adopted policies and practices in the field of migration policy (Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic, 2018).

Slovakia, one of the EU countries that has been the most critical of a pan-European approach to the migration crisis, promised in 2016 and tried to help the bloc reach a goal that has so far proved to be elusive: a sustainable policy for dealing with refugees. This failure matched the political rhetoric of former Prime Minister, Robert Fico, who said that Muslims are "impossible to integrate" in Europe (Barigazzi, 2016). According to the survey from 2016, 61 percent of Slovaks thought their country should not accept any refugees. This was the most after Hungary and Macedonia. States with a negative attitude towards migrants are geographically close. European countries that had a negative attitude towards migrants were also strongly opposed to receiving Syrian refugees. People from these countries have had a negative attitude to migrants before the refugee crisis and the crisis has

only confirmed them in this attitude. The survey also showed that the level of acceptance of migrants was higher for people with higher education and income living in urban areas. It was also higher for migrants themselves (Radosavljevic, 2017). As former Prime Minister Robert Fico said in February this year, V4, including Slovakia, will never agree with mandatory quotas. The Visegrad Group will never agree with mandatory quotas for redistributing migrants. Fico said that the sovereign country which Slovakia is, the European Union will not determine what to do in this area (TASR, 2018).

Although the Slovaks and some Slovak politicians do not accept the admission of migrants and refugees, the Constitution of the Slovak Republic sets out another view. In the second chapter, the Constitution of the Slovak Republic guarantees for everyone fundamental rights and freedoms regardless of gender, race, color, religion, national or social origin or nationality. No one can be harmed or disadvantaged for these reasons. Foreigners enjoy basic human rights and freedoms in the Slovak Republic guaranteed by the Constitution. The Slovak Republic provides asylum to aliens persecuted for exercising political rights and freedoms. Asylum can be denied to those who have acted in violation of fundamental human rights and freedoms (The Constitution of the Slovak Republic, 2014). The government approved the latest amendment to the Asylum Act on Migrants and Asylum in April this year. Under the common European rules, the Ministry of the Interior will have a baseline for asylum in the asylum procedure instead of the 90 days to 6 months. The deadline may be extended by up to 9 months. This will be the case, for example, if it is necessary to assess complex questions of fact or law before the decision is taken, or even if the asylum seeker does not cooperate or otherwise complicates the assessment of his application. Consequently, if this is necessary for a proper assessment of the asylum application, this period may be renewed for a maximum of 3 months. At the same time, there is a new possibility of suspending the asylum procedure for up to 6 months / repeatedly, with a total interruption of up to 15 months / if the situation in the applicant's country of origin is uncertain, this situation is considered to be temporary. In these cases, however, our country must inform the European Commission and decide on the application no later than 21 months. A new reason for not granting subsidiary protection and the reason for non-asylum to join

the family is added. The Ministry of the Interior will ask for a new opinion (previously a statement) on the assessment of the asylum application, in addition to the Slovak Information Service and the Military Intelligence. The intelligence services will assess the applicant for the security of the Slovak Republic in terms of threats to the interests, the protection of which belongs to their competence. Disagreeing opinion will be a reason for not granting supplementary protection or asylum for the purpose of family reunification (Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic, 2018).

While, the Slovak Constitution clearly mentions protections to migrants, Slovak politicians had used rhetoric to make the March 5th 2016 elections, and the campaign preceding it, the primary driving forces shaping public discourse on migration. The election campaign highlighted that Slovakia remained reactive, and did not have any substantive public discussion about migration until the moment when the situation on the Balkan route and in Budapest escalated.

However, following the death of 71 migrants in Austria near the Slovak border in August 2015 members of the Slovak government met with representatives of civil society and established an ongoing consulting and implementation mechanism; a working group on the government's response to the crisis. The consulting mechanism was the first serious attempt to create a dialogue between the government and civil society and make progress in solving several migration related issues. But the lack of significant experience with migration in the past, has forced the Slovak government to rely on ad-hoc mechanisms, such as using European funds [EIF]) for contracting Slovak NGOs to carry out integration and social work with successful asylum applicants. The fragility of this mechanism was demonstrated by autumn of 2015, when due to EU project management issues, the Ministry of Interior ceased funding any integration projects within this framework. Slovakia's engagement remains plagued with basic problems and confusion within the government with respect to the division of responsibilities, both financially and logistically. For example, there is no comprehensive package of policies, related to everything from healthcare to employment support, that clearly specifies the responsibility of different government offices.

The media in Slovakia has played a two-fold role. The majority of the mainstream media has echoed the rhetoric coming out of the political

discourse. This was reproduced without any significant critical evaluation as a narrative of migration waves, security concerns and Islam. The public broadcaster RTVS, which covered the humanitarian crisis with correspondents on the ground and evaluated certain claims made by politicians, took a more critical approach. Broadsheet dailies SME and N projected an even more "activist" position with highly compassionate coverage and strong pro-refugee opinion pieces that centered on the human suffering and responsibility to assist. RTVS, SME, and N also publicly and explicitly supported the "Plea for Humanity" campaign. The migration crisis, prior to the 2018 murder of a journalist, was the *largest mobilization of civil society since the 1998 elections*. In particular, the system of non-institutionalized volunteers organized their activities through non-traditional means (e.g. social media) sent a message highlighting a different face of Slovakia. The cooperation between Christian and secular-liberal organizations and individuals may be considered as evidence of the growth of civil society and social capital, as a counterweight to a populist politics. FInally, the migration crisis for Slovakia demonstrates something about how Slovaks approach the whole issue. When the narrative is securitized and refugees and migrants are presented as a de-humanized mass and threat, negative emotions are high; but, when the agenda focuses on helping real people, the Slovak public seems to be accepting and supportive.

10.3 Czech Republic

In the Czech Republic the Ministry of the Interior is responsible for the issue of international migration and international protection at the legislative, conceptual, analytical and implementation level. And the Department of Asylum and Migration Policy is specifically responsible for this. As such, the Czech Republic's migration priority is in line with the Government's Policy on Migration for Foreigners to take effective measures to promote controlled legal migration while minimizing illegal migration. It is also linked to the effort to ensure the effective protection of national borders within the Schengen area. The Strategy for Migration Policy of the Czech Republic sets out seven principles that are prioritized and represent the basic thematic areas in the field of migration: security as a cross-sectional element, integration of foreigners, illegal migration and return

policy, international protection (asylum), external dimension of migration, legal migration, the free movement of persons within the European Union and the Schengen area and the coherence with the common policies of the European Union (Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, 2015). Despite this official policy, the response within Czech society and politics has been primarily focused on securitization with criticism of proposals from the Brussels and German Chancellor Merkel. Moreover, while the migration crisis in the Czech Republic has not been expressed by the number of refugees crossing the border or applying for protection; it has, similarly to other V4 countries, been felt within public debates and media coverage.

For decades, migration in the Czech Republic was without the interests of politicians, the media and the general public. However, with the migration crisis Czech society and also a number of politicians raised the issue of migration to the top of their political priorities with vocal and visible Islamophobic sentiment that has grown quickly and gained significant media attention. The result is an amendment to the Foreigners Act. Some proposals from this amendment severely restrict the rights of foreigners living in the Czech Republic and they are contrary with constitutional and European law. But, this follows the idea that migrants are bad for the country. The mainstream Czech media has produced mostly objective reports, serving a role in facilitating discussion of the issue among various relevant actors, yet, alternative online media sources and even parts of the traditional media have framed the debate from the perspective of Islamophobic and anti-refugee groups. A relevant example of this bias is TV Prima, which became internationally infamous when leaked documents from an internal meeting of company executives and editors exposed that journalists were given direct instructions from managers to portray refugees only in a negative light. Since, political parties have used the issue of migration as a political ploy, the policy debate therefore has lacked a focus on developing a realistic approach to addressing issues raised by the migration and refugee crisis.

Migration is a natural and permanent historical phenomenon and opportunity. For the immigrant, the receiving country and the country of origin. International trade, foreign investment, foreign studies, professional internships, highly qualified foreign workers, or low skilled labor, multinational corporations managers, as well as cultural or scientific

transnational cooperation are all very closely associated with migration. Significant restrictions or even the exclusion of immigration would be a threat to the economy itself and would not only lead to a loss of competitiveness, but within the framework of reciprocity, this immigration policy most likely affects the freedom of movement of the Czech citizens themselves. Half a million foreigners living in the Czech Republic do not move in a vacuum - they are members of society, interwoven with the fibers of social, family or labor relations. By restricting their rights, the Czech politicians also indirectly damage their own citizens (Jurečková, 2017). Nevertheless, due to the narrative via media and politicians, the majority of Czech citizens oppose the acceptance of any migrants (around 60 percent) and a total of 70 percent of respondents oppose allowing refugees to enter the EU. 77% would agree to immediately return refugees to the country from which they entered EU. Only 36% would support any permanent solidarity scheme of relocation of refugees within EU states. 79% agrees with border controls of all people including EU citizens. 50% would agree to help financially and by other means to other EU states facing higher number of refugees. Such negative sentiment has been fuelled by the swelling Islamophobic movement, which carried out various activities in 2015.

In spite of this, the Czech Republic adopted two key integration policy documents. At the end of 2015 the government adopted the Updated Policy for the Integration of Foreigners, which was broadened to include persons designated for international protection within the State Integration Program (SIP). The SIP's updated version took effect in the beginning of 2016 in accordance with the European resettlement and relocation policies. The capacity of the program is to assist up to 2,000 refugees. According to a Globsec analysis (2017), a total of 200 million CZK (7,400,000 Euro), with 73 million CZK (2,000,000 Euro) allocated from the state budget and the rest from EU AMIF shall be used.

A positive outcome of the migration crisis for the Czech Republic arguably is the fact that NGOs, human rights activists, the religious community, and other civil society actors have responded to the humanitarian needs of refugees. Moreover, civil society actors have sought to displace the dominant discourse of Islamophobia, xenophobia and racism through various initiatives. The crisis in the Balkans culminated in a strong humanitarian response from NGOs working in the field and volunteers travelling to the

Balkans to assist refugees. Furthermore, civil society actors have sought to displace the dominant discourse of Islamophobia, xenophobia and racism through various initiatives. The crisis, particularly on the 'front lines' of the Balkans has developed a strong humanitarian response from NGOs working in the field and volunteers travelling to the Balkans to assist refugees. Additionally, support for refugees transiting through the Czech Republic was also particularly visible with people offering accommodation, food, and work opportunities for refugees.

Yet, the migration crisis, in the Czech Republic which still is without a refugee presence, is as a worrying example of how Central European society can be easily radicalized through the combination of a lack of responsibility coming from political and societal elites, the media, and the domination of social online media through propaganda, and frustration within Czech society.

10.4 Hungary

Since the summer of 2015 migration crisis, Hungary has functioned as a transit, source, and destination country of both regular and irregular migration. Its geographic location, European Union membership, and relative prosperity, collectively act as pull factors for migrants. As an EU Member State, a section of Hungary's borders form the external borders of the European Union. Both Eastern and South-Eastern migration routes cross Hungarian territory, with the Western Balkan route (via Turkey, Greece, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia or Croatia to Hungary) being the most active. Hungary has been one of the main entry points into the EU for migrants seeking to gain access to other Member States. The result of these facts is the reality that the migration crisis has most affected Hungary from the V4 countries. As what has occurred in the Czech Republic, the Hungarian government's approach has been based on securitization of its policies and rhetoric. The result, has been the unfortunate increase in xenophobia as a consequence of governmental anti-migrant campaigns and political acts, as the Hungarian government has used the refugee issue in a conscience effort to transform the political system. Because, Hungary has become a country through which thousands of legal and illegal migrants flow to other parts of the European Union. This

has resulted in the Hungarian government building a fence in an attempt to stop the influx of migrants.

The Hungarian government controversial decision to prevent further inflow of migrants by constructing a wire fence along their 175-kilometre border with Serbia was only the beginning. The government also announced fence-building on sections of the border with Croatia and has considered fence construction on the border with Romania. In an incident after closing the border with Serbia, Hungarian police used tear gas against immigrants on the Serbian side of the border. Earlier in 2015, the Fidesz government ran an anti-immigrant campaign, a 'National Consultation on Immigration'. The campaign consisted of questionnaires and anti-immigrant posters (Migration Policy Center, 2018).

In July 2015, the Hungarian parliament passed amendments to the Asylum Act. The UNHCR raised concerns about the amendment, which may lead to denying assistance to asylum-seekers, their deportation and prolonged detention. The Hungarian government stood in opposition to the quota system voting against it along with other three Member States. While ruling party, Fidesz ran an anti-immigrant campaign, many Hungarians protested against it renaming the consultation 'National Insult' and covering campaign's posters with graffiti for which activists were arrested. Crowd-fundraising allowed financing a counter-campaign. The governmental campaign was criticised by advocacy organisations and researchers. Despite this positive actions, it has largely been overshadowed by anti-immigrant protests took place in the country as well as demonstration against border fence raising. While civil society organisations and volunteers were active in supporting refugees arriving in the country with collected food, medicines and clothes as examples distributed to refugees and medical care was provided (Migration Policy Centre, 2018). Still, Hungary witnessed the most serious refugee wave in its post-democratic transition history in 2015, when authorities registered more than 177,000 thousand asylum-seekers, this resulted in the closure of the southern border was completed in mid-October 2015.

As a result of the Hungarian policy, the closure of the Western-Balkans route and the EU-Turkey Statement, the trends of irregular migration have shifted and migratory pressure decreased considerably. While 7,182 migrants applied for asylum in the first quarter of 2016, this number

dropped to 1,495 during the same period in 2017, representing an 82% decrease in the number of asylum seekers. In 2017 Iraqi (881), Afghan (348) and Romanian (338) nationals were the most common nationalities among irregular border crossings (or attempts for irregular border crossing). In relative terms, Bulgaria, Hungary and Germany have recorded the largest relative decreases of first time asylum seekers (more than -80% less each) in the third quarter of 2017 compared with the same quarter of 2016 (Migration issues, 2018). In January 2018, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán commentated that the European Union's migration policy had failed. While, critics say reforms introduced by the ruling-Party, Fidesz undermine democracy and the rule of law, charges rejected by Budapest (Goclowski and Than, 2018) Prime Minister Orbán and Fidesz, continue to have high numbers in national opinion polls, thanks to strong economy, tough anti-migrant policy and defiance of EU institutions. But, the migration policies and new new restrictions arguably shall incur further internal criticism. However, while the European Court of Human Rights have denounced the laws and ruled against the restrictive border defence laws introduced in September 2015, the Orbán-led governing party's political strategy has been effective; to polarize society along political fault lines. In this effort, within the political field is based on a principle of 'national' and 'anti-national' what contextualizes every political topic according to this division. Any criticism or offer of another view is dismissed, because Fidesz and the Orbán-government is the only voice of Hungarian national interest. Therefore, though civil society organisations tried to minimize the negative effects of the refugee crisis and assist refugees with their daily challenges, even attempting to make the government's' decisions and their results more transparent they drew criticism because they supposedly deviated from the government's' definition of 'acceptable society' and several were consequently labelled "foreign agents". The government thus expanded its scope of securitisation to include civil society organisations. In conclusion, the politics of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán have been built on the logic of perpetuating conflicts rather than creating some kind of constructive national consensus. This strategy is applied to both the domestic and EU levels to set the political agenda and consolidate domestic political support on the migration crisis.

10.5 Poland

Poland along with other Visegrad Group states strongly opposed the quotas of refugee relocation. Additionally, anti-immigration fears and sentiments have been used as a political ploy by the ruling political party - PiS, successfully exploiting Poles' anti-immigration fears and sentiments. Instead, Poland has lobbied for increased assistance for the refugees' country of origin and periphery, supporting the idea of treating with the root causes of the refugee crisis. However, while the migration phenomenon is a major source of contention in Poland and the rest of the V4 as this chapter has shown, it affects Poland to a far smaller degree than other EU member states. Following its October 2015 election victory, the new Law and Justice (PiS) government agreed initially to implement the scheme approved by its predecessor and, as a start, accept 100 migrants though favoring Christian refugees, for example one private organisation scheme (agreed by the government) would welcome 50 Christian families from Syria in Poland.

However, in April 2016 it suspended the process arguing that the verification procedures for the vetting of migrants were insufficient to guarantee Polish national security. Since then Poland (along with Hungary) has not accepted any migrants under the EU scheme. A set of laws and amendments, including anti-terrorist legislation, have been introduced that ease surveillance and detention of migrants. This is a departure from previous actions of accepting asylum seekers from Russia, Ukraine, and Tajikistan, thus offering a perception of racial, ethnic, and religious preference.

Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki said that in terms of migration and quotas that were to be imposed on European Union member countries Poland strongly reject such an approach as it infringes on sovereign decisions of member states. Polish Prime Minister Morawiecki and also Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban lead conservative governments under fire from Brussels over their refusal to take in migrants under a quota system and over their efforts to tighten state control of their courts and media. Morawiecki and Orban appeared to have struck up a good personal relationship, reinforcing their countries' diplomatic rapprochement within the EU (Goclowski and Than, 2018). The PiS government expressed the priorities in the field of migration policy: internal security (including border

protection), facilitation of channels for economic migration, and further easing of the inflow of people of Polish origin. securitization of migration and the perception of migrants as potential threats can be seen not only in the political discourse, but also in the actions that have already been taken. Moreover, in June 2016, the government adopted a so-called antiterrorist law, in accordance with which every foreigner in Poland can be put under surveillance without a court order, for essentially an indefinite period of time. It also grants the Internal Security Agency, the police and the Border Guard the right to take fingerprints, facial images and even biological material (DNA) from foreigners in the case that there are doubts concerning their identity. This has drawn criticism from NGOs claiming stigmatization and discrimination as seen in the frequently-reported cases of foreigners being denied entry into Poland at the Polish-Belarusian border crossing in Terespol.

The Polish government first suspended, and in March 2017 subsequently abolished the "Polish Migration Policy" document written by the previous government. The stated reasons for this decision included the refugee and migration crisis, and an increase in Ukraine immigrants due to the military conflict with Russia. But, by far the most significant reason was arguably the ideological incompatibility between the PiS government and the previous one as key differences including attitudes toward the idea of multicultural society, and opening doors for migrants of various cultures and religions are at odds. This is contested however, by Jakub Skiba, secretary of state in the Ministry of Interior and Administration: "T*his is a pragmatic position, rather than an ideological one. In our opinion, an ideological approach that is based on a vision of multiculturalism and broad migration absorption is incorrect.*"[1] In either case, Poland has made it clear that they are not migrant friendly, which is unfortunate since economic migration may be a possible solution for easing problems associated with Poland's demographic decline.

To conclude, the recent developments may lead to a situation where Poland will de facto close itself for both refugees from Southern Europe (relocations) and so called spontaneous asylum seekers crossing the Polish Eastern Border. It is also highly probable that the government will play the "Ukrainian card", framing the immigration from this country as a

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[1] "Pragmatycznie, a nie ideologicznie' – o polityce migracyjnej Polski," [Pragmatically, not ideologically" - on the migration policy of Poland] Interview with Jakub Skiba, Biuletyn Migracyjny, December 2016.

significant challenge for the Polish state. The priority of migration from neighbouring countries will probably be maintained as a safe reservoir of cheap, temporary labour with theoretically no or limited integration needs.

10.6 Romania

Initially Romania was not, during 2015–2016, part of the transit routes to Western EU, probably because it is not part of the Schengen agreement. Also, since Romania is east enough it has been mostly avoided by refugees traveling from Turkey to Germany along the path that became known as the "Balkan route." So, it is easy to assume that Romania is not a 'popular' EU nation to migrate. Additionally, because accommodation capacity is limited, and the welfare allocated per refugee are far from those granted by the Western European states, Romania was not a destination country. However, because of its geographic position and responses of other EU nations, since 2017, the situation has changed. While Greece and Italy have been a waypoint for more than a million migrants and refugees crossing the Mediterranean to Europe in recent years, now it is the Black Sea. In the summer of 2017 through September overcrowded fishing boats have increasingly been intercepted by Romanian Coast Guard.

Romania has in the previous decade been home to permanent immigrants, mostly Moldovans and Turks, so it was perhaps a surprise that Romania opposed the mandatory quota[1], joining Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia departing from its traditional partners of France and Germany. However, if one considers the domestic situation in Romania where lack of public enthusiasm for supporting the resettlement of refugees is the logical answer as quantitatively supported by the dramatic increase in the percentage of Romanians opposed to receiving refugees in Romania: from 52.6% in September 2015 to more than 75.8% in December 2015[2]. This explanation is further creditable with the statements of Romanian President Klaus Iohannis, "*We have analyzed ... the evolution of the phenomenon of migration,*

[1] Romania was allocated 4188 refugees by the EU, according to the European Commission's 2015 decisions, which laid down so-called mandatory refugee quotas and against which Romania, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia opposed officially, by voting against in the European Council.

[2] See M. Sebe's analysis of Romania's Stance in the Issue of the Refugees Crisis. Available online: https://www.iedonline.eu/ download/2016/IED-Mihai-Sebe-Working-Paper-2016-update.pdf

in particular, the illegal migration. This phenomenon that unexpectedly intensified in 2015, is not something extraordinary since a long time, but it has become something we have to face daily. And this is my message … to get out of the paradigm that we are talking about a time-limited crisis and preparing to cope with long time further. We have data from the European Union and the services we are working with … there is no indication that this migration pressure will diminish. We still have, in particular, out of Africa, signs that have to keep up the alert. Unfortunately, we do not have positive signals about the war in Syria. Ministry of Interior have to be prepared for those who will illegally attempt to enter the territory of our country, but also for those who will be relocated based on the decision taken at European level." Furthermore, this statement supports the president of the European Commission, Mr. Juncker, who has argued for the expansion of the Schengen zone, "*A more united Union also needs to become more inclusive. If we want to strengthen the protection of our external borders, then we need to open the Schengen area of free movement to Bulgaria and Romania immediately*". Between 2016 and 2017 Romania's attitude was unchanged regarding the implementation of the solidarity mechanism, yet it has shown a solid commitment towards the situation in the Mediterranean, participating in the joint efforts of the Member States to reduce the pressure of illegal migration. Romania has practically controlled over 2,000 km of EU's external border, with a traffic of more than 54 million citizens and over 19 million vehicles only in 2016. Also in 2016, Romanian border guards detected 1,624 foreign citizens who attempted to cross the border illegally, of which 1,075 on the way of entering the country and 549 in the exit direction, many of them acting illegally within group of migrants with the support of traffickers (351 migrant groups were identified and 140 traffickers/facilitators were identified). Most of them came from states like Iraq, Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey, Kosovo, Albania, Sri Lanka, Morocco and Egypt.[1] Additionally, Romanian efforts in providing security in the crisis of migration and refugees Romania is the second contributor to operations along the maritime border in the Mediterranean, with participation of ships and personnel and Romanian border guards support their Bulgarian partners through effective presence at the borders with Turkey and Serbia. On this last point, it is increasingly proving vital as refugees wishing to penetrate the EU by the Black Sea requires ships with

[1] See detailed report on the activity of the General Inspectorate of the Border Police in 2016 at https://www.politiadefrontiera.ro

adequate technical performance and the Romanian-Bulgarian fluvial border is difficult to achieve without risking life, thus the land border with Serbia is preferred, but refugees are stopped by the fence built by Hungary as well as the extreme measures taken by Croatia and Austria.

Moreover, Romania, surprisingly may have one of the better prepared institutional infrastructure of the Central and Eastern European nations to respond to the immigration crisis. In addition to creating legislation and adhering to international standards, current legislation assistants the building up of the necessary bodies for efficient management. In doing so, Romania adheres to the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugee Status. Furthermore, Romania's Additional Protocol of 1967, by Law no. 46/1991, and Law on Asylum (Law 122/2006), established the legal regime of aliens claiming protection in Romania, the legal status of foreign beneficiaries and a form of protection and specific procedures. The Romanian Immigration Office combined the responsibilities of the Authority for Foreigners, the National Refugee Office and the Office for Migration of the Labor Force, thus facilitating the process by which aliens are highlighted, protected and, as the case may be, integrated into the Romanian society. This developed refugee infrastructure, includes the Timisoara Emergency Transit Center. The first institution of its kind in the world, that offers temporary accommodation to refugees in need of emergency evacuation from the first country of asylum, until their relocation to third countries since 2008.[1] At present, there are five other Centers of Procedures and Accommodation for Asylum Seekers, distributed in a balanced manner throughout Romania.

10.7 Bulgaria

There is a contradictory narrative regarding Bulgaria. On one hand one may admit that the rates of illegal migration through Bulgaria are relatively low. And in comparison to other European states the economic and social pressure to handle migration is also low, despite the political and psychological effect, upon Bulgarian society. However, Bulgaria, and other South-Eastern European nations, is regarded by refugees exclusively as a

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[1] The Center can host 200 immigrants in transit and 50 asylum seekers. Since its inception in 2008, the Center housed more than 2,000 people, contributing to the implementation of UNHCR's protection policy. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Press Release, June 20, 2016, https://www.agerpres.ro/comunicate/2017/06/20/ comunicat-de-presa-mae-16-03-20.)

transit corridor on their way to Central and Western Europe. So, Bulgaria is affected by migration and since 2016 the number of those using Bulgaria to get to rest of Europe is increasing. FRONTEX calculates are that in 2015 in excess of 1,800,000 migrants entered Europe. While half utilized the East Mediterranean route, nearly 800,000 proceeded further via the Western Balkans. So, while Bulgaria is not part of the main route to refugee migration, it nevertheless has dealt with thousands of migrants. Since 2013 a total of 58 034 applied with 20,391 in 2015 alone. Moreover, Bulgaria is one among many European countries dealing with insufficient capacity and unhelpful nationalist politics in the recent 'migration crisis'. The response to the increase in irregular entries across the Bulgarian-Turkish border since 2013 has been one of crisis management.

The sense of crisis management is aided by Bulgarian society. The attitude towards the policy of the government in connection with the refugee crisis are quite ridden with discrepancy, and often not consistent. This has led to an impression that there is no fairly clear vision of the possibilities for a long-term solution to the problem. Incidentally, a lacking unified and coordinated position of the EU on the issue, controversial signals of various European capitals, the Bulgarian position quite harmoniously fits in with the general disharmony reigning in Europe.

In Bulgarian politics this has allowed for ambivalent and often contradictory verbalization of the political position on the part of state and governmental institutions, though, in practical terms Bulgaria has adhered to a steady and pragmatic action vis-à-vis the refugee crisis. This is something to remember in spite of the numerous attempts to exploit the refugee crisis as an instrument for domestic policy ends. A unified philosophy, albeit not formulated clearly enough, by several consecutive Bulgarian governments since 2013 has made determined effort towards a controversial element of the crisis, a protective wall.

The wall along the Bulgarian-Turkish border, while initially being met with serious dissent and disapproval by rest in Europe has gradually become an unified approach to regulate refugees (Kyuchukov 2016). The wall is not all. The entire length of the Bulgarian-Turkish border boosts advanced surveillance technology. This includes sophisticated motion sensors, thermal imaging and night vision cameras able to penetrate several kilometres. Additionally, the border is manned by over 1,500 armed police

and 33 kilometres of the border is lined by a three-metre-high barbed-wire fence that is being extended a further 130 kilometres since June 2015. Latent public fears in Bulgaria are associated with international terrorism, the import of radical ideas from the outside and into the moderate Muslim communities. Also, the establishment and activation of Islamist terrorists cells in the region steaming from refugees. There is also a residual effect. An intensification of organized crime and corruption. So, Western Europe fears foreigners within, that are already there, including generations; in the Balkans the threat is associated with those from without (migrants who are still striving to enter) as well as the strengthening nationalisms in the Balkans that risks splitting along ethnic and religious lines.

If one considers the method of operation e.g. crisis management and formulated action towards migration, rather than a coherent migration policy it becomes more prevalent when one looks towards the numbers. Bulgaria has been dealing with a migrant crisis since 2013! Since that first surge, a total of 58,034 people have applied for international protection with the Bulgarian refugee agency. In 2014 (5162) and 2015 (4708), with just 764 in 2016. This translates to 10634 people being granted refugee status between January 2014 and December 2016. The table below indicates the number of applications submitted by protection seekers.

Table 1: Bulgaria and refugees

Year	No. of Requests	Refugee status	Humanitarian Status	Denials	Terminated proceedings	Total No. of decisions
2012	1387	18	159	445	174	796
2013	7144	183	2279	354	824	3640
2014	11081	5162	1838	500	2853	10353
2015	20391	4708	889	623	14567	20787
2016	19418	764	587	1732	8932	12015

Source: Novinite, 2017

This does not tell the entire story however, since 7000 migrants were detained within Bulgaria's territory in 2015. And between January and November 2016, only 4526 migrants were detained trying to cross into Bulgaria from Turkey. 17,977 migrants were arrested on the territory of Bulgaria after having crossed though there are no clear statistics about how many left[1]. This truth bring up another issue. Once inside Bulgaria, there is no integration policy and the efficacy of international law and EU directives is openly questioned by racially charged domestic political rhetoric. The absence of an all-European policy conditioning a coherent implementation of available mechanisms to deal with migration is certainly of concern and why Bulgaria is a supporter of a united approach.

By virtue of being an external EU border, Bulgaria is tremendously interested in the adoption of a unified all-European approach and the identification of a solidarity-based solution to the problem. Yes, Europe did develop and continues to use a set of tools extensive enough e.g. the Schengen Agreement, or the Dublin Protocol, for addressing the current crisis, a major deficit was exposed, the absence of an all-European policy with coherent implementation of available mechanisms.

10.8 Slovenia

As part of the Eastern Mediterranean migration route, between October 2015 and March 2016 a total of 477,791 migrants and refugees have arrived to Slovenia, with most continuing their journey to Austria and other Northern and Western European countries. From that number supplied by the International Migration Office, approximately 470,000 refugees and migrants passed through Slovenian territory between September 2015 and March 2016 (Garb 2018), creating a crisis that required a great deal of organisational and field work on the part of many governmental and non-governmental institutions.

Slovenia, similar to Austria, has arguably had a positive history with migration. Beginning in the 1950s and intensifying in the late 1970s, migration to Slovenia from other Yugoslav republics took place. Since independence, Slovenia has seen increasing trends of migration flows from the late 1990s until the present day. Additionally, as in Western European

[1] A complete analysis available online at: https://www.novinite.com/articles/178377/ Bulgaria+and+the+Migrant+Crisis+in+Numbers

member nations, positive economic trends coupled with an ageing domestic population and increased need for labour migrants created favorable conditions for migration, though such migration was primarily intra-E.U. migration Unfortunately, the global financial crisis and recession from 2008-09 stopped economic growth in Slovenia and its subsequent recession saw the rise of unemployment.

When Slovenia joined the European Union in 2004 and entering the Schengen zone in 2008 it saw its migration policy become more restrictive. While, Slovenia has adopted the "southern model" standard EU framework for migration and integration policies, said framework compliments migration and integration policies provided within the Slovenian constitution which stresses the important of border controls and exclusion over integration measures.

The majority of asylum seekers in Slovenia in 2016 were nationals of Afghanistan (419), Syria (281), Iraq (120), Pakistan (104), Iran (78), Turkey (60) and Algeria (42). In 2016, a total of 1,308 asylum requests were filed in Slovenia and 170 persons were granted international protection. Until August 31, 2017, 869 requests for international protection were filed, with 396 claims from Afghan nationals. Between May 2016 and September 2017, the IOM assisted 217 asylum seekers in their arrival to Slovenia under the EU relocation scheme. Slovenia also has a sizeable population of former refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina who have been granted permanent residence permits.

There remains, however a contradictory nature to Slovene policy whereas intra-EU migration has widely been accepted, but since March 2016, new border restrictions for migrants crossing through the Balkans route from Greece to Western Europe allow only migrants who plan to seek asylum in the country, or those with clear humanitarian needs are allowed entry. Predictably, this has had a ripple effect upon neighbor nations with Serbia announcing its border closure with Macedonia and Bulgaria to migrants without valid documents. Partly as a result, the future of the EU's passport-free Schengen zone has been cast into doubt as eight of its members, including Austria, Hungary and Slovakia, have tightened border controls, leaving thousands of migrants stranded in Greece.

In response to then-Prime Minister Miro Cerar remark that the Balkan route was shut down and that cooperation with Turkey on a radical plan

to return to Turkey all migrants arriving in Greece; the UN expressed concern about the plan and Amnesty International referred to it as a death blow to the right to seek asylum. Moreover, Thorbjorn Jagland, Secretary General of the Council of Europe, said the proposal to send migrants back would contravene international law and that the Slovenian government needed to "amend their approaches" (BBC 2016). Predictably, the Slovenian government responded with Interior Minister Vesna Györkös Žnidar describing the measures as "necessary and proportionate", but the proposals have been criticised by organisations including the Red Cross, Amnesty International and Unicef, who claims the changes would deny refugees the right to protection which is guaranteed under international and EU law.

Following the major elections that took place in France and Germany that saw immigration controls as a key issue, it is not surprising that anti-immigrant political parties are popular in Slovenia. In the 2018 elections, the anti-immigrant SDS party of right-wing leader Janez Jansa won the Slovenian parliamentary election.

Not surprising, anti-immigrant political parties have become popular. Following the trend of far-right and anti-immigration parties winning elections across Europe since 2016 Slovenia experienced this in 2018. Winning elections in Italy, Poland, and Hungary, many of these parties are also a part of coalition governments, as in Austria. For Janez Jansa and SDS, if he can convince smaller Slovenian parties, such as the anti-establishment List of Marjan Šarec (LMS) that placed second with just over 12%, to join; a coalition government in Slovenia will exist. This is a result of the June, 2018 parliamentary election. Long and tough post-election talks will occur because nine parties have entered parliament, all vying for influence (Guardian 2018). Therefore, if a coalition is made with SDS as the head, then there is a very real possibility that the rhetoric heard elsewhere in central Europe will be heard from Ljubljana. Jansa, was a vocal opponent to the quota system prior to the June elections. Still, this is not a guarantee, as most parties stated prior to the elections an unwillingness to join an SDS-led government. Nevertheless, immigration was a key issue in the election and shall remain.

Conclusion

International migration has significant impacts on receiving and sending countries and has become an increasingly important aspect of a globalised world. Austria has been a model of historically accepting and integrating peoples from various status backgrounds whether migrants or asylum seekers, however since 2018 Austria has taken a harder stance. This is also the case in Slovenia, which though having a positive history of intra-European migration since 2015 has not been open to the policy from Brussels, and strict border controls has effectively closed the Balkan route.. Moreover, anti-immigration and anti-establishment political parties won the June 2018 parliamentary elections which complicates any future agreement on common EU immigration policy since SDS is opposed to the current quota system.

In all these countries, since the beginning of the migration crisis, populism has evolved, supported by politicians in their rhetoric. It is important that migration policies really help people who need it and they are not abused by policies to promote their goals. This is unfortunately not the case in these nations. The migration policies in these countries are characterized as laws that disadvantage migrants, with specific legal amendments in Czechia and Hungary. Poland has decided to accept only Christian migrants. Slovakia, for example is one of the least popular countries for migrants. Migrants do not choose Slovakia as their target country for political and economic reasons. Romania's attractiveness does not amount to Western European countries, yet Romania has also become a more appealing land route to the rest of Europe, since Hungary choked off the "Balkan route" and the deterioration of Turkey-EU relations and Greece's response capacity has apparently activated a Central Balkan route that refugees would prefer to the traditional one, West Balkan, one used in recent years. While Bulgaria is not the end-destination for migrants and refugees, the challenge of receiving, accommodating and integration, the pressure of the refugee wave on state administrations in the Balkans has been more direct along with accompanying latent fears over terrorism and division with society and ethnic and religious grounds.

Within the Visegrad Four countries, the Czech Republic and Hungary have adopted amendments to the laws that disadvantages migrants.

Poland has decided to accept only Christian migrants, though have since 2017 refused its migration policy. Since the beginning of the migration crisis, populism has evolved, supported by politicians in their rhetoric. It is important that migration policies really help people who need it and they are not abused by policies to promote their goals. This has characterized the basic principles of migration policy in Slovakia, Hungary, and Czech Republic. The international dimension of the refugee crisis, the Visegrad Group response and solutions proposed by the European Commission have been striking. Most interesting, the migration crisis has reunited countries that were divided on other issues. For the Visegrad Group this is connected to a common vision of EU migration: reducing and controlling the migration flows (border protection) and increasing aid to refugees staying outside of the EU. For Bulgaria and Romania and Austria new common policy that supports sovereignty of member states is a priority as is solving the cause of migration.

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11
NORTHERN EUROPEAN AND BALTIC RESPONSES

This chapter deals with the response of the Northern part of the EU. Similarly to other chapters in this part of the book the selection of the countries is partially arbitrary. The chapter focus on the position of several states which played a key role during 2015 crisis. This is especially the case of Sweden which plays a central role in the crisis and attempts to solve the issue. Not neglected has been the role of the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, which are strong EU actors and the role of Denmark and Finland with strong influence on EU policies and national experiences with migration. It is important to note that in this bloc there are countries with valuable immigration experience: Denmark, Sweden, Finland have since the 1970s experienced steady migration of foreigners, while since the 1990s, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania have experienced the trend of inter-European integration

Northern Europe and the Baltic states are currently witnessing a mixed-migration phenomenon, in which economic migrants and asylum seekers travel together. In reality, these groups can and do overlap. Fleeing war, political persecution, seeking financial betterment are well known reasons. While, the nations that comprise this geographic local of the European Union is normally not the first choice of immigrants, under the European Union's resettlement plan they have arguably become the new front lines in a crisis that ebbs and flows.

Additionally, inconsistent methods with which asylum applications are often processed has forced since 2015 policy proposals and implementation. While EU member states such as Greece and Italy, have long served as the

main points of entry for migrants and refugees due to their proximity to the Mediterranean Basin, migrants and refugees are making their way north.

However, as with the sovereign debt crisis, national interests have consistently trumped a common European response to this migrant influx. The bloc's increasingly polarized political climate, where many nationalist, anti-immigrant political parties have either arisen or been created, is partially to blame for the muted humanitarian response from some states. Also, this can be observed in the north and baltics where the economic disparity between these northern states also contribute to varying degrees of success as well as integrating minorities into the social mainstream. Many of these immigrants are coming from Muslim countries, and the relationship between immigrant Muslim communities and the majority populations is not always positive. While, Sweden's open immigration policies may make economic sense, given demographic trajectory of declining birth rates and an ageing population, it is viewed with suspicion in Latvia and Lithuania. The following subsections explore how ad hoc EU policy towards the migration crisis and national i.e. domestic concerns play a important role in the response.

11.1 Sweden

Among the countries discussed in this chapter there is Sweden. Sweden was an attractive location for migrants. In 2015-2016, 12% of asylum seekers in the EU, including 700,000 children arrived. A total of 163,000 people arrived in 2015, with 10,000 arriving per week. While Sweden is a country that is familiar with immigration in prior decades, the amount of immigrants was unprecedented. The risks of undocumented people entering the country, some of whom might be involved in planning acts of terrorism allowed for the justification of new Swedish legislative measures. By mid-November 2015, the Swedish government decided to introduce border controls with neighboring countries Denmark and Germany. The following month, in December 2015, the Swedish parliament voted in favor of identification controls, that were enacted in January 2016. By doing this, the border was basically pushed back to Denmark and fewer people claimed asylum in Sweden, with a reported 162,877 processed asylum claims, against 28,939 in 2016 and only 4,401 claims had been made as of March

2017. What has been lost in the public narrative and legislative acts in Sweden is the issue of the right to asylum and protection. The arrival of tens of thousands of asylum seekers revealed the inefficacy of the asylum system, she went on, and while the government has devised a comprehensive return policy it has yet to succeed in a welcome policy. The introduction of border controls in November 2015 has been described in the press as a slap in the face for open borders, while politics reasoned this as representing the need for 'breathing space[1]

11.2 Denmark

Denmark lies between the two most popular European destinations for today's migrants and refugees: Germany and Sweden. Denmark, similar to Sweden has a history with migrants. Its guest worker schemes in the 1960s and 1970s saw the government contracted seasonal workers from countries including Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Pakistan, to take up low-skilled jobs (Jørgensen and Thomsen, 2013) the 1980s to 90s witnessed a new migration trend: that of family reunification, as these guest workers settled in Denmark and their families followed. Despite this background, Denmark has not traditionally been a magnet for immigration, though as the examples listed above also meant that Denmark was necessarily not an unwelcome place either. However, the late 1990s, the number of migrants and descendants of migrants have steadily increased and in 1999 Denmark enacted the Act on Integration, a comprehensive – if controversial – policy on migrant integration (Hedetoft, 2006). In the late 1990s in response to the steady increase in migrants and descendants of migrants, Denmark enacted the Act. The Integration Act[2], which put the labour market at its

[1] The Guardian (2015) 'Sweden slams shut its open-door policy towards refugees'. 24 November. Available from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/24/sweden-asylum-seekers-refugees-policy-reversel

[2] The Danish Integration Act, passed in 1999, is intended to 'ensure that newcomers are granted the possibility to utilise their resources and capabilities in order to become participating, self-sufficient and contributing fellow citizens on equal terms with the society's other citizens in accordance with the basic norms and values in the Danish society'. This legal framework emphasises 'newcomers' or those categorised as 'non-Western immigrants' and refugees, and equally distributes the responsibility of their integration among local municipalities. These 98 municipalities are given a quota of newcomers and instructed to provide housing, language classes, and welfare benefits of 6,000 kroner per month, as long as migrants comply with compulsory trainings. Although the objective of the allocation scheme is to share the responsibility and disperse refugees (and subsequently 'avoid ghettoisation'),

heart, alongside a language training approach. This program is more like an individual contract for refugees and reunified family members over the age of 18 who have been granted residency. It functions very much like a reward system where, for example, a bonus is given to the municipality when a migrant enters employment, education, or passes the Danish language exam. Economic incentives 'as an instrument politically are very important,' we heard, as the ultimate aim is self-sufficiency. The Act was reformed in 2015 based on the 2016 tripartite agreement between trade unions, employers, and the Danish government, to advocate for a 'work from day one' approach where every migrant is considered 'job ready'. This was partly a natural progression in migration law, but largely influenced by the 'refugee crisis' from the summer 2015 that saw around 18,500 migrants applied for asylum in 2015 which made the Danish welfare state, that guarantees free health care and education struggle to cope (Delman, 2016).

11.3 Finland

Prolonged conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as in the Horn of Africa and West Africa have played an important role in forced migration. Arguably, there is no single explanation for migration since various underlying factors, such as political, economic and social reasons as well as pull factors in the receiving countries, as explored in Chapter Two of this book explored. Whatever the reason, between 30,000 and 50,000 migrants from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan arrived to Finland in 2015, a significant numbers in terms of the ratio of migrants to the native population. According to the Finnish Immigration Service from June 2016 to May 2017, about 63,000 people applied for residence permits, international protection and citizenship.

In response, Finland has contributed to cooperation, military and civilian crisis management, and humanitarian aid, in various parts of the world. In Northern Europe this includes Finnish contribution to the management of immigration and migratory flows in the Baltic Sea Region from a broad

considerations are made, such as family reunification, medical attention, employment availability, and the number of refugees allocated in previous years. See Jørgensen, M. B. (2014) Decentralising immigrant integration: Denmark's mainstreaming initiatives in employment, education, and social affairs. Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe, and Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration. Integration in Denmark. Available from http://uim.dk/arbejdsomrader/Integration

security perspective. Despite these 'positives' there are contradictions within public opinion and practice.

The Finnish Ministry of Interior states on their website that "Finland is an open and safe country" and explains the country's policy toward migration. In brief, migration will help to answer Finland's dependency ratio problem, but at the same time, competition for workers between countries will increase. Moreover, Finland must be able to effectively attract skilled workers who will stay in the country for the longer term. Still, while an argument is being made that diversity is part of everyday life, Finns are afraid of the consequences of the latest wave of immigration, which has been seemingly justified in two very public rape occurrences. Nevertheless, Government officials have taken this immigration strategy personally, stressing the values of mercy and compassion in the context of immigration. Prime Minister Juha Sipilä attracted the attention of the international media when he offered his second home in Kempele to refugees.

But, while the Finnish government can produce liberal policies calling for more openness towards immigration, real politics are observed, as was seen in the Finnish vote of abstention on the EU's quota system for refugees and their relocation in EU countries. Moreover, the Finnish government is comprised of two opposite view and consensus is important, but difficult. The ruling center-right political party, the Center Party (Keskusta), is both pragmatic and skeptical towards the European Union. The second most powerful political party, the True Finns (Perussuoamalaiset), is known for its anti-EU, anti-immigration and anti-Muslim rhetoric; its leader, Timo Soini, is the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In the immediate aftermath of the migration wave in 2015, and subsequent Finnish elections, Prime Minister Alexander Stubb was defeated in the 2015 election[1] with the the True Finns website stated: "*Finland is not to make everybody happy in the world. Finland should take care of the Finns first.*" The slogan explains much about the seemingly contradictory domestic and international immigration policies of the Finnish government. And why perhaps Thousands of Iraqi refugees who arrived in Finland last year have decided to cancel their

[1] The victory of two EU-skeptic parties over the EU-enthusiastic and pro-immigrant Kokoomus Party says much about the feelings of injustice felt by the Finnish public. But while Stubb's Kokoomus joined the governmental coalition with Soini and Sipilä, its position is weak. Today, the Finnish government is at a crossroads. Tensions are running high and beginning slowly to fracture the nationalists, led by Soini's party.

asylum applications and to return home voluntarily, citing family issues and disappointment with life in the frosty Nordic country.

11.4 Estonia

The Estonian government believes that the country has to contribute to the solution of the large-scale migration crisis that has hit the European Union, both for humanitarian reasons and to carry its weight as an EU and NATO ally. As of March 2016, Estonia had accepted 107 quota refugees–87 from Greece and 20 from Turkey. Estonia has also agreed to take in about 500 people over the next two years. Additionally, Estonia offers one of the best welfare support systems in Europe giving every refugee free housing and income support for two years. Moreover, refugees may also receive language courses, translators and assistance in finding employment. Finally, while a contentious benefit, refugees receive the same unemployment and welfare benefits available to Estonian citizens, as long as they remain in Estonia. Despite this, the greatest security threat that the Estonian government faces is the growth of anxiety, tension and aggression inside the society. Those elements do not only destabilize the situation internally, but can also be used by external actors in order to reach their political goals.

The refugees go to Estonia through a program of relocation, not resettlement. Estonia has relocated refugees from Greece and Turkey and is in negotiations with Italy. In addition to the generous benefit package mentioned in the above paragraph, refugees in Estonia have the best chances of integrating into society. The Estonian government spreads the refugees across the country, particularly in sparsely populated rural areas, offering better opportunities for immersion. Children are enrolled in schools and adults receive help learning Estonian and English coaching on finding jobs; the goal of eventual resettlement is empowering the refugees to support themselves. Moreover, the Estonian Refugee Council, has taken the creative step of actively seeking out refugees, particularly those in the Luhansk, Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts of Ukraine, while collecting nearly thirty-five thousand euros in April 2017. Since May 2017, more than 25 percent of the 150 refugees taken in by Estonia had left the country. Partly the answer to this is that most refugees did not choose Estonia; the EU

assigned them to the country. Many are disappointed with the cold climate and discouraged by the low-paying jobs they secure. Still, the greatest challenge refugees in Estonia face is their own expectations, since many refugees, especially the ones relocated from other EU countries, find themselves discontent with life in Estonia and eventually leave.

Refugees living in Estonia are among the most welcomed in all of Europe. This was not the initial opinion. The crisis has brought migration-related issues into the political debate. Estonia was firmly against the quota system proposed by the European Commission. The Conservative People's Party (EKRE), won its first seats in elections in March of 2015, using the migration issue, and saw its support surge, with one of its MP's Jaak Madison stating, "*The dream of multiculturalism is over.*" The Estonian Minister of Internal Affairs, Hanno Peykur stated that those refugees who are economic migrants, whose need for protection has not been established would be deported. Such a public statement can be put into the context of how the initial crisis divided the public sphere of Estonia. In June 2015 more people (42%) had been against receiving people who had been granted protection than in favor (31%) with this antagonism express in social media as well. For example, Facebook communities called 'NO' to Refugees had over 18,000 likes as opposed to 'Tolerant Estonia' with over 10,000 likes (Valdaru, Asari, Malksoo 2016). This points to the simple fact that Estonia was ill-prepared initially.

In the resettlement and relocation programs, Estonia had to create all relevant action plans fresh. Anti-migrant attitudes are growing dangerously fast across the rest of Europe. However, the Estonian government has not taken any specific action to alleviate both the international and internal tensions that have developed as a result of this crisis. Additionally, because of the lack of uniformity in the EU, the terrorist attacks in Paris and in Brussels and assaults in Germany and Sweden have reduced the overall feeling of security and enhanced the perception that the migrants coming from the Middle East and Africa are in fact a security threat. Yet, with the successful relocation and resettlement program in Estonia by the end of 2016, public attitudes towards immigration and beneficiaries of protection had changed for the better with 56% Estonians in favor of receiving refugees (Valdaru, Asari, Malksoo 2016).

11.5 Latvia

Public opinion in Latvia in 2015 indicated 69% of citizens were not receptive to the idea of welcoming refugees from North Africa and the Middle East, despite the government approving the European Commission's plan to spread out the refugees with Latvia accepting 531 and receiving 318. The attitude stems partly from history as an earlier wave of migration dramatically shaped today's Latvia; during Soviet occupation, Moscow sent thousands of Russian speakers that diluted the ethnic Latvian population. During those four decades, the share of native Latvians dwindled from seventy-five prior to the Second World War to fifty-two percent by 1989. According to Arnis Kaktiņš of the SKDS polling agency, the "trauma is still not healed. Latvians are feeling insecure, which explains their views on refugees." Despite this historical explanation, the Latvian Foreign Ministry has actively encourages cooperation with Turkey to reduce the influx of refugees into the EU as well as reinforcing the EU's borders. This partly related to a rare occasion of unity between the Latvian majority and Russian minority whom are not keen on the prospect of resettling a few hundred asylum-seekers, sharing the view of Central and Eastern European leaders that the mainly Muslim asylum-seekers will find it difficult to integrate.

The Latvian government created the "Our people" campaign to improve the perception and remind the public that while there are cultural differences, people should support one another, and also the opportunities to receive some education and learn the language is provided during the typical three month period that they wait to learn of their approved status. In Latvia, migrants are given either refugee or an alternative status. This period is during when migrants have their application processed and are either given refugee or alternative status. If they are approved for refugee status they are given permanent residence permit, while those with the alternative status are provided with a residence permit that is valid for one year. Refugees are those who fear persecution for their beliefs and race, while asylum seekers receiving alternative status are accepted due to them being threatened with punishment and violence and are in need of protection. This is in accordance with Chapter 8 of the Latvian Constitution that stipulates that refugees and people with alternative status have the same rights and obligations. In addition to qualifying for refugee benefits,

they are entitled to pensions, unemployment and other benefits that regular Latvian citizens can receive and also unite with closest relatives by bringing them into the country.

Such benefits mean a subsistence payment of over 130EURO for twelve months to those granted refugee status and to those with alternative status for nine months. Migrants can reside in the Mucenieki asylum seeker center for free. Latvians are sympathetic with the peril of migrants, if they have a real reason to be refugees. This underscores a valid point within Latvian society. A willingness to help, as evidence by Latvian officials traveling to Greece and Italy to meet migrants and prepare for their relocation to the Baltic country, but a weariness to pressure from Brussels to the quota scheme and use of Latvian benefit system. The settlement of migrants is not the main issue, it is integration within Latvian society. On this point, efforts have been made, assigning a social worker to every refugee/family, an invitation to learn about Latvian culture and telling them about Latvian laws and customs. Still, in a September 2015 survey by SKDS, 70% of people said armed conflict was an understandable reason to become a refugee, with around half that number believing religious or ethnic persecution at home was a good enough reason to come to Latvia, security arrangements have been put into process and political realities remain. Latvia is currently building a fence along the Russian border to prevent people from entering the country illegally, ensuring the protection of the European Union borders and should be complete by 2019. The opposition, Harmony Center party, comprised of Russian-speakers, helped the nationalists strip the government of the right to accept more refugees without putting it to a parliamentary vote. While, the three coalition parties were reluctant to agree with the EU on imposing quotas they eventually agreed. But, This has created within Latvia a common political reality within the Baltic states. France and Sweden are viewed as having failed to integrate, because the migrants are against integration, having a completely different set of values, so Latvia would prefer new arrivals who "belong to the same civilization" as Raivis Zeltīts, the secretary-general of the National Alliance, told POLITICO. This view has some validity because while the refugees were mostly from Italy and Greece upon arrival from Africa and the Middle East, they leave Latvia shortly after. Difficulty in finding jobs, the language barrier, and new

culture are reasons. In September of 2016 of the 23 refugees admitted, by October all 23 had left.

11.6 Lithuania

To say that Lithuania is a transit country, like the other Baltic states is not false. Neither is the fact that Lithuania aspires to be a regional leader, setting an example to other small countries. While it is accepted that Lithuania seeks and receives the respect as a full-fledged member of the European Union, its actions do not always meet the standard. This is observed in the migration crisis.

While it is arguable that Lithuania represents the outskirts of the Union; the border with Russia being the EU's external border, Lithuania faces the reality that its Baltic neighbors as explained above face as well. Migrants that arrive in Lithuania after being granted refugee status or subsidiary protection, typically leave. This is despite the legal efforts made by the government. For example on 22 June 2015 the government adopted a decision to resettle 70 and relocate 1,035 foreigners in need of international protection by the end of 2017. By the end of 2015, the Law on the Legal Status of Aliens was amended to provide for the possibility of relocating and resettling third-country nationals in the Republic of Lithuania. Such amendments, in principle, make it possible to set up national resettlement programs. This would support the numbers of migrants; since 2014 and up to and including April 2017, a total of 588 persons have been granted protection in Lithuania, either refugee status (351 persons) or subsidiary protection (237 persons) (Brunovskis, 2017). But benefit package is an issue. Lithuania, similar to Latvia and Estonia, are among the EU's poorer countries, and benefits are limited. Lithuania pays a refugee family of two parents and two children 450 Euros a month for the first six months in comparison to Estonia provides free accommodation for two years in addition to financial benefits.

The unattractiveness of Lithuania may be explained several ways, though not mutually exclusive. For example, while Lithuania's integration policies are lacking and unable to integrate foreigners who have been granted asylum, it is important to understand immigration statistics, experiences, and challenges in the larger context of Lithuanian development. For example,

at the height of asylum arrivals to Europe in 2015 and 2016, Lithuania experienced a decline in arrivals. A total of 291 people applied for asylum in Lithuania in 2015. In comparison, 2,545 people applied for asylum in Norway in one month the same year (November 2015). Therefore the integration efforts are thus limited and can not be compared to the integration efforts and programs in the Nordic countries. Also, since only a handful of asylum seekers remain in the country after gaining legal residency, it is extremely difficult to assess the integration efforts beyond the ones offered in the integration centre in Rukla, where refugees live for three to six months after gaining legal residency because, Lithuania is widely used as pathways to a Schengen visa and access to Western Europe by migrants.

As of spring 2017 Lithuania has, like the majority of signing states, not fulfilled its obligations under the agreement. But, should a negative opinion be given to Lithuania? A total of 343 persons have been resettled in or relocated to the country. Additionally, an argument can be made that the relocation agreement has reinforced this transit status because the vast majority of the relocated refugees leave after being granted asylum making their way to Britain, Germany or Scandinavia, target destinations, regardless of EU bloc rules that had them relocated to Lithuania and other Baltic nations.

Conclusion

Northern Europe and the Baltic states have seen migrants and refugees arrive under a resettlement and relocation plan. While, these migrants and refugees typically do not choose these EU nations, with the exception of Sweden and perhaps Denmark, preferring Germany and France circumstances and the failure of the Dublin agreement has led to new broad EU policy on migrant quotas and resettlement and relocation.

However, as with the sovereign debt crisis, national interests have consistently trumped a common European response to this migrant influx. The bloc's increasingly polarized political climate, where many nationalist, anti-immigrant parties have either arisen or been created, is partially to blame for the muted humanitarian response from some states. This can be observed in the north and baltics where the difficulty that they face are integrating minorities into the social mainstream. Many of these immigrants

are coming from Muslim countries, and the relationship between immigrant Muslim communities and the majority populations is not always positive. While, Sweden's open immigration policies may make economic sense, given demographic trajectory of declining birth rates and an ageing population, it is viewed with suspicion in Latvia and Lithuania. The following subsections explored how ad hoc EU policy towards the migration crisis and national i.e. domestic concerns played a important role in the response.

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12

THE RESPONSE WITHIN EASTERN PARTNERSHIP

The goal of this chapter is to explain the effects and policies of the European Union's visa-free regime with the Eastern Partnership countries (the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine). In accordance to this, the following chapter structure is offered: in the first section, the questions on the essence of The EU visa-free regime and the nature of the mechanism for obtaining it by the Eastern Partnership countries are answered. The second section characterizes the main positive effects of the visa-free regime for the Eastern Partnership countries (The increase of human dignity and self-respect in the citizens of Eastern Partnership countries; Freedom of mobility into the EU – a reality for the common man; Increase of population mobility; the increasing value of these countries' national passports; development of international transport infrastructure, etc.). In the third section the negative effects of the EU visa-free regime are presented. Among them, noted are the increase in the number of citizens who are applying for asylum in the EU; the increase in the number of visa-free regime violators; the challenges and risks of the depopulation of the country of origin. In the fourth section the main consolidation measures for the visa-free regime are reviewed. In particular, it is proposed that financial responsibility for violating the visa-free regime be included, and that short term labour visas and other mechanisms be created under the conditions of the visa-free regime. Topical literature is proposed at the end of the chapter.

12.1 The visa-free regime with the EU:

Regarding The visa-free regime is a complex two-way process that includes in itself both the free, visa-less entry into the country or residence, and the free, visa-less entry into the destination country. The visa-free regime was included into the politico-practical dimension of the European Union's relationship with a number of post-soviet states (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) in the context of Eastern Partnership policy (2009). The main goals of Eastern Partnership are "*to create the necessary conditions for political association, (...) to create deep and comprehensive free-trade areas, (...) and to take gradual steps towards full visa liberalization*" (Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, 7 May 2009).

Based on the experience and under the influence of the Balkan states[1], Ukraine was the first to initiate and sign the Plan for the liberalization of the visa regime with the European Union. Later, in 2010-2011 the Republic of Moldova and Georgia followed. The achievement of visa-regime liberalization was influenced by the necessity of implementation of in-depth reforms in the field of justice, security and internal affairs, consolidation of legal institutions, respect for human rights, counteraction to corruption and irregular migration, the improvement of people's living standards and population mobility.

The plan of action for the post-soviet states, in general, was similar to the Plan for the liberalization of the visa regime for the west-Balkan states. However, there were differences. The plan for the Eastern Partnership countries was structured into National Plans of Action, which have two clearly fixed stages. In other words, from a bureaucratic point of view, the process of Plan realization is becoming more difficult and detailed. Between these stages there is an expected monitoring of the liberalized visa regime influence on migration and security.

All technical laws were adopted quite fast, without opposition from the state bodies. The laws that were a potential threat to political stability and the government's image (laws on combating corruption and discrimination) were adopted with some difficulties, after prolonged periods of postponing and political reflection.

[1] Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia obtained visa-free regime with the EU in December, 2009; Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina – at the end of 2010.

The European Union has become more demanding as to the assessment of reform implementation and practical policies. For example, Macedonia obtained the visa-free regime without adopting the Law for counteracting discrimination, whereas Ukraine was denied access to the second stage until it adopted the law. The Republic of Moldova and Georgia adopted the law in strict abidance with EU demands.

Table 1: The quantitative indexes of implementation of the EU's demands for the realization of the Plan of action for the liberalization of the visa regime with the EU by the Eastern Partnership countries (on a ten-point scale)

Country	Block 1: Security of documents, including biometry	Block 2: Unregulated migration, including readmission	Block 3: Public safety and order	Block 4: Foreign relations and fundamental rights
Armenia	7.5	6.5	4.3	4.5
Azerb.	4.0	4.0	3.2	2.3
Belarus	4.0	5.3	3.2	2.5
Georgia	7.5	6.5	4.8	6.0
Moldova	10.0	9.0	7.8	8.0
Ukraine	6.0	7.0	7.2	6.8

Moldova was the first to obtain the visa-free regime with the EU (April, 2014). Georgia obtained the visa-free regime in March, 2017, and Ukraine obtained it in June of the same year. This was because in the realization of the Plan of action on the liberalization of the visa-free regime Moldova (compared to the other Eastern Partnership countries) was a factual leader, and implemented all of the EU's (Litra 2013: 3) demands the most efficiently. The quantitative analysis of Polish experts (the Stefan Batory Foundation) has shown this quite clearly.

The obtaining of the visa-free regime by these Eastern Partnership countries was met with enthusiasm by both their populations and the representatives of governmental bodies. It is no secret that the visa-free regime turned out to be one of the true and tangible achievements on the

way toward European integration that the population of these countries has experienced for itself.

12.2 The positive effects of the EU visa-free regime

The introduction of the visa-free regime by the European Union for Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine was accompanied by a number of positive effects such as the increase of human dignity and self-respect in the citizens of Eastern Partnership countries. The visa-free regime helps citizens of post-soviet states feel free and worthy as people and as citizens when interacting with border police officials and the EU states' governmental bodies. Sadly, the visa regime, circulation through various consular bureaus, collection of various documents, and the denial of a visa (without being explained the motives) have not contributed to the forming and education of the sentiment of self-respect and freedom in the visa applicants.

Furthermore, we should note that the corruption often encountered by people at consular institutions, in legal and quasi-legal networks that do business through special relations with employees of the consular institutions, including those in EU countries, and the population's increased financial expenses[1] for acquiring a visa, likewise did not contribute to the fortification of the sentiment of human dignity of these countries' citizens. The rejection of this reality by the common people transformed into a consolidation of their visa-free regime expectations.

The population, the political elites of these post-soviet countries are finding themselves in the situation when they have to make a real geopolitical choice: a) orientation toward Europe, the European Union, European values; or b) orientation toward Russia, the Eurasian Union. This makes up the specific case of the post-soviet countries. This makes Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine significantly different from the countries of the Balkan region (Байор 2013; Bajor and Schöll-Mazurek 2015; Цуркан and Мошняга 2013: 191-199).

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[1] For example, during the 2004-2007, the Italian consulate in Bucharest (Romania), where Moldovan citizens would go to get Italian visas, was forced to re-staff twice due to corruption. The factual price of expenses for the Schengen-visa, depending on the country of destination, could reach 4.500 Euros.

The best agitator in favor of this geopolitical and societal-political choice is the visual and factual acquaintance with the European Union, the life of populations of the EU member-states. The visa-free regime facilitates this acquaintance. Primarily this means young and middle-aged people, who manifest a high level of mobility and the ability to adapt.

For the political elites who made the geopolitical choice in favor of the EU, the visa-free regime is important from an electoral point of view. This is tied to the fact that an actually and specifically discerning person will for the most part, vote for those political formations that give him the capability to freely travel to Europe, compare the life in Europe with their current reality. And this is confirmed by the voting results of the Moldovan diaspora from the EU, the USA, Canada, and Russia.

To a lesser degree this concerns people of older ages, who, due to their age or financial capabilities are not very mobile, and consider that back in the soviet days, life was better, calmer, more satisfying and secure, and provided more confidence in the future. This orientation on the past is reinforced by an emotional aspect, motivated by the fact that back in those days, they were young, full of strength and hopes. One should also take into consideration the soviet propaganda that convinced people that they were living in the world's best country. Likewise, the policy of state-paternalism, as the form of social interaction between people and the state is something that appeals to the vulnerable layers of society. In brief, freedom of mobility into the EU – a reality for the common man.

The process of democratic societal transformations in post-soviet states is difficult and contradictory, reforms do not yield expected results. De-facto, the visa-free regime is one of the few real achievements of European integration that affect the lives of the common people, the citizens of Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine.

The visa-free regime is the success that people see and can project upon themselves, can obtain certain profits from. Some do it in the form of visa-less tourism and migration, without having to stand in consular lines, collect documents, and pay for consular services, without the uncertainty and wasting time.

However, people's expectations in many cases tied the visa-free regime to the freedom of legal stay and employment in EU countries. This kind of combination (visa-free regime and legal employment in the EU) was the

population's most common expectation of European integration (Moschna and Cork 2015: 128). This was characteristic of Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine likewise. People want to freely travel, to earn money abroad, to solve their financial problems. The money they earn during migration is a positive and tangible result. It makes life easier for both the individual person and the country as a whole; gives the ability for financial maneuvering, payment of salaries to the state employees, pensioners, and students.

The authorities of the Eastern Partnership countries that obtained the EU visa-free regime can clearly see that this is a kind of situation when one has to choose between two evils. Departure and employment of people abroad is an important way to "let off the steam from the pot" of increasing social tension within the country, to distract people from the issues of national state management. The result is an increase of population mobility.

The visa-free regime has widened the migration possibilities of these countries' populations. An increase of the migration flow between the EU and Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine is taking place. Thus, more than 500 thousand Moldovan citizens have travelled to the EU using biometric passports during the first year alone (April 2014 – April 2015). Likewise, during the four years of the visa-free regime's functioning, it was used by an enormous amount of people.

Table 2: Amount of Moldovan citizens entering the EU using biometric passports in 2014-2018

2014	2015	2016	2017	2018 (before 23.04)
303.511	811.162	1.239.284	1.535.937	449.479

Source: Sputnik 2018.

The mobility of Georgian citizens has increased in an analogous way. Thus, more than 160 thousand people, possessors of the biometric passport, have already made use of the visa-free regime during the first, incomplete year of its activity.

Table 3: Amount of Georgian citizens entering the EU using biometric passports in 2017

½ April 2017	½ May 2017	½ July 2017	½ October 2017	½ January 2018
7.000	...	55.000	161.885	165.059

Source: Geomigrant.com 2017a.

The same picture is seen in Ukraine. During the first month of the visa-free regime's activity between Ukraine and the European Union, 1 million, 875 thousand, 647 Ukrainian citizens have traveled to EU countries. Of them, 434.074 people have crossed the border using biometric passports with visas. At the same time, 95.461 Ukrainians have traveled to the European Union using biometric passports without a visa (RBC 2017a). Herewith, as it was already mentioned above, the increase of mobility of the Ukrainian population was also caused by a real possibility of employment in Poland. Ukraine found itself in the specific situation when the visa-free regime and permitted short-term labor migration united, having become the two sides of the process of Ukrainian citizens' migration into the EU. Poland has officially permitted temporary employment to Ukrainians who travel either within the visa-free regime or with a Schengen visa issued by another EU state. In total, in 2017, the Ukrainian State Statistics Service registered about 10 million Ukrainian "entries" into Poland, 4.3 million into Russia, and 3.1 million into Hungary (Knyazev 2018).

It is important to note that there is increasing value of these countries' national passports. Hanley and Partners - Kochenov, the creators of the Quality of Nationality Index (QNI) have analyzed and ranged by different indicators the world's 209 citizenships during the period between 2013 and 2017.

Russian has shown the best result among the CIS states. In the overall rating, it shared 63rd place with the Republic of Palau. Among the Eastern Partnership countries, the Republic of Moldova was in the lead, holding 73rd place. Ukraine took 80th place, and Georgia – 84th place. Georgia and Ukraine were the countries where the increased value of national citizenship over a year was the most significant. They ascended the rating by 20 and 19 positions accordingly. The main reason was them obtaining the visa-free regime with the Schengen-zone countries. The European Union's decision

to grant visa-free regime acted as a kind of guarantee / recommendation for its granting of the visa-free regime to third (non-EU) countries.

The other, less active Eastern Partnership countries found themselves on lower positions: Belarus – 92nd place, Armenia – 103rd place, and Azerbaijan – 110th place. The activation of their efforts in obtaining the visa-free regime (which is already happening) will lead to changes in the situation, and to the improvement of their ratings (prian.ru 2018).

By granting a visa-free regime, the EU influenced the increase of the significance of the national passports of the countries that obtained it, not only internationally, but within the country's' own borders as well. This is expressed through the fact that separatist regions' residents are striving to obtain the biometric passports of Moldova and Ukraine, in order to make use of the EU visa-free regime. This striving is supported by both the EU authorities, and the national governments. Thus, in Moldova, during the first year of the visa-free regime activity, about 27 thousand residents of the self-proclaimed Transnistria have applied for Moldovan biometric passports. Of more than 200 thousand possessors of Moldovan biometric passports in Transnistria, 77,000 are now being used to travel to the EU and back without visas. The Georgian government considers that the ability to freely cross the Schengen zone countries' borders will be a motivating factor for the residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to obtain Georgian biometric passports (geomigrant.com 2017b).

A somewhat different situation happened in Ukraine. In the self-proclaimed "Lugansk People's Republic" and "Donetsk People's Republic" there is an increase in the number of firms that offer to make a Ukrainian biometric passport for 100 dollars with a trip into the so-called Ukraine-controlled territory. In the last two years, in Crimea, there has been a noticeable hype around the Ukrainian biometric passport. According to the data of the Ukrainian state services, in 2015-2016, there have been issued 26140 biometric passports and 5304 biometric documents for children below the age of 16 (aoinform.com 2017).

Ukrainian authorities, fearing potential provocative actions coming from the Crimean authorities and the separatist Lugansk and Donetsk in regard to the visa-free regime, proposed to issue the residents of these regions with old type (non-biometric) passports. However, the European Commission rejected the approach that infringes the rights of Ukrainian citizens residing

in these regions, and demanded that they be issued new type (biometric) passports (lenta.ru 2017).

Furthermore, the authorities of Moldova and Ukraine assume that the national biometric passports will decrease their citizens' interest in obtaining other states' passports. Thus, no less than 700.000 Moldovan citizens possess the Romanian passport, and about 70 thousand possess the Bulgarian passport (Mosneaga 2017: 73). A less pressing situation is in Ukraine: more than 100 thousand Ukrainians possess the Hungarian passport, and 100-150 thousand – Romanian passport (cursorinfo.co.il 2018).

According to experts' estimations, there is a perceived decrease in the number of Moldovans who obtain passports of other countries (Romania, Bulgaria, etc.) with the purpose of entering the EU; and an increase in the number of Moldovan citizens who obtain Moldovan biometric passports and travel to EU countries. Moreover, 135 thousand have departed using the biometric passport, and 68 thousand have used it for the first time.

If in Moldova and Georgia there were no perceivable hype and lines to obtain biometric passports, then in Ukraine, this happened. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, in Moldova and Georgia, the process of issuing biometric passports began earlier, and there is a richer experience of population passportization. Secondly, these countries' populations are not as numerous as Ukraine's. And thirdly, the granting of the visa-free regime coincided with the period of summer vacation, in other words, the hype and lines to obtain biometric passports were tied to the combination of two factors – the hype of the visa-free regime, and the tourist hype. As noted by the Ukrainian Migration Service, the summer touring season yearly is the peaking period of passport registering (RBC 2017b).

There is laso development of migration transport infrastructure. This most clearly manifested in Ukraine, which is a big country with a numerous population. However, this is also happening in Moldova and in Georgia. These countries are becoming interesting to EU low-cost air-companies. There is the growing interest in bus transportation coming from national and international automobile transport companies. The visa-free regime contributes to the increase of the number of international routes between Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and the EU. Thus, during the course of one month, in the Kiev (Zhuliany) airport alone, there appeared 9 new routes to EU countries. Mobile communications companies have decreased the price

for their services for travelers to EU countries, etc. (RBC 2017c; RBC 2017d; RBC 2017e; Capital 2017; RBC 2017f).

12.3 Negative effects

The European Union introducing the visa-free regime with the Balkan countries, Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia has shown that the positive phenomenon of the visa-free regime that brings the populations of these countries new possibilities to realize their human right to freedom of mobility is accompanied by a number of negative consequences. Herewith, we should note from experience that the negative consequences are not immediately manifested once the visa-free regime is granted. By experts' estimations, such tendencies begin to come into effect or to manifest within a 5-6 month latency.

Among the negative consequences, we can note: an increase in the number of refugees and asylum seekers from these countries in the European Union; an increase in the number of citizens who are violating the EU visa-free regime in both the duration of their stay and in labor activity; immigration from other CIS and third countries who strive to get residence/ citizenship of Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine in order to profit from the visa-free regime and move further into the EU.

It is important to note that there is an increase in the number of citizens who are applying for asylum in the EU. The practice of the visa-free regime for the citizens of Western Balkan states (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina), and the Eastern Partnership states has shown that the lifting of the visa-free regime leads to a noticeable increase of the number of citizens who are attempting to obtain refugee status or asylum in the European Union (Malinovskaya 2017: 25-31). Herewith, the majority of asylum seekers are aware of the unfoundedness of their applications. They are conscious of the fact that they will not receive asylum as Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine[1] are considered safe countries. Most asylum seekers in the EU strive to solve their everyday problems, and not to avoid life-threatening situations or persecution based on political, religious, racial, gender, or sexual preferences. They, as

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[1] Today, Ukraine is dealing with an armed conflict in its eastern regions; there are numerous refugees, mainly to Russia, Belarus and the European Union. The EU's specific approach toward the refugees from Ukraine is that the only Ukrainians who are recognized as refugees are the ones who reside in the immediate conflict zone. Other regions, and the country as a whole are regarded as safe for human life and activity.

for example the interviewing of Moldovan asylum seekers in Germany has shown, aim to sit winter out in warmth without spending their finances, to get free medical aid from the EU member states' authorities, etc.

Among the main reasons for asylum seekers in the EU, we can list:

- **Refugees from Ukraine's eastern regions** where war rages. Asylum is also given to those who claim "escape" from Crimea or the Donetsk and Lugansk regions. Experts note that in Ukraine, for a sum of 2.5 thousand Euros, a person can make all the necessary documents.
- **Belonging to a sexual minority group**. People are attempting to receive asylum based on declarations that they are representatives of sexual minorities ("oppression of LGBT-minorities" in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova). This is the most popular "legend".
- **Political opinions** ("we are persecuted because of our political opinions").
- **Belonging to the Ukrainian Communist Party, that is banned in Ukraine.** This tactic is used primarily to emigrate to Spain and Italy (lenta.ru 2018).
- **Racial or ethnic reasons** (discrimination against people belonging to the gypsy/ Roma group).

Refugees from Ukraine: The armed conflict in the eastern regions of Ukraine (Lugansk and Donetsk) has lead to numerous refugees and internally displaced persons. According to the data of the UNHCR, in Ukraine there are more than 1 million internally displaced persons, and there are 300 thousand more Ukrainian refugees in the world. The majority of them stayed in Russia. A small part found asylum in Belarus, Moldova, and the EU countries.

In Russia and Belarus on the one hand, and in the Western countries on the other, the attitude toward Ukrainian citizens' requests for asylum is different. If in Russia and Belarus, more than 90% of all the Ukrainian requests are considered well-founded, than in Poland, the UK, France, Belgium and Finland, the percentage is less than 10%. In Canada, the USA, Germany, Italy and Czechia, this index is between 35% and 65%, but it is still lower than in Russia and Belarus. Applications from Ukrainian citizens have been given in a total of 67 countries; however the majority of them

came to Russia – 94%. In Germany, there were 2,700 applications, in Poland and Italy – 2,100 each, in France – 1.400 (UNHRC 2015).

The low index of positive decisions over the Ukrainian refugee applications is explained by the fact that their place of residence in Ukraine is taken into consideration. In regard to the residents of the eastern regions (Lugansk and Donetsk) where the armed conflict is taking place, the index of positive decisions is high. These people make up about a quarter of the total number of Ukrainian asylum seekers. The rest are residents of other Ukrainian regions that were not touched by war. Naturally, these people will not get a positive answer to their requests.

In the European Union countries the number of Moldovan citizens who are striving to obtain asylum is growing. Herewith, the main called reason for this is discrimination based on ethnicity or non-traditional sexual orientation. As statistics show, the overwhelming majority of people who are aiming to obtain refugee status are gypsies (Roma people). Seeing as how Moldova is regarded as a safe country, asylum is only granted in singular cases. Those who are denied asylum must return home. Practice shows that Moldovan citizens are violating this demand. Thus, they are creating problems for the EU's law-enforcement bodies.

Table 4: Data of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Moldova in regard to Moldovan asylum seekers in EU and Schengen-zone countries

Country	2016					2017 (9 months)				
	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
Austria	2	1	1	1		14	12	2	6	6
France				156	97				134	133
Switz.	13	7	6	3	5	20	14	6	2	2
Germany	1158	920	238	187	269	682	605	77	1045	631
Romania	1		1	5	5	2	2		1	1
Belgium	7	7		2	2	9	9			
Poland	1	1		2	1	9	6	3	3	3
Norway	2	2				3	3			
Hungary				10	9				1	1
Lithuania	1	1			1					
Sweden	5	5				15	14	1	1	1
Italy	4	4		1	1	1	1		1	1

Total	1194	948	246	367	390	755	666	89	1194	779

Note: 1 – Readmission applications submitted to the Moldova; 2 – Readmission applications accepted by the Moldova; 3 – Readmission applications refused by the Moldova; 4 – Information received on transfers (number of persons); 5 – Persons successfully transferred to the Moldova

At the most part, Germany is the one that has to deal with Moldovan asylum seekers in the EU. This is because Germany is a country that has a favorable social benefits system and high living standards, which attract refugees from all over the world, including Moldova.

Practice shows that Moldovan Roma are beginning to orient toward other EU countries. A diversification of countries is taking place, and one should be expecting an increased negative attitude toward Moldova and the visa-free regime granted to its citizens coming from other countries. Thus, if in 2016, there were 34 rejection cases for Moldovan citizens in the Netherlands, then in 2017 (over a period of 9 months) the number of such cases increased to 86.

There is also an increase in the number of EU asylum-seekers from Georgia. Their motivation is similar to that of Ukrainian and Moldovan citizens.

It is important to stress that there are also visa-free regime violators. The visa-free regime creates beneficial possibilities for the third country populations who received the EU visa-free regime to migrate into the European Union. At the same time, practice has shown that the visa-free regime contributes to the cheapening of trips (one doesn't need to pay for visas), removes the selection during visa issuing. This leads to the inclusion into migration of society's marginal and poor, who are using any means necessary to remain in the EU, even illegally. These processes are characteristic of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and, as practice shows, of the Republic of Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine.

According to research, in Georgia, there was a rather high index of rejected applications for the Schengen-visa – more than 12% in 2016 – before the visa-free regime came into effect. Naturally, these people did not disappear; instead, they began to realize their goals through "debt migration" in the conditions of the visa-free regime.

Table 5: Amount of Georgian migrants who have violated the visa-free regime with the EU (based on the Georgian MIA data)

Country	½ April 2017	½ May 2017	½ July 2017	½ October 2017	½ January 2018
Total migrants	7.000	...	55.000	161.885	165.059
Total violations	3	182	3.000	9.875	10.330

Source: EurAsia Daily (2018)

Practically, in the one year of the visa-free regime's activity, in Georgia there have been registered more than 10 thousand migrants. The share of regime-violators among the migrants that used the visa-free regime is of 6.25%. Experts are drawing the conclusion that their number is continuously growing.

By mid-October, 2017, the Treaty on the readmission of irregulars between the EU and Georgia affected 8,148 Georgian citizens. According to the data of the Georgian MIA, the readmission statistics continue growing. In 2011, readmission affected 548 Georgian citizens, in 2012 – 929 citizens, in 2013 – 1,080 citizens, in 2014 – 1,181 citizens, in 2015 – 1,265 citizens, in 2016 – 1,600 citizens, and in the first nine months of 2017 – 1,545 citizens. Within the readmission framework, Georgian citizens who've been illegally residing in the EU have been returned from 23 EU countries. The majority – about 3 thousand people – were brought back from Germany (geomigrant 2017c).

Similar tendencies can be seen in Moldova as well. In the conditions of the visa-free regime, the number of Moldovan citizens that were detained for illegal stay, for exceeding the legal term of stay (90 days), or for illegal labor activity in the EU is increasing.

Table 6: Amount of Moldovan irregulars discovered in EU countries and deported to their homeland (people)

2014	2015	2016	2017
400	1.800	3.000	5.000

According to the data of the border police of the Republic of Moldova, in the last four years since the introduction of the visa-free regime (28th of April, 2014), 1.469.917 people – possessors of Moldovan biometric passports – used the ability to travel to EU countries. Of them, 1,168,079 people or 79.5% returned. Comparing this to the 2017 index (three years of the visa-free regime), we can see that the number of people who are violating the visa-free principles of the EU is increasing, and therefore, are putting the EU visa-free regime for Moldova at risk. In three years, the amount of returnees was higher, and made up 86.4% (departed were 982,764 Moldovan citizens, returned were 849,591) (Sputnik 2018).

According to official FRONTEX data, since the moment of visa-regime liberalization with the EU (28th of April, 2014 and until 31st of December, 2017) entry into the EU was denied to about 14 thousand Moldovan citizens. The main reason – their inability to satisfy entry demands, lack of financial means, and previously exceeding the term to legal stay in EU member-states (Sputnik 2018).

The reasons for visa-free regime violations in Georgia's and in Moldova's cases are quite prosaic. People are aiming to use the visa-free regime not just, and not because they want to get acquainted with the life, culture, and population of the European Union, but to earn money, to engage in labor activity. Sociological research shows that a significant part of these countries' citizens are not aware that the EU visa-free regime does not grant the right to work in EU countries. Thus, in Moldova, polling (November, 2014) has shown that more than half of the respondents (54%) are aware that the visa-free regime does not grant legal possibility for employment. At the same time, every third respondent (34%) considers that it does (Moshniaga, Turcan and Byor 2015: 128).

The practice of the visa-free regime shows that there are different strategies to obtain income. On the one hand, there are many cases when people have used the visa-free regime to arrive to the EU but did not return home, and instead chose to illegal status of stay and labor activity. These are factual candidates for deportation should the EU countries' police discover them.

On the other hand, there are cases when people are striving to use the visa-free regime (trip to the EU) to find work and labor contracts. They return home, make all the necessary documents, and enter the EU as legal labor migrants.

At the same time, a new tendency has also revealed itself: the visa-free regime and illegal short term labor. The visa-free regime made changes to the forms of employment for the citizens of Eastern Partnership countries in the EU. The "shift method" is becoming more and more popular. Our research among Moldovan labor migrants in Germany, Italy, and Portugal, conducted in March-April, 2016 (Mosneaga 2017), has revealed that this is today's reality and is a relatively mass practice.

The "shift method" means that a person enters the EU legally using the visa-free regime, gets employed illegally, substitutes their relative / co-national who travels back to Moldova to rest, or to get treatment, and acts as a guarantee and advisor for the substitute's professional and personal qualities. The new employee works for 2-3 months (without violating the "90 day term of stay" principle), receives their money, and leaves the EU. The original employee returns and continues working at their employer. They have managed to solve their problems back home, and to maintain their workplace in the EU. The employer got quality and continuous work from the labor migrants. However, the country does not receive its tax for the "shift workers"; there is the issue of illegal employment, and a violation of the labor legislation.

The Ukrainian situation is somewhat different from that of the Moldovan or Georgian. Ukrainian migrants are aiming to use legal possibilities of employment that are provided by Poland (Golotyuk 2017), which strives to solve the issues on its own labor market that have appeared following the departure of its citizens for work in EU countries.

To obtain employment, Ukrainians do not need to register special permits – for up to six months per year, they can work via "declarations of intent to employ a foreigner" that are published by employers. In 2017, about 1.3 million such documents were published, of which 1.2 million concerned Ukrainian citizens. The declarations only grant temporary employment. In order to find a Ukrainian employee, the low and mid-level entrepreneurs publish 4-5 declarations per vacancy each (Avseyushkin and Lelich 2017). In Poland, there are 1-1.5 million Ukrainian labor migrants. In 2017, they transferred to Ukraine, according to the data of the National Bank of Ukraine, a sum of 3.1 billion dollars (1/3 of all monetary transfers) (Knyazev 2018).

In accordance to the new rules of seasonal employment of foreigners (1. 1. 2018), employers must inform the appropriate state bodies of all changes

when hiring citizens of Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Russia who are using the simplified procedure of access to the Polish labor market. The changes also provide that alongside the labor permits that are issued by the voievodal for a period of three years, there are also permits for seasonal employment that will be issued for a period of nine calendar months.

The new legislation also presumes the creation of a registry of foreigners' labor that will include information on classic labor permits, on seasonal labor permits, on declarations of intent to employ foreigners, as well as information provided by local administrations on personnel problems at local labor markets. A fee of 7-8 Euros is also to be introduced for registration of an employer's declaration of intent for foreign employment (Avseyushkin and Lelich 2017).

Important issue is also depopulation of the country of origin. It is known that migration in poor countries is accompanied by depopulative consequences. In the conditions when a poor country transits from lack of freedom to freedom (the visa-free regime is the freedom of people's mobility) and legal employment in a more economically developed country, there is a high probability of a depopulation explosion. This is the situation that Ukraine finds itself in today. There is poverty and war, the visa-free regime with the EU and legal employment in Poland. There is also the geographic and cultural proximity between Ukraine and the consumer-countries of Ukrainian labor migrants in the EU. All these factors put together stimulate labor migration and the depopulation of Ukraine. The visa-free regime by itself does not contribute to depopulation.

Naturally, Ukraine does not want a depopulation explosion and would like to confine itself to the "soft" variant of the depopulation processes, with a prospect of minimizing them. Alone, it cannot solve this issue, and the European Union must help it, this especially concerns Poland who is the main consumer of Ukrainian labor migrants.

12.4 Consolidation measures for the visa-free regime

The process of consolidation of the EU visa-free regime with Eastern Partnership countries is a two-way process that includes active actions on both ends. The European demanded that the authorities of the Eastern

Partnership countries that received the visa-free regime carry out activities of information and clarification among their citizens, to consolidate migration management within the countries in the conditions when separatist formations are present, to counteract illegal migration, and the use of documents of these countries for migration into the EU of citizens of other countries. On its end, the EU, its member-states strove to minimize the negative consequences, to help, and to provide an effective functionality of the visa-free regime.

To regulate the process of migration in the context of the EU visa-free regime with Ukraine, to decrease corruption and its influence on the process of population migration, the EU took specific measures. In particular, after Ukraine fulfilled the Plans for the liberalization of the visa-free regime in 2015, new demands concerning the counteraction of corruption in government institutions were introduced. Ukraine was supposed to improve its tax return system (this was done by September, 2016). It was supposed to create two new agencies aimed at intensifying the combating of corruption in Ukraine. The EU allocated 16 million Euros for the implementation / support of this. An introduction of information formularies for the Ukrainian population participating in visa-free travel was planned. Based on the use of USA experience, a goal was established to create the European database of travels, information, and control. This would have created more favorable conditions for monitoring the migration of Ukraine's population. Furthermore, visa-free regime suspension was not ruled out as a mechanism in case of necessity.

By granting Georgia the visa-free regime, EU countries took steps to streamline the migration processes and to develop the capabilities of documented migration of Georgian citizens in EU-space (geomigrant.com 2018). Germany offered help within the "Reintegration and Emigration Programme for Asylum-Seekers in Germany; Government Assisted Repatriation Programme" project for returning home those Georgian citizens who came to Germany before the visa-free regime was introduced, but failed to obtain asylum there. Program participants can independently choose the date of their return home, during the trip they would not be accompanied by representatives of official agencies, and medical aid would be provided to them if necessary. Georgian citizens can make use of this program up until February 28th, 2018. They will be granted additional

financial aid in the sum of 3000 Euros that they will be able to spend on the provision of housing conditions: paying for rent, construction or repair materials / services.

Greece has made changes to its Emigration Law (28ᵗʰ of March, 2017) that expand the possibilities for the legalization of citizens from "third countries"; the list of documents that would be required for persons illegally staying in Greece to obtain legal status has been supplemented (namely, marked were the "receipts for monetary transfers home during the last 7 years" and others). Georgia saw in this a positive aspect for the legalization of its citizens, illegal migrants, whose numbers in Greece, based on Georgian authorities' data, ranges between 150,000 and 220,000 people (geomigrant. com 2017d).

We should note that the Eastern Partnership countries conducted particular work with its citizens. The populations were informed via mass-media, primarily on national television, on the demands and principles of the EU visa-free regime. Border police representatives, upon citizens' entry into the EU would verify their motives and the presence of necessary documents and financial resources. Such activities proved to have certain positive influence on the behavior and motivation of citizens who were entering the EU. This is especially characteristic of the first months of the visa-free regime activity.

However, gradually, this process gained new features. Firstly, the government structures' activity of informing and verifying the population traveling in the visa-free regime framework has decreased. Activity decay is a standard practice, at least in post-soviet states.

Secondly, the activity of government structures coincided with the period when the visa-free regime comes to be used by two different migration flows – tourist and labor. Herewith, the first (tourist) flow initially oriented at returning home and respecting the visa-free regime's rules, dominates quantitatively, and experiences a sudden spike that is explained by the liberalization of the visa regime, the decrease of financial and temporary expenses, and of bureaucratic procedures necessary for the realization of tourist goals. The labor flow, on the other hand, oriented at illegal employment and the visa-free regime violation, grows slower, with a phase lag. Its growth happens in the conditions when border institutions are calming down.

Thirdly, the decrease of the origin-country's role happened, among other things, as result of the fact that its representatives and structures, who were active in the control process over the fulfillment of the visa-free regime's requirements, faced manifestations of visa-free regime violations by its citizens abroad; their deportation, and unpleasant EU information on irregular migrants and the increase of asylum seekers. They found themselves confused, at a loss of their professional identity; they could not see and did not know any real mechanisms to counteract these phenomena: – the violations happened outside of their countries' borders, in EU territory. How were they supposed to react?

The EU's experience of handling dialogue with Eastern Partnership countries has revealed several behavioral models in the countries that obtained the visa-free regime:

1. Attempting to shush and ignore the problem (the "ostrich behavior" model). This is manifested through hiding the increasing amounts of irregulars in, and deportations from the EU; an increasing number of asylum-seekers in EU countries; hiding the situation in national mass-media and the country's public opinion. This behavior model was, initially characteristic of all the countries that have obtained the EU visa-free regime.

2. Attempting to "talk down" the problem (the "change of conversation topic" model). Thus, Ukraine attempted to convince the European institutions that the irregulars and deportees were those who entered the EU based on a visa, and violated the visa-regime's rules. This does not concern those that used the visa-free regime for migration into EU countries. In other words, the Ukrainian "visa" migrants are bad, whereas the "visa-less" ones are good.

3. Collaboration with the European institution and search of real means of minimizing problems (the "dialog and collaboration" model). This route is, sooner or later, taken by all countries if they hear the EU's warning of withdrawing the visa-free regime. It is assumed that the current policies of Moldova and Georgia are oriented this way.

The growth of the number of fake refugees and visa-free regime violators and countries, have lead toward a backlash from the EU, which demanded that the counteraction of these negative processes be strengthened. On its

end, the EU began to harshen its policies in regard to these countries, and to demand the consolidation and toughening of their migration policies.

The EU countries are toughening their approach to the activity of the visa-free regime. The cancellation of the visa-free regime is tide not to the number (amount) of discovered irregulars or fake refugees, but to the percentage of their number compared to the previous year.

The Moldovan authorities, upon realizing the reality of the Germany's warnings regarding the cancellation of the visa-free regime, took real steps towards solving the problem of returning irregular migrants and fake refugees. They are actively collaborating on the level of Internal Affairs institutions. On August 15th, 2017, the Moldovan side offered to decrease the identification period for Moldovan irregulars from 11 work days (the EU standard) to 3 work days. The majority of irregulars Germany presented to Moldova for identification have confirmed Moldovan citizenship (the error is of up to 20%). Deported Moldovan citizens are accepted back home without any problems or objections. In cases when non-Moldovans are sent from Germany to Moldova, the decision of their return to Germany is taken promptly. The mechanism began working quite effectively in the conditions when there's an open collaboration between the sides. However, this agreement, while works de-fact, did not receive de-jure registration.

This likewise concerns the visa-regime violators from other countries. The authorities of the North Rhein-Westphalia and Baden-Wurttemberg, where there has been an increase in the number of readmissions and the criminogenic situation aggravated because of Georgian immigrants, have demanded that Georgia's visa-free regime be canceled. Deportation decisions are taken in an express fashion. Greek authorities do not grant entry to many Georgian citizens who are coming to Greece from Turkey by bus, and are sending them back right at the border (geomigrant.com 2018b, 2018f).

Concerned with the increase of the number of irregulars and asylum seekers in the EU, the European Parliament Committee on the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs supported the initiative in accordance to which the countries that have a visa-free regime with the EU will have to go through a "pre-authorization". Furthermore, this measure will come into effect in June 2020 (geomigrant.com 2018c).

The Georgian parliament is discussing a bill on the broadening of the reasons why citizens may be forbidden to cross the border. According to the bill, a Georgian citizen is in right to visit a European Union country if they have a biometric passport issued in the last ten years, if they have a return ticket, an active hotel booking, a passenger's insurances, and money on their bank account. If it will be established at the customs checkpoint that the citizen is headed toward a European Union country, they will have to provide the aforementioned documents in order to depart (Geomigrant 2018d).

Eastern Partnership countries are harshening the procedures for foreigners to obtain citizenship or residence permits in countries that were granted EU visa-free regime.

It is no secret that there exists the probability of foreigners obtaining Ukrainian citizenship en mass (Milenko 2017). The reasons for this are that the Ukrainian Law "On citizenship" provides such a possibility. According to the law, foreigners may claim Ukrainian citizens after continuous residence in the country over a period of five years (or two years if they are married to a Ukrainian citizen). Herewith, they are required to freely speak the national language and to have enough money to live in the country. In general, the procedure of obtaining citizenship takes up to a year. The accelerated procedure that lasts up to one month can only be used by those who have direct relatives in Ukraine. The Ukrainian legislation is quite liberal toward those who want to obtain Ukrainian citizenship if "one of the applicant's parents of grandparents resided in Ukraine before the collapse of the Soviet Union". In this case, the person does not need to prove even a minimal level of possession of the Ukrainian language. We should note that this has already been put into discussion, and it was proposed that the procedure be harshened. Undeniably, the EU has influenced this by demanding more control and order in the issue of citizenship granting.

Georgia is complicating the procedure for foreigners to obtain its citizenship. Currently, in order to become the citizen of the Republic, one must reside in the country for no less than five years. This term is proposed to be extended to seven years. Changes will also affect foreigners who marry Georgian citizens. If currently, the term to obtain Georgian citizenship by foreigner-spouses is of two years, than after the changes come into effect, the term may be extended to three years. Furthermore, the procedure of

granting foreigners the certificate of temporary residence is also to be changed. In accordance to the current rules, in order to obtain the permit for permanent residence, a foreigner must reside in Georgia for a period of six years. This is planned to be extended to ten years. The term for issuing a temporary residence permit is to be extended to twelve years. Today, the longest term is of six years. If a foreign citizen does not have any reason to permanently stay in Georgia, after six years have passed, they will be issued a temporary residence permit, instead of a permanent one (geomigrant.com 2018e).

In the Republic of Moldova, foreign citizens who started enterprises were given residence permits. But 78% of them did not actually work, and were only present "on paper". The reason for this can be found in the various blanks within the Moldovan legislation that allowed one to open a small enterprise if the enterprise's checking account had a sum of 200 Euros on it. Moldovan authorities began to introduce the Czech method, so that the results and income of the enterprise's activity could be seen and verified.

A consolidation of migration control on the administrative borders with the self-proclaimed separatist state formations is taking place. In this regard, the experience of Moldova and Ukraine is indicative. The consolidation of border control, the prevention/ minimization of illegal (irregular) migration is implemented in various ways. Firstly, management is carried out through joint Moldovan-Ukrainian border control. On March 11th, 1997, the governments of the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine signed a treaty on the organization of joint control on seven Moldovan-Ukrainian border-crossing checkpoints (the northern and southern regions). This treaty, however, did not include the eastern (Transnistrian) part of the border because the Ukrainian side did not allow the presence and activity in its territory of foreign border security agencies, namely of the Republic of Moldova. With the goal of overcoming this situation, the international EUBAM mission was created, and it managed to solve these issues to a certain degree.

Today, in the context of the transpiring international and internal changes in Ukraine and Moldova, the situation has undergone a positive evolution. In the fall of 2017, a Moldovan-Ukrainian treaty on the creation of joint border checkpoints along the Transnistrian part of the border has been signed. For this, in Ukrainian territory, it was decided to create 6-8 common border

checkpoints for control and accounting of migration mobility. On its side, the Republic of Moldova provided the representatives of Ukrainian border and customs services with the ability to operate on the joint checkpoints in Moldovan territory. This is already taking place on the northern part of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border (the "Criva" joint customs and border control checkpoint). Currently, it has been decided that a similar checkpoint should be opened on the southern part of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border ("Palanca").

Secondly, there's the organization of migration control within a country's own territory without implicating the border police officials. In 2005, the government of the Republic of Moldova decreed that within the country, there be created 14 customs checkpoints along the administrative border with Transnistria, in order to cut off the smuggling of goods and firearms from Transnistria (Vasiloi 2017). In 2014, the Bureau for Migration and Asylum of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Moldova opened 6 migration control checkpoints along the administrative border with Transnistria. The creation of these checkpoints was motivated by the necessity to increase control and counteract illegal migration into Moldova in the conditions of the visa-free regime with the European Union, and to regulate the migration flow that goes through Transnistria. The checkpoints were opened on the main transport highways, where the main passenger flow from Transnistria is going through. These checkpoints were created next to the border control checkpoints. The Bureau representatives are informing public transport (bus and maxi-taxi) passengers of the necessity of migration control and registration, in order to not be fined upon departure from the Republic of Moldova. Registration of foreign citizens is taking place strictly on a voluntary basis.

The introduction of this practice of migration control has led to the increase of registered foreigners coming in from Transnistria. If previously, their number was of about 8% (4-5 thousand people), than today, this number has been increased to more than 70% (83 thousand people). Accordingly, the number of foreign citizens who were fined for violating the principles of stay in the Republic of Moldova has decreased.

In Georgia amendments to the local laws are being prepared so that readmission expenses are paid for by the person who is being readmitted; the procedure of family-name change is being complicated; the collaboration

between the Georgian MIA and the EU in the field of combating organized crime is becoming active, and the activity of police attaché's in Georgian embassies abroad is intensifying. The Georgian diaspora is beginning to take a more active part in the process of informing Georgian migrants, this is especially true in France.

Cancellation of the EU visa-free regime with a country that was previously granted it is, arguably, too harsh a measure. The principle of collective responsibility is applied to the whole country because of individual perpetrators, which is unjust as thousands of law-abiding citizens that make no violations would suffer from it. The punishment must be just and pointed at those who are violating the rules of the visa-free regime. Responsibility must be individual, and – this is also important – not just administrative, but also financial. The punishment's financial component will be the really functioning instrument of sifting out those people who want to obtain that which they do not deserve through dishonest means, or those who are violating the laws and procedures of the accepting (EU-) country.

Those people who've violated the principles and procedures of the visa-free regime are eligible for deportation for a particular term (the 5-year term can be maintained) and will have to pay for services (the cost of being kept under guard, and for being fed by the state institutions responsible for the deportation procedure; the ticket price, etc.). The aforementioned services would have to be paid in full, if the person wishes to re-enter EU territory after the term of their deportation expires. Without paying, the person should be denied entry into the EU even after the deportation term expires. Similar measures should be taken in regard to asylum-seekers who've failed to prove their refugee status.

This information on deportees and failed refugees and asylum seekers, on their financial debts for the services provided should be given to the origin-country's border police. In other words, the origin country's border police will be able to find its professional identity, including in exercising control, information, and prohibiting functions. Additionally, this will serve to the establishment of collaboration and to the increase of trust between the origin and destination countries' border police agencies.

Both the illegal migrant, and the fake refugee who are attempting to obtain economic gain from their actions, have to understand that they themselves have little to gain, primarily financially and economically, from

their activity. Indeed, the effects of such measures for the EU countries will not be seen immediately, but it will definitely lead to the decrease of perpetrator flows into the EU.

It is assumed that one of the ways of minimizing the negative consequences of the visa-free regime could be the EU's introduction of free short-term labor visas. This mechanism should serve to increase both the civilization and regulation of short-term labor migration, and the level of trust between the EU and the Eastern Partnership countries. The introduction of such labor visas will allow the legalization of labor activity of those people who are violating this demand. These people will be included into the legal field, and will not act as perpetrators. And if they will be allowed into the legal field, they will play by its rules. The person whom society places outside the law will act accordingly – they will be violating the established rules and norms, they will behave a-socially and provocatively. This is proven by the fact that the overwhelming majority of the citizens who are using the EU visa-free regime are striving to depart the EU after the 3-month term expires. This EU demand for them is not only a legal, but also a moral norm.

Furthermore, the circular character of migration contributes to integration and attempts to return in the destination country to a lesser degree. This will contribute to the visa-free labor migrants' return home. Furthermore, they come into contact with the diaspora on a less than regular basis.

Conclusion

In conclusion it can be noted that the EU visa-free regime with the Eastern Partnership countries works despite all the aforementioned problems. The implementation of measures for the consolidation of the visa-free regime will not cancel illegal migration out. However, it will be possible to minimize these flows, so that the numbers of visa-free regime violators are reduced as much as possible.

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Conclusion

Migration is a prominent part of the post-2015 agenda for Europe. The migration crisis has exposed a number of already existing challenges in the European Union and amongst national European policies. Issues such as poverty, instability in home countries, natural disasters and violent conflicts will continue to drive people to seek safety. This means that within the European Union's vicinity, migration shall continue as people seek to better their livelihood.

Furthermore, a united response is increasingly sought as definitions of migration and asylum have become a large part of the narrative within European society. In doing so, misconceptions that would constrain reasonable policy can be dispelled. In recent years, there has been an anti-immigrant backlash as distortions have fueled extremist political parties and exacerbated mainstream politicians self-inflicted political wounds of disengagement of their voters to the reality of migration.

Presented monograph has made a small, but deliberate attempt to engage not only the academic and scholarly community, but the broader public on various aspects of migration.

In this endeavour the first part of the monograph explored the theoretical and practical challenges within the study of migration in Europe. The authors discussed specific themes such as the theory of migration, the push and pull factors of the new wave migration, protection of EU borders, the development of EU migration and asylum policy, the security dimension of migration, and how the migration crisis has affected the future of the European Union as a political and economic bloc; concluding with an exploration of migration within European society whether as integration, assimilation or multicultural.

The second part was regional specific. The authors have attempted to examine the responses by European member states since 2015 to the migration crisis, since the migration process has become an integral characteristic not only of the contemporary world, but an important and topical part of each member state's social policy.

As such, the Western responses of by Germany, France, Benelux, United Kingdom, and Ireland; the southern European responses from Italy, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Malta, Cyprus, and Croatia, to the Central and Eastern European Response by Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Austria, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania; the Northern Responses of Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania all were explained. Additionally, in the second part of this book was discussed the European Eastern Partnership countries and those in the visa-free regime with the EU, specifically Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine.

The second part of the book provided certain corrective to the national perspectives on migration. It seems that Western countries deals with the issue but faces limits and problems set by national capacities. Despite generous proclamations practical implementation of measures is often very different than theory. The issue of migration becomes political tool for pursuing its own national interests. On the other hand countries of Central and Eastern Europe showed very pragmatic and cautious approach to migration. Some of them were very narrow and communication full of criticism with lack of constructive approach turned against them. Especially V4 countries had image of countries lacking solidarity with others. Nevertheless, despite lower numbers migrants are still coming and position of Western EU countries is going slowly to meet position of the critics.

The EU in its history always made right choice to face crisis. Hopefully, migration crisis of 2015 and years following will contribute in long term to greater unity than fragmentation and undermining of the EU project which is greatly challenged. The immigration debate will never be an easy one, but it can become less tendentious and more deliberative. Better cooperation and dialogue must be the goal and this idea the reader should take as lessons from this book. The era of destroyed public trust in leaders, debased governments, damaged policy goals are possible, if not, in some cases already realized.

Nevertheless, demographic forces, globalization and environmental degradation, sectarian conflict, and wars mean that migration pressures across borders will likely increase in the coming decades.

As the subheading of the Introduction stated, Europe faces a time of choosing. Better cooperation and dialogue between the member states can and will occur. And policy intervention, if managed in a responsible way can protect the rights of migrants, draw the economic, social, and human benefits of migration while suppressing negative, reactive domestic elements of popular sovereignty; and at the same time respect and honor the traditions and values of European society.

Resumé

Migration is a prominent part of the post-2015 agenda for Europe. The migration crisis has exposed a number of already existing challenges in the European Union and amongst national European policies. Issues such as poverty, instability in home countries, natural disasters and violent conflicts will continue to drive people to seek safety. This means that within the European Union's vicinity, migration continues as people seek to better their livelihood. It is within this basic understanding that this book begins its study of migration and the migration challenges facing Europe.

In two distinct parts, the book explores the theoretical and practical challenges within the study of migration in Europe as well as regionally specific responses. This book discuss specific themes such as the theory of migration, the push and pull factors of the new wave migration, protection of EU borders, the development of EU migration and asylum policy, the security dimension of migration, and how the migration crisis has affected the future of the European Union as a political and economic bloc; concluding with an exploration of migration within European society whether as integration, assimilation or multicultural. The immigration debate will never be an easy one, but it can become less tendentious and more deliberative. In this effort, the book takes a look in its second part, to regionally specific responses by the European Union member states since 2015.

Europe
and the Migration Crisis:
The Response
of the EU Member States

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